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σῶμα κοινωνίαν τῆς ψυχῆς μεμψάμενος ἐν δ ε σ μ ῷ  τε εἶναι καὶ τεθάφθαι ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν 
ψυχὴν λέγει…. Καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι μεμψάμενος τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄφιξιν πρὸς σῶμα, ἐν 
Τιμαίῳ περὶ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς λέγων τόν τε κόσμον ἐπαινεῖ καὶ θ ε ὸ ν  λέγει εἶναι 


































































































































































































































































































               Limit                        The Unlimited 
























ἡ ἀσύντακτος πρὸς τὴν τριάδα, καθάπερ ἠξίωσεν ὁ μέγας Ἰ ά μ β λ ι χ ο ς  ἐν 
τῷ ΚΗῳ βιβλίῳ τῆς χ α λ δ α ϊ κ ῆ ς   τ ε λ ε ι ο τ ά τ η ς   θ ε ο λ ο γ ί α ς   ( D a m a s c .   i n  
P r m . , i n   R u e l l e ,   D u b .   e t   S o l .   I   p .   8 6 ) .   D i l l o n   ( 1 9 8 7 )   c i t e s   a n d    
t r a n s l a t e s .  
209 …εἶναι τοίνυν τὴν δυάδα τῶν ἀρχῶν προδιῃρημένην τῆς εἰρημένης δυάδος αἰτίαν, ὥσπερ 




























210 Καὶ γὰρ ἡ μία ἀρχὴ πρὸ τῶν δυεῖν∙ αὕτη μὲν οὖν τὸ ἁπλῶς ἕν, ὃ μέσον ὁ Ἰ ά μ β λ ι χ ο ς  
τίθεται τῶν δύο ἀρχῶν καὶ τῆς παντάπασιν ἀπορρήτου ἐκείνης, αἱ δὲ δύο, π έ ρ α ς  φέρε καὶ 





































































































219 Shaw (1995) trans. κατὰ δέ τι σημαινόμενον καὶ ὕ λ η ν  αὐτὴν καλοῦσι καὶ π α ν δ ο χ έ α  
γε, ὡς παρεκτικὴν οὖσαν καὶ δυάδος τῆς κυρίως ὕλης καὶ πάντων χ ω ρ η τ ι κ ὴ ν  λόγων (TA 
5,12‑15). 
220 Shaw (1995) 33. 
221 DM 265.6‑10.  Cf. Shaw (1995) 33. 
98 
Because of the balanced, mathematical precision underlying such a cosmology, it 
is impossible for Iamblichus to concede that matter is evil.  He makes the point  
repeatedly throughout On General Mathematical Science.  The material principle cannot be 
“evil or ugly,”222 especially since as “receptacle” of the One, such qualities would tarnish 
the One by implication.223  If evil intrudes, it does so only negatively, at lower levels of 
being – well below the levels of mathematical and geometrical perfection – as 
Iamblichus spells out explicitly: “But in the last things, in the fourth and fifth levels, 
which are composed from the last elements, evil appears, not as a guiding principle, but 
from something falling out and not maintaining the natural order.”224  Evil is thus not 
characteristic of the natural order (φύσις) but is rather an aberration from proper being 
at the natural order’s level.   
Such a Pythagorean vision is consistent with the monist vision set forth by Plato 
in the Laws and the Timaeus.  Shaw suggests some of the evident parallels, including his 
argument that the material principles of both Moderatus (posotes) Iamblichus (hule / 
hulotes) are “functionally the equivalents of the material principle in the Timaeus, which 
was able to receive the Forms without distortion because it lacked all formal qualities 
(Tim. 49b).”225  Along the same lines – again suggesting this common Pythagorean‑
Platonist cosmology – the dyadic principles of “unity” and “multiplicity” evident in 
Iamblichus’ thought effectively shadow the outlook of the Timaeus.  In On General 
Mathematical Science, “unity and multiplicity” are combined by “persuasive necessity”226 
– language that echoes Plato in the Timaeus, in which “persuasive necessity” combines 
                                                       
222 κακὸν δὲ ἢ αἰσχρὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐ προσῆκον ἴσως ἐστὶ τιθέναι (DCMS 15.23‑34). Cf. 16.1‑2. 
223 πῶς οὐκ ἄλογον ἂν εἴη λέγειν τὸ κακὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσχρὸν δεκτικὸν κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ τοιούτου 
πράγματος εἶναι; (DCMS 16.4‑6). 
224 ἐπ’ ἐσχάτῳ δὲ ἐν τοῖς τετάρτοις καὶ πέμπτοις τοῖς συντιθεμένοις ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν 
τελευταίων κακίαν γενέσθαι οὐ προηγουμένως, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐκπίπτειν καὶ μὴ κατακρατεῖν τινα 
τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν (DCMS 18.1‑13). 
225 30. 
226 …οῦ τε ἑνὸς καὶ τῆς τοῦ πλήθους ἀρχῆς, τὸ πρῶτον γένος, ἀριθμῶν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων 
μετά τινος πιθανῆς ἀνάγκης συντιθεμένων (DCMS 15.17). 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“same” and “different.”227  In each case, the “harmonia” of these opposed principles 
functions as “the framework for the manifest world.”228   
It follows that from whatsoever angle we view the matter, Iamblichus appears to 
embrace a monist vision of reality.  Whether we focus on his sympathy to a Platonic 
vision of the cosmos in which religion properly ordered and paideia rightly supplied give 
shape to a human polis synchronized with the divine, or on his insistently 
Neopythagorean view of sensible matter as derived from the Monad, formed by 
mathematical ratios and therefore basically good, we plainly must conclude that 
Iamblichus thought is a conscious departure from much of the dualism that 
characterizes the Platonism of his age.   In his schema, it is not the material world – an 
emanation from the One – that is distorted or evil, but rather the soul that suffers 
inversion and distortion in embodiment.  What remains for immediate explanation is 
just how matter so conceived can still be regarded, paradoxically, as both hindrance and 
help, that is, how it may function in the Iamblichean scheme as both the site of a jarring 
psychic disorientation and the necessary means of the soul’s healing.  From an 
understanding of this important Iamblichean resolution of a classic Platonic problem, we 
shall then move to a more minute consideration of the Iamblichean symbolon, a ritual 
concept in clear, almost necessary continuity with the theoretical monism already 
                                                       
227 Plato actually here writes of force rather than persuasion, though the point is perhaps the same, 
namely that opposed principles whose combination makes possible a world of material 
differentiation.  Although the formulation is not so openly quantitative as  Iamblichus’ emphasis 
on the Dyad, it is similar in its attempt to account for the passage from unity to multiplicity.  The 
context is Plato’s discussion of the formation of the soul itself, which occupies a bridge position 
between the unity of the World Soul and the multiplicity of material embodiment.  Plato captures 
its liminal position by asserting the fusion of “being which is indivisible and always the same” 
(τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας) with “being which is transient and 
divisible in bodies” (τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς) – elements termed “Same” 
and “Other.”  He posits a “third form of being” (τρίτον οὐσίας εἶδος) that is composed from 
these two, and which serves as a conceptual bridge allowing the forced “blending” of all three: 
“And He took the three of them, and blent them all together into one form, by forcing the other 
into union with the Same, in spite of its being naturally difficult to mix. (καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὐτὰ 
ὄντα συνεκεράσατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμεικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταὐτὸν 
συναρμόττων βίᾳ)” Ti. 35a. 
228 Shaw (1995) 33. 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discussed, and an idea with which Christian thought on eucharist would find 
considerable affinity. 
 
5. Matter as Obstacle, Matter as Instrument: Daemons and Demiurgic Souls 
 
  Even when Iamblichus’ metaphysics are shown clearly to be fundamentally 
monist, we must still explain the paradoxical language employed in De Mysteriis 
concerning the nature of material reality.   That is to say, it must be shown how 
Iamblichus resolves the latent Platonic tensions between positive and negative views of 
matter.  At times Iamblichus seems to adopt a univocally negative view of matter, the 
perspective of the Phaedo: matter as a shell that limits the soul’s noetic capacities.  Very 
often Iamblichus discusses material embodiment and the “influences emanating from 
matter”229 precisely in terms of “pollution”: 
And so pollution emanating from material things may 
communicate itself to entities which are confined in a material 
body, and to be purified from such influences is necessary for 
such things as can be polluted by matter.230 
 
Under discussion here are the important distinctions to be made between higher beings 
and lower, and Iamblichus sees fit to comment on the necessary “purification” of the 
lower almost gratuitously.  Later, in his discussion of the effects burnt offering, he seems 
to argue from similar premises, assuming that the “essences” involved in burnt offering 
must be separated from matter by purging fire before they can effectively interact with 
daemons.  Just as thunderbolts in nature separate matter from “those elements which are 
immaterial in their essence,”231 – elements otherwise “overcome by [matter] and 
imprisoned in it”232 – just so the fire of sacrifice  
                                                       
229 τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης πάθη (DM 204. 7). 
230 Καὶ ὁ μολυσμὸς οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνύλων συμπίπτει τοῖς ἀπὸ σώματος ὑλικοῦ κατεχομένοις, 
καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τούτων ἀποκαθαίρεσθαι ἀναγκαῖον ἐκείνοις ὅσα δύναται ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης 
μιαίνεσθαι∙ (DM 204.3‑6). 
231 τὰ ἄυλα μὲν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν (DM 215.12). 
232 κρατούμενα δὲ ἀπ’ αὐτῆς καὶ πεπεδημένα (DM 215.12‑13). 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destroys all that is material in the sacrifices, purifies the offerings 
with fire and frees them from the bonds of matter, and renders 
them suitable, through the purification of their nature, for 
consorting with the gods….233 
 
In like manner this same fire “liberates us from the bonds of generation and makes us 
like to the gods, and renders us worthy to enjoy their friendship, and turns round our 
material nature towards the immaterial.”234  Exactly how the consuming fire works with 
equal effect on the sacrificial victim and the sacrificing agent is left somewhat unclear, 
but the language nevertheless effectively illustrates Iamblichus’ intended point.  Both in 
sacrifices and in the sacrificing agent, all that is material is represented as a “bondage” 
from which inner essences must be liberated, a perspective which initially appears 
narrowly dualist. 
  A key to the deeper complexity of the thought here may possibly be found in the 
language of “turning” found toward the end of the passage, where Iamblichus argues 
that the effects of the fire “turns” (περιάγει) our material nature toward the non‑
material.  Such language suggests a process of re‑orientation rather than some simple 
liberating rupture.  Other passages, too, give a  sense of how some kind of process may 
be involved, a process contingent on the degree of investment or absorption in the 
particularities of material nature on the part of individual embodied souls.  In arguing 
for the freedom of the world soul from the ill effects of matter – namely, passions and 
other hindrances to intellection – Iamblichus argues that individual souls are indeed 
enchained, but that the perception that higher souls – such as the world soul – ought 
therefore to be similarly limited, arises from a failure to grasp the superiority of wholes 
to parts.235  Iamblichus does not spell out here what the remedy for any individual soul 
                                                       
233 ἀναιρεῖ τὸ ὑλικὸν πᾶν ἐν ταῖς θυσίαις, τά τε προσαγόμενα τῷ πυρὶ καθαίρει καὶ ἀπολύει 
τῶν ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ δεσμῶν, ἐπιτήδειά τε διὰ καθαρότητα φύσεως πρὸς τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἐπιτήδειά τε 
διὰ καθαρότητα φύσεως πρὸς τὴν τῶν θεῶν κοινωνίαν ἀπεργάζεται (DM 215.14‑216.3). 
234 ἡμᾶς διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων ἀπολύει τῶν τῆς γενέσεως δεσμῶν καὶ ἀφομοιοῖ τοῖς θεοῖς, 
πρός τε τὴν φιλίαν αὐτῶν ἐπιτηδείους ἐργάζεται, καὶ περιάγει τὴν ἔνυλον ἡμῖν φύσιν ἐπὶ 
τὴν ἄυλον (DM 216.3‑6). 
235 ἡ τῶν ὅλων ὑπεροχὴ πρὸς τὰ μέρη (DM 200).  A frequent trope in Iamblichus, and a key 
element in his theodicy.  Cf. Shaw (1995) 39‑40; 54‑55; 63‑66. 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might be, trapped in its particular body and beset by its particular impressions and 
obstacles, but the prospect that remedy might be available though a re‑orientation of the 
soul toward wholeness is at least left open. 
  Iamblichus’ commitment to theurgy turns at least in part on this awareness that 
embodiment causes problems in particular cases, but that the soul may be turned 
toward a more productive engagement with the material realm.  Indeed, it is axiomatic 
to his religious system that no one –  not even the most accomplished philosopher – is 
exempted from this requirement for this more productive engagement.  This 
understanding is what gives Iamblichus’ arguments their demotic flavor: if every soul is 
embodied, and if religious cult that is engaged with materiality affords the opportunity 
to begin the process of psychic re‑orientation, then arguments against religious cult 
advanced by the likes of Porphyry succeed only in shutting out both the class of 
philosophers and spiritual adepts and the great mass of humanity from any possibility of 
ascent.  In a vigorous reply to Porphyry’s basic position, Iamblichus famously counters 
that such views entail too sharp a separation of divinity from the world, rendering the 
world a place of barrenness in which no initial avenues of ascent may be found: 
This doctrine constitutes the ruination of sacred ritual and 
theurgical communion of gods with men, by banishing the 
presence of the higher classes of being outside the confines of the 
earth.  For it amounts to nothing else but saying that the divine is 
set apart from the earthly realm, and that it does not mingle with 
humanity, and that this realm is bereft of divinity; and it follows, 
according to this reasoning, that not even we priests would have 
learned anything from the gods, and that you are wrong to 
interrogate us as if we had some special degree of knowledge, if in 
fact we differ in no way from other mortals.236   
 
Thus, even given the apparent dualism of passages such as those noted above, in which 
matter is an imprisoning shell that must be burned away, we must also consider how 
Iamblichus’ insistence on materially grounded, universal religious cult is rooted in an 
                                                       
236 DM 28.6‑10.  See Brown (1978) 101.  Iamblichus is elsewhere quite explicit in his aims: “The 
purpose of the present discourse is not to provide precepts for such [a theurgically advanced] 
man (for he is superior to all legislation), but to provide a set of rules (νομοθεσίαν) for those who 
need regulation.” 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awareness that all souls experience embodiment, and that all souls must be afforded 
occasion to have their orientation toward matter and embodied experience repaired in 
the direction of wholeness.   
In the course of the long and fascinating discussion of sacrifice in book five of De 
Mysteriis, while granting the possibility that we may become “wholly soul” (ὃλοι ψυχή) 
and that we may be “raised up in intellect” (μετέωροι … τῷ νῷ) – a state in which we 
“traverse the heights in the company of all the immaterial gods”237 – Iamblichus 
nonetheless insists that such a state is not attainable by most men, who are generally 
“confined in a hard‑shelled body,” and corporeal (σωματοειδεῖς).238  “Highly purified 
men” (ἀποκεκαθάρμενοι ἄνθρωποι)239 are extremely rare; one might expect to meet 
with one, or at best very few.  Nevertheless – despite the rarity of such exalted spiritual 
attainment – Iamblichus is willing to prescribe a “double mode of worship” (ὁ διπλοῦς 
τρόπος): one form, “simple (ἁπλοῦς) and immaterial (ἀσώματος) and purified (ἁγνός) 
from all generation” for the “unpolluted souls (ἀχράντοις … ψυχαῖς); another, “filled 
with bodies and every sort of material business (ἐνύλου πάσης πραγματείας)” for the 
rest, those who are neither “pure” (μὴ καθαραῖς) nor free from generation.240  
Iamblichus sees this, in fact, as an imperative.  In his view, to fail to see the need for such 
an approach would effectively strip the world of meaningful religion, leaving men 
separated from their gods.  Most people are deeply immured in reality’s material 
manifestation; they can little aspire to spiritual elitism of the rare kind.  As such, without 
material cult, they are cut off completely from the gods at every level.241  
Thus religious practice informed by theurgic principles can be understood to 
offer a path of ascent to all willing participants; but it is important to emphasize that – 
although a “double mode” of worship may be prescribed – Iamblichus sees every soul as 
in need of proper theurgic engagement with materiality, despite the concessions to 
                                                       
237 μεθ̉ ὃλων τῶν ἀύλων θεῶν μετεωροπολοῦμεν (DM 219.2‑4). 
238 DM 219.5. 
239 DM 219.10‑11.  One of Iamblichus’ frequent references to Heraclitus. 
240 DM 219.6‑10. 
241 DM 220. 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philosophical elite that as are occasionally evident.  Ultimately, even the higher grade of 
theurgist is not exempt from participation in material rites.  A theurgist of reasonable 
attainment might choose to exempt himself from more debased material worship, but 
material cult is still somehow necessary as “a basis for the more noble type – for without 
these the superior type could not be attained to….”242  For Iamblichus, the materially‑
grounded forms of cult remain always fundamentally necessary even for philosophical 
and religious over‑achievers. The goals of his discipline are conventional – being “united 
to the gods” and “[ascending] to the One” – but he will not split reality to accommodate 
the claims of an anti‑materialist philosophical elite, to the exclusion of a more universal 
account of the soul’s predicament. 
It is essential to note also that such claims are consistent with Iamblichus’ 
theoretical monism, his insistence on the continuity of all reality, and the derivative 
conviction that the manifest world is in some basic sense  therefore good – insofar as it is 
an emanation of the One and a manifestation of pure mathematical ratios.  But such 
claims also imply that the dispositions of some souls toward material reality can excel 
the dispositions of others.  If one soul experiences matter as an evil, such an experience 
must be viewed in terms of that particular soul’s condition, rather than in terms of 
matter interpreted as unqualified evil.  Thus matter’s evil is relative to the condition of 
any given soul, where relativity is measured in terms of the particular soul’s orientation 
toward transcendent wholeness over diffuse material differentiation.  Before 
understanding how a cultic engagement with material reality can paradoxically heal 
souls that are bound by matter, we must first examine how souls first become bound.  
For Iamblichus, this has to do with the role of the daemonic in cosmogony.   He describes 
the order (taxis) of the daemons as follows: 
It is not a primary initiator of action, but submits itself to the 
service of the good will of the gods it follows, revealing in action 
their invisible goodness, while likening itself to it, producing 
creations which are in its image, giving expression to the ineffable 
                                                       
242 ὡς ὑπόθεσιν … τῶν τιμιωτέρων ‑‑ ἄνευ γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐκ ἂν ποτε παρεγένοιτο τὰ 
ὑπερέχοντα (DM 225.7‑8). 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and causing the formless to shine forth in forms, bringing out onto 
the level of manifest discourse that which is superior to all 
reasoning, and receiving already that degree of participation in 
beauty which is innate to them, while providing and conveying it 
unstintingly to the classes of being that come after it.243 
 
The daemons are thus agents that mediate that transit of form into matter.  They are 
indispensable inasmuch as they produce creations – specifically described here as 
demiurgic products (δημιουργήματα) – that conform (ἀφομοιούμενα) to the otherwise 
unseen good (τὸ ἀφανὲς … ἀγαθόν) of the gods.  Hence formless (τὸ ἀνείδεον) 
receptacle of nature is invested with forms, and what transcends logos (τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντα 
λόγον) is given expression in “manifest discourse [logoi]” (εἰς λόγους φανεροὺς). 
Plainly the daemons perform the work of the Demiurge, here conceived in terms of 
supplying logos to an otherwise neutral, formless natural receptacle.   
  One aspect of this basic role is their function as agents that bind souls to bodies.  
Their nature is “fit for finishing and completing encosmic natures, and it exercises 
oversight on each thing coming into existence.”  More specifically, “One must assign to 
daemons productive powers that oversee nature and the bond uniting souls to bodies.”244  
Thus the same agents responsible for introducing form into matter are also tasked with 
drawing souls downward into their embodied experience.  Here we can begin to see a 
bit of the ambivalence surrounding the daemonic in Iamblichus’ system.  On the one 
hand, they perform an essential – and fundamentally good – demiurgic role; on the 
                                                       
243 οὐ πρωτουργὸν οὖσαν, ὑπηρετικὴν δέ τινα τῆς ἀγαθῆς βουλήσεως τῶν θεῶν 
συνεπομένην, καὶ ἐκφαίνουσαν εἰς ἔργον τὸ ἀφανὲς αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν, ἀπεικαζομένην τε πρὸς 
αὐτό, καὶ τὰ δημιουργήματα ἐπιτελοῦσαν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀφομοιούμενα, τό τε γὰρ ἄρρητον 
αὐτοῦ ῥητὸν καὶ τὸ ἀνείδεον ἐν εἴδεσι διαλάμπουσαν, καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντα λόγον αὐτοῦ εἰς 
λόγους φανεροὺς προσάγουσαν, καὶ δεχομένην μὲν ἤδη τῶν καλῶν τὴν μετουσίαν 
συμπεφυκυῖαν, παρέχουσαν δ’ αὐτὴν ἀφθόνως τοῖς μεθ’ ἑαυτὴν γένεσι καὶ 
διαπορθμεύουσαν. (DM 16.11‑17.5). 
244 ἀπεργαστικὴν μὲν εἶναι τὴν τῶν δαιμόνων καὶ τελεσιουργὸν τῶν περικοσμίων φύσεων 
καὶ ἀποπληρωτικὴν τῆς καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν γιγνομένων ἐπιστασίας … Δυνάμεις τε τοῖς μὲν 
δαίμοσι γονίμους, ἐπιστατικάς τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τοῦ συνδέσμου τῶν ψυχῶν εἰς τὰ σώματα 
ἀφοριστέον (DM 67.9‑11; 67.12‑68.1).  Cf. Shaw (1995) 40, for an economical handling of these 
passages. 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other hand, they draw souls downward into the disorienting experience of embodiment.  
The problem to be resolved in theurgy is how the descended soul may be re‑oriented. 
First, though, it is worth noting that this Iamblichean ambivalence toward the 
daemonic and the materiality that it governs has deep roots in other Platonizing religious 
tradition.  That is to say, Iamblichus as a religious theorist does not present the first case 
of paradox in characterizing human interaction with the material and the demonic.  
Friedrich Cremer and Hans Lewy have demonstrated how similar is Iamblichus’ 
thought on the nature of the daemonic and materiality to the cosmology implicit in the 
Chaldean Oracles, fragmentary texts whose assimilation into a coherent corpus can be 
only controversially dated.  The parallels are evident primarily in connection with an 
apparently dualist attitude that, as in the case of Iamblichus, turns out to be more of a 
qualified monism.  In placing the Chaldean texts alongside Iamblichus’ thought we can 
perceive how the latter’s ambivalence toward matter, and his corresponding 
ambivalence toward the daemons who are closely linked to matter, stand in interesting 
parallel to a “Chaldean” tradition of framing material reality and the daemons governing 
it as both obstacle and, paradoxically, ritual instrument.  As in the case of Iamblichus, 
the Oracles offer a relative view of materiality, where the degree of matter’s “goodness” 
is contingent entirely on the disposition of the soul encountering it, such that from the 
perspective of both texts, matter is seen to thwart and mediate the soul’s re‑orientation.  
The tradition of the Oracles captures this duality with its implicit theory that the quality 
of any given soul’s embodiment can be seen as an index of the condition of the soul itself; 
i.e., the measure of the soul’s adaptation to matter signifies the degree of its re‑
orientation to the cosmos.   
In a critical passage of De Mysteriis,245 (as he attempts to distinguish theurgy from 
divination), Iamblichus specifically invokes “Chaldean prophets.”246  According to these 
authorities, beings that are “gods in the true sense” associate with good men in cultic 
contexts, “and they remove from them every vice and passion.”  When such gods “shine 
                                                       
245 DM 175.12‑180.4. 
246 DM 176.2. 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forth,” they cause “that which is evil and daemonic” to scatter, such that the practicing 
theurgist is purified, “freed from passions, and from every unruly impulse.”  On the 
other hand, “as many as are themselves guilty of crime … owing to the debility of their 
proper activity or the deficiency of their inherent power” fail to obtain contact with such 
gods, attaching themselves rather to “evil spirits” and becoming “akin to the wicked 
daemons to whom they have become attached.”247  Under such circumstances, “impious 
blunders of wickedness … are introduced in a disorderly manner into the sacred 
works….”  Those who so consort with daemons “who are deceitful and causes of 
licentiousness are obviously in conflict with the theurgists,” whereas for theurgists 
themselves there is “a pure participation in … goods” as they “are filled from above 
with the fire of truth.”248   
The Chaldean Oracles share this ambivalent view toward matter and the daemonic.  
Fiercely dualist at first glance, only upon closer examination do the Oracles disclose  a 
view of matter as an indicator of the soul’s condition, rather than as a straightforward 
hindrance.  Initially, Chaldean theology seems to regard matter univocally as a “worker 
of evil.”249  Elsewhere the body is “the root of evil,” and “the descent to earth is the 
severing of ourselves … where both jealously and envy must be rejected  … for being 
material, they have matter as a nurse.”250  Often the texts intone admonitions, such as, 
Do not hasten to the light‑hating world, boisterous of matter, 
where there is murder, discord, foul odors, squalid illnesses, 
corruptions, and fluctuating works.  He who intends to love the 
Intellect of the Father must flee these things.251 
 
                                                       
247 DM 176.3‑177.5. 
248 DM 177.10‑178.9. 
249 τὴν ὕλην εἰσάγουσιν ὡς κακίας ἐργάτιν (Psellus, Opusc. logica, physica, allegorica, alia 3.136‑7). 
250 Ῥίζα τῆς κακίας τὸ σῶμα … τὸ δὲ καταβαλεῖν εἰς γῆν, τὸ ἀφ’ ἡμῶν ἐκκόψαι … εἰς ἣν καὶ 
ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον καταβλητέον … ὑλικὰ γὰρ ὄντα 
τὴν ὕλην ἔχει τιθήνην (Proclus, Eclogae de philosophia chaldaica,  in Des Places (1971), p. 208, 
Majercik trans.). 
251 Μηδ’ ἐπὶ μισοφαῆ κόσμον σπεύδειν λάβρον ὕλης, 
ἔνθα φόνος στάσιές τε καὶ ἀργαλέων φύσις ἀτμῶν 
αὐχμηραί τε νόσοι καὶ σήψιες ἔργα τε ῥευστά∙ 
ταῦτα χρεὼ φεύγειν τὸν ἐρᾶν μέλλοντα πατρὸς νοῦ. (134 Des Places, Majercik trans.). 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Elsewhere, in a doubtful fragment, we are similarly advised, 
Flee swiftly from earthly passions, flee far away, you who possess 
the superior eye of the soul and the steadfast rays, so that the 
great, heavy reins of the body might be held in check by a pure 
soul and the ethereal radiance of the Father.252 
 
Given such a grim view of material reality, it is perhaps no surprise to find it haunted by 
daemons with whom it is dangerous to consort.  The oracle advises: “For you must not 
gaze at them until you have your body initiated.  Being terrestrial, these ill‑tempered 
dogs are shameless.”  As such, “they enchant soul, forever turning them away from the 
rites.”253  The imagination behind the Oracles delights in canine metaphor, as we see 
elsewhere: “From the hollows of the earth leap chthonian dogs, who never show a true 
sign to a mortal.”254  These dogs are expressly linked to matter and are furthermore 
defined as its offspring: “[Nature] persuades us to believe that the demons are pure, and 
that the offspring of evil matter are good and useful.”255 
  As severe as such a view might seem, we would be wrong to conclude that the 
worldview embraced by the Oracles is strictly dualist.  As Hans Lewy’s study shows, the 
Oracles actually offer a more nuanced view of matter, suggesting that it might be an 
indicator of a soul’s standing rather than a mere impediment to its ascent, a point which 
is made particularly clear in their deployment of the figure of Hecate as a mythologized 
Platonic World Soul, with special emphasis on the function of the World Soul in forming 
and presiding over material, embodied nature.  In the world of the Chaldean Oracles, as 
                                                       
252 Φεῦγε τάχος χθονίων παθέων ἄπο, τηλόσε φεῦγε, 
ψυχῆς ὄμμα φέριστον ἔχων καὶ ἀκλινέας αὐγάς, 
σώματος ὡς ἀνέχοιτο μέγα βρίθοντα χαλινὰ 
ἐκ καθαρῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ αἰθερίης πατρὸς αἴγλης (213 Des Places, Majercik trans.). 
253 Οὐ γὰρ χρὴ κείνους σε βλέπειν πρὶν σῶμα τελεσθῇς∙ 
ὄντες γὰρ χθόνιοι χαλεποὶ κύνες εἰσὶν ἀναιδεῖς 
καὶ ψυχὰς θέλγοντες ἀεὶ τελετῶν ἀπάγουσιν (135 Des Places, Majercik trans.). 
254 … ἐκ δ’ ἄρα κόλπων 
γαίης θρῴσκουσιν χθόνιοι κύνες οὔποτ’ ἀληθὲς 
σῆμα βροτῷ δεικνύντες (90 Des Places, Majercik trans.  Psellus, PG, 122, 1140 b 12 – c 2, explains 
that “the oracle is about demons involved in matter.”). 
255 [ἡ φύσις] πείθει πιστεύειν εἶναι τοὺς δαίμονας ἁγνούς, 
καὶ τὰ κακῆς ὕλης βλαστήματα χρηστὰ καὶ ἐσθλά (88 Des Places, Majercik trans.). 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Lewy has shown, Hecate is conceived as a personification of the World Soul.  As “she 
who has mouths, faces, visages on every side,” she mirrors the function and the double 
orientation of the World Soul, who occupies the boundary between the noetic and 
material realms, and who may therefore be viewed as oriented both “toward the 
intelligible world, from the Intellect of which she is ‘illuminated,’ and toward the 
sensible world, to which she transmits her ‘light.’”256  As Lewy suggests, the most careful 
explanation of this dual orientation of the World Soul is offered by Plotinus: 
And the offspring of Intellect is a rational form and an existing 
being, that which thinks discursively; it is this which moves round 
Intellect and is light and trace of Intellect and dependent on it, 
united to it on one side an so filled with it and enjoying it and 
sharing in it and thinking, but, on the other side, in touch with the 
things which came after it, or rather itself generating what must 
necessarily be worse than soul.257 
 
Thus the soul mediates between the higher Nous above and the generated world below.  
That the Chaldean texts refer to Hecate as Physis and Ananke suggests their kinship to 
earlier Platonist thought, where the World Soul is often termed physis because of its 
function in governing in the cosmic body.  Plotinus neatly divides the World Soul, 
retaining its upper portion on high while placing its lower portion within the sensible 
world to which it mediates form.  This lower half of the World Soul Plotinus terms 
physis.258  So far, the Chaldean Hecate appears linked to earlier Platonist concepts of the 
World Soul (Psyche) and of Nature (Physis), particularly from the perspective of a 
divided World Soul defined by Plotinus .  It remains to explain the link to Ananke and 
Heimarmene, “Necessity” and “Fate,” as they are connected by Platonists to the work of 
the World Soul.  Middle Platonist thinkers appear to have extended the World Soul’s 
involvement with Nature to include governance of the natural world, and therefore of 
                                                       
256 Lewy (1978) 355. 
257 Νοῦ δὲ γέννημα λόγος τις καὶ ὑπόστασις, τὸ διανοούμενον∙ τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ νοῦν 
κινούμενον καὶ νοῦ φῶς καὶ ἴχνος ἐξηρτημένον ἐκείνου, κατὰ θάτερα μὲν συνηγμένον 
ἐκείνῳ καὶ ταύτῃ ἀποπιμπλάμενον καὶ ἀπολαῦον καὶ μεταλαμβάνον αὐτοῦ καὶ νοοῦν, κατὰ 
θάτερα δὲ ἐφαπτόμενον τῶν μετ’ αὐτό, μᾶλλον δὲ γεννῶν καὶ αὐτό, ἃ ψυχῆς ἀνάγκη εἶναι 
χείρονα∙ (Enn. 5.1.7.42‑48.  trans. Armstrong). 
258 Enn. 3.8.4. 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the human souls inhabiting it as well.  This move appears to stem from a reading of  a 
passage in Plato’s Timaeus, where the demiurge reveals to newly created souls “the 
nature () of the universe, and explains the them the rules of fate ().”259  Nature and Fate, 
in this reading, both become the realm of the World Soul’s operation.  Within this 
understanding of the World Soul as a complex of Psyche – Physis – Heimarmene, the 
Chaldean texts frame the goddess Hecate, who would thus mirror the dual relationship 
of the World Soul to individual human souls in the embodied world.  Like the World 
Soul, she could be seen as both the occasion for the soul’s existence (the source of its 
good), as well as the hindrance present to the soul in material reality (physis) and fate 
(heimarmene).  How the Chaldean tradition came to adopt the figure of Hecate as 
figuring the world soul is not entirely clear, though Lewy speculates that she may have 
been borrowed from magical disciplines, and notes further that we can begin to perceive 
her elevation to the status of a more universal goddess in other cult contexts.260  
Whatever the case, it is plain that this goddess takes over many of the characteristics of 
the World Soul for the purposes of the Oracles, and that the Chaldean tradition was 
likely the first explicitly to link the mythic attributes of Hecate to the metaphysics of 
Plato’s World Soul.  The connection probably stems from the recognition of similarity 
between Hecate’s function as “princess of demons,” who “commands the dark powers 
which enslave the corporeal existence of men” – thus “[extending] her dominion over all 
natures, which their fear of the demons had given up to her” – and the Platonic World 
Soul, who is by this period associated with destiny and necessity, as we have seen.  The 
key to understanding the appeal of Hecate, however, lies in the fact of the World Soul’s 
duality.  The World Soul, by virtue of its orientation toward both the noetic and sensible 
realms, “personifies not only the compulsion of natural existence, but also the freedom 
of the mind.”261  It is perhaps a natural move to link Hecate with  a psychic hypostasis so 
conceived since Hecate, too, partakes of this “ambivalence of metaphysical potency.” 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Ti. 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(1978) 357. 
260 Lewy 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363‑64. 
261 ibid. 365. 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She occupies the boundary between noetic and sensible, between the pure life of the 
intellectual soul and the world of embodiment.  By virtue of her attributes, variously 
filtered and interpreted by cultic and philosophical tradition, she is able to take on – for 
purpose of the Chaldean Oracles, the mediating functions of the World Soul, such that she 
could function in relation to individual souls in a manner calibrated to each one.  For 
those oriented toward materiality and subject to demons, her activity would be 
oppressive; for those alert to the possibilities of intellect and transcendence, she could be 
a help.  As Lewy puts it: 
The Chaldean Hecate encountered the human souls in forms 
always adequate to their internal conditions: for those sunk in 
body she was necessity; for the erring, demonic temptation; for 
the renegade, a curse; for those who recalled their divine nature, a 
guide; and for those who returned home, a grace.262 
 
This continuous presence of Hecate to the human soul reflects the underlying 
metaphysical reality that the function of Hecate is the function of the World Soul, from 
which individual human souls are essentially derived and projected into the embodied 
world, and toward which they are drawn back in their ascent.  Hecate should thus 
probably not be equated directly with “matter” per se, as Gregory Shaw suggests, but as 
Physis she surely falls within the theurgists’ realm of generation, and as such can rightly 
be viewed polyvalently as a “mirror of the embodied soul … an index of the soul’s 
spiritual condition” and thus evil “only in proportion to the soul’s attachment to its 
material existence.”263  Clearly then, Chaldean cosmology, like Iamblichean theurgy, 
tends more toward monism than may be initially apparent.  Hecate‑as‑Nature or 
Hecate‑as‑Necessity is also Hecate‑as‑Soul: depending on one’s proper understanding of 
and orientation toward sensible reality – and hence one’s proper relationship with the 
daemons over which Hecate presides – one’s experience of embodiment and material 
reality could be alternately disorienting and chaotic, or healing and salvific. 
                                                       
262 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365. 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(1995) 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The tradition of the Chaldean Oracles can thus be seen to possess a certain 
explanatory power with respect to Iamblichus’ later, more fully developed version of 
theurgy.  In both cases, an ambivalence toward matter and governing daemones that is 
sometimes expressed is startlingly dualist language is worked out in favor of a 
fundamental monism, wherein the soul, properly “turned” and re‑oriented, may interact 
with the daemonic more positively and thus be rescued from a mere enslavement to 
matter.  It remains to explore what conditions govern a correct orientation toward 
matter and its governing daemones, and by what tokens the practicing theurgist might 
know that he was transcending material imprisonment by properly re‑orienting his soul 
toward a more harmonious relation to daemones and the divine principles informing the 
natural order. 
 
6. Divine Matter and Iamblichean ritual 
 
In Iamblichean thought, like that of the Chaldean texts, the materially manifested 
world made possible through the demiurgic activity of daemons must itself become the 
site of the soul’s ritually effected re‑orientation.  From the monist view of a good material 
order animated by daemons who endow matter with differentiating logoi, follows the 
conclusion that the created order thus affords virtually infinite opportunities for re‑
connecting to the divine: “Since it was proper not even for terrestrial things to be 
deprived of participation (κοινωνίας) in the divine, earth also has received [from 
participation] a share in divinity such as is sufficient for it to be able to receive the gods 
(χωρῆσαι τοὺς θεούς).”264  A “pure and divine form of matter,” is not only an acceptable 
component, but even a necessary contributor to correct practice.  Iamblichus’ 
justification of this claim is triumphantly emanationist, and supplies a lucid practical 
description of what is implied by his monist metaphysics.  In this vision, all lower, 
                                                       
264 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔδει καὶ τὰ 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μηδαμῶς 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θείας κοινωνίας, 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subordinate beings are vindicated by virtue of their being informed and embraced by 
higher realms:   
In the highest levels of beings, the abundance of power has this 
additional advantage over all others, in being present to all 
equally in the same manner without hindrance; according to this 
principle, the primary beings illuminate even the lowest levels, 
and the immaterial are present immaterially to the material.  And 
let there be no astonishment if in this connection we speak of a 
pure and divine form of matter; for matter also issues from the 
father (πατρός) and creator (δημιουργοῦ) of all, and thus gains its 
perfection (τελειότητα), which is suitable to the reception of gods 
(πρὸς θεῶν ὑποδοχήν).  And, at the same time, nothing hinders 
the superior beings from being able to illuminate (ἐλλάμπειν) 
their inferiors, nor yet, by consequence, is matter excluded from 
participation (μετουσίας) in its betters, so that such of it as is 
perfect (τελεία) and pure (καθαρά) and of good type 
(ἀγαθοειδής) is not unfitted to receive the gods.265 
 
What is most fascinating about such as passage is Iamblichus’ willingness to state rather 
directly the consequences of his metaphysics, even in the face of anticipated objection 
(“And let there be no astonishment….”).  By virtue of an emanationist scheme that sees 
lower levels stemming cleanly from higher, it is possible for Iamblichus to assert, rather 
audaciously, a matter that is “perfect” and “pure,” a matter that is “illumined” by the 
gods and therefore suitable as a “receptacle” for divinity. 
This principle will receive its highest elaboration in Iamblichus in his elaboration 
of a theory of the symbolon as divine manifestation in the world.  Here, however, 
Iamblichus prefers to move from the abstract to the particular, proceeding to a curiously 
detailed recitation of some of the materials involved in theurgic practice .  In keeping 
with the theme of a pure and divine matter as capable of “receiving” the gods, he 
enumerates a series of things that, given a certain “perfection and purity” can function 
as a “receptacle” for the divine: 
Observing this, and discovering in general, in accordance with the 
properties of each of the gods, the receptacles adapted to them, the 
theurgic art in many cases links together stones, plants, animals, 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aromatic substances, and other such things that are sacred, perfect and 
godlike, and then from all these composes an integrated and pure 
receptacle.266 
 
Such an understanding applies also to other areas of cult life, extending beyond what we 
might initially recognize as ritual to “the construction of dwellings for the gods” and 
“the consecration of statues.”267  Matter is here foundational to the performance of 
proper cult, so long as it is properly selected with an eye to its “purity,” where purity 
appears to correspond to its reception of a given divinity.  Matter thus conceived is 
essential in its functioning as a bridge between the human and the divine: 
there is no other way in which the terrestrial realm or the men who 
dwell here could enjoy participation in the existence that is the lot of the 
higher beings, if some such foundation be not laid down in advance.268 
 
Even religious visions fall within the reach of this understanding.  According to certain 
secret Hermetic discourses, “a certain kind of matter (ὕλη τις)” is imparted by the gods 
“through sacred visions (διὰ τῶν μακαρίων θεαμάτων),” we can infer that it must be 
“of a like nature (συμφυής)” with the gods who bestow it.  As such, the sacrifice of such 
material rouses up those very gods to manifestation (ἐπὶ τὴν ἔκφασιν), summons them 
to reception, welcomes them when they appear, and ensures their perfect 
representation.”269  Matter then, is selected with an eye to evoking the particular divine 
response; particular material corresponds to a particular divinity.  The same rule applies 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which is 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gods, 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selecting for use that which is akin to them, as being capable of harmonizing with the 
construction of dwellings for the gods, the consecration of statues, and indeed for the 
performance of sacrificial rites in general.”   
Οὐ γὰρ δὴ δεῖ δυσχεραίνειν πᾶσαν ὕλην, ἀλλὰ μόνην τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν τῶν θεῶν τὴν δὲ 
οἰκείαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐκλέγεσθαι, ὡς συμφωνεῖν δυναμένην εἴς τε θεῶν οἰκοδομήσεις καὶ 
καθιδρύσεις ἀγαλμάτων καὶ δὴ καὶ εἰς τὰς τῶν θεῶν ἱερουργίας (DM 234.1‑4). 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γὰρ 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ἐπὶ γῆς τόποις ἢ τοῖς δεῦρο κατοικοῦσιν ἀνθρώποις μετουσία ἂν 
γένοιτο τῆς τῶν κρειττόνων λήψεως, εἰ μή τις τοιαύτη καταβολὴ πρώτη προενιδρυθείη (DM 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πείθεσθαι 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τοῖς ἀπορρήτοις 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ὡς καὶ διὰ τῶν μακαρίων θεαμάτων ὕλη τις ἐκ 
θεῶν παραδίδοται∙ αὕτη δέ που συμφυής ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις τοῖς διδοῦσιν∙ οὺκοῦν καὶ ἡ τς 
τοιαύτης ὕλης θυσία ἀνεγείρει τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν ἔκφασιν, καὶ προσκαλεῖται εὐθέως πρὸς 
κατάληψιν, χωρεῖ τε αὐτοὺς παραγιγνομένους καὶ τελείως ἐπιδείκνυσι (DM 234.7‑11). 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to the selection of cultic materials in particular geographical regions, where the produce 
of a given area corresponds to the divinities presiding over it.  Such correspondence 
must be observed since “in all cases their own creations are particularly pleasing to the 
creators.”270  Matter that is coessential with whatever things may fall within the 
“jurisdiction” of a particular divinity, then, is instrumental in establishing a synergy 
with that divinity.  Thus, “whether it is a case of animals or plants or any other products 
of the earth that are administered (διακυβερνᾶται) by higher beings, they have no 
sooner received a share in their authority (ἐπιστασίας) than they procure for us 
indivisible communion (κοινωνίαν) with them.”271  What is more, as is perhaps implied 
in the above catalogue of “stones, plants, animals, aromatic substances,” cultic 
engagement with matter need hardly be limited to conventional, communal sacrifices.  
A range of cult acts employing “pure” substances of various kinds can serve to link us to 
divinity.  Iamblichus makes this explicit when he asserts that “some among such things, 
when preserved and kept intact, serve to increase the kinship (οἰκείωσιν) of those who 
preserve them with the gods – that is to say, those which, in remaining intact (ἀκέραια), 
preserve the power of community (δύναμιν τῆς κοινωνίας) between gods and men.”272   
Others, however, make the kinship (οἰκειότητα) more prominent 
(λαμπροτέραν) through being sacrificed (καθαγιαζόμενα), these 
being those whose resolution (ἀνάλυσιν) into the first principle of 
their primary elements (τὴν τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων ἀρχήν) 
makes them akin (συγγενῆ) to the causal principles (αἰτίοις) of 
the higher beings, and thus more honored by them 
(ἱεροπρεπεστέραν); for as this kinship is progressively brought to 
perfection, the benefits deriving from it become ever more perfect 
also.273 
 
Here we encounter an explanatory passage similar to the passage on burnt offering  
noted above, in which a seemingly dualist understanding of matter resulted in the 
prescription that fire purge it away.  In the present context, though, we see that burn 
                                                       
270 ἀεὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ποιοῦσι τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἔργα διαφερόντως ἐστί κεχαρισμένα (DM 235.3‑4 ). 
271  (DM 235.5‑7). 
272  (DM 235.7‑10). 
273  (DM 235.11‑15). 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offering, in which the victim is reduced to “the first principle of [its] primary elements,” 
a state ripe for interaction (or “kinship”) with the “causal principles” of higher beings, is 
only one option among many cultic options enabling human interaction with the causal 
principles latent in the material world.   
  Iamblichus is notoriously at his most evasive when discussing the “mechanics” 
of cult informed by theurgy – precisely what materials are to be used and how – as the 
preceding discussion might suggest.  What is central to his theory, however, is the idea 
that the material world, whose disruptive force in the soul’s embodiment brings about 
Platonic anatrope, categorically must play a role in “righting” the inverted soul.  The 
range of physical mechanisms by which this improvement in the soul’s condition might 
be brought about are presumably manifold (expressed as the many possibilities for a 
“pure receptacle”) but the underlying theory is fairly uniform.  Iamblichus’ most 
arresting articulation of that theory comes in his development of a framework for 
understanding the idea of the symbolon in theurgic cult.  I will argue that here 
Iamblichus actually goes beyond understanding “pure” matter as simply a “receptacle,” 
and that he must – as a function of his own metaphysics, which require of him the 
conclusion that the material world is an immediate manifestation of perfect principles – 
conclude that the symbolon is a manifestation, a making present of the divine within the  
material world.  It was precisely this point, perhaps already latent in religious culture, 
that Christian thinkers would find appealing. 
 
7. Eikon and Symbol as Means of the Soul’s Ascent 
 
  Central to the understanding Iamblichus’ theory of the soul’s ascent through 
theurgy is the complex of ideas represented by the terms eikon, symbolon, and synthema. 
Here I shall argue that these terms actually do represent a coherent attempt to articulate 
an theory of divinity made manifest in the world, and that as such they follow 
reasonably from Iamblichus’ consistent monism.  Strictly speaking, the eikon, or “image,” 
represents that which is divinely manifested in the world, whatever is perceptible and 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may be identified by the knowledgeable theurgist as the site of divine presence.  
Symbolon and synthema are terms that are roughly synonymous already in the Chadlean 
Oracles, and in the De Mysteriis they appear to remain so.274  They designate Platonic 
forms in a later articulation characteristic of the Oracles and related to Middle Platonism.   
Where the eikon, then, is the outward, material manifestation of divine symbolon, 
knowledge (gnosis) of which enables the proper selection of objects and rites (eikones) 
whose deployment makes possible the assimilation – through the mediation of a 
material object – of the theurgist’s soul to the demiurgic power that enforms and frames 
the world.  If the terms eikon and symbolon sometimes appear to be invoked in a confused 
way, I will argue that this is due to a somewhat paradoxical need to blur the distinctions 
between them deliberately, within the context of a metaphysical monism.  That is to say, 
given that Iamblichus hopes to make plausible the idea of transcendence mediated 
through matter, he actually gains from eliding any distinction between divine 
manifestation (eikon) in the world and the mediating bridge that links material reality to 
the transcendent realm.  The image is thus a material manifestation of a link to 
hpercosmic transcendence.  The blurring of this conceptual line is sustainable perhaps 
only for a mind committed to the sacredness of the material cosmos. 
It is useful to note that these terms have another life within the disciplines of 
Neoplatonic textual exegesis.  Iamblichus was surely aware of the application of the 
symbolom by Porphyry in his Cave of the Nymphs as an “allegorical literary image that 
conveys a hidden message.”275  His Pythagorean commitments also give him certain 
knowledge of the tradition of describing the utterances of Pythagoras and his circle as 
“symbols” conveying a secret wisdom.276  Thus there is a long tradition prior to the third 
century of understanding symbola in terms of veiled linguistic manifestation of inner 
mysteries.  Iamblichus takes matters further, deriving from this earlier tradition a more 
                                                       
274 In neither the Chaldean Oracles nor the Corpus Hermeticum is symbolon expressly connected with 
ritual acts.  See Struck (2004) 216‑17. 
275 ibid. 214. 
276 ibid. 214. 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preciely defined ritual application of the term.277  Here I shall invoke the term’s use in 
exegetical contexts only to suggest that there is an informative if somewhat imprecise 
parallel between their use in exegesis and their use in a theurgic context: eikon and 
symbolon in the disciplines of Neoplatonic allegory, where eikon applies to texts with 
more “manifest” allegorical meaning and symbolon to those of more “veiled” 
signification, might allude to a similar distinction in the metaphysics of theurgy, where 
similarly the eikon “manifests” the mysterious symbolon.  In a 1976 article John Dillon 
undertook to explain what he thought to be a three‑tiered Pythagorean system of 
allegorical interpretation adopted and further developed by Iamblichus, then taken up 
by later Neoplatonists and applied to the exegesis of Platonic dialogues.  Dillon’s hope 
seems to be that the terms’ meanings, and their subsequent application to exegetical 
projects, may be precisely defined; the problem, as he discovers, is simply that in none of 
the cases that he cites – drawn for the most part from the works of Proclus – do the key 
terms of symbolon and eikon appear to be applied with any consistency.   He readily 
concedes that in “more normal Greek usage” terms such as symbolon and eikon could be 
used interchangeably, but he cannot quite shake the instinct to search beneath such 
imprecision – which he finds throughout Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Timaeus – for a 
lucid Pythagorean system of classifications, into which the important terms of allegorical 
exegesis can all be neatly slotted.278   
Dillon first locates the traces of this system in Proclus’ Timaeus commentary, 
where the question at hand is the proper exegesis of Timaeus 17BC and Socrates’ 
recapitulation of his previous day’s discourse on the ideal state.279  Proclus, cataloging 
the interpretations of his predecessors, notes that Iamblichus supplies an allegorizing 
reading in which the recapitulation serves as a king of prolegomena to the contemplation 
of nature, wherein the narrative of the state serves as an image – an eikon – of the order 
                                                       
277 Note Struck’s (2004) recognition of Iamblichus’ adaptation of the term, suggesting an 
equivalent in the term “talisman” understood as “a token with some from of effocacious link to 
what it is supposed to represent” (204). 
278 Dillon (1976) 257‑258. 
279 In Ti. I 29, 31ff. Diehl.  See Dillon (1976) 248‑49. 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of the Universe.  Proclus traces this thinking to the Pythagorean habit of instructing 
students first through “similitudes” (ὅμοια) and “images” (εἰκόνες), then through 
“symbols” (σύμβολα), before moving on at the last to “complete knowledge,” which is 
attainable on after the students’ souls and vision have been purged in the first two steps, 
and they become capable of contemplating intelligibles.  In this same passage, Proclus 
carefully distinguishes between the summary of the Republic as an eikon that “prepares 
us to understand the orderly creation of the Universe” and the Atlantis myth, which 
functions rather as a symbol.280  Dillon develops a distinction between the two terms that 
he believes is further supported by Proclus’ thoughts expressed elsewhere, in his 
discussion of the exegesis of myth presented in his commentary on the Republic.  There, 
eikones are understood to represent their paradeigmata or prototypes more immediately 
and accurately, without any encumbering discordant elements; symbola, on the other 
hand, do not reflect the essences of the transcendent beings to which they refer, although 
they must nevertheless retain a certain resemblance to them.281  Thus a distinction 
between eikon and symbolon is established, according to which an eikon appears to be 
more or less a mirror of its archetype, while a symbolon – at more of an exegetical remove 
– requires more of an elucidation before its archetype can be readily perceived. 
Unfortunately Proclus does not observe his own Pythagorean distinction.  Prior to his 
seemingly careful distinction between eikon and symbolon in the Timaeus commentary, he 
has already casually asserted that both the recapitulated Republic and the Atlantis myth 
                                                       
280 Dillon (1976) 248‑49. 
281 In R. pp. 72‑73.  See Dillon (1976) 251ff. To some extent the very tendency toward interpreting 
myths symbolically – and Proclus suggests in the Timaeus commentary that all myths are symbola – 
derives from the need to purge them of those more sordid elements that made them less than 
ideal reflections of philosophically conceived divine life; but Dillon is surely correct in pointing 
out that the real issue is simply that myths often do not transparently gesture toward 
transcendence.  Rather, a mythical story might seem to have “a self‑contained meaning, not 
directly pointing to any truth beyond itself, in a way that a conscious allegory should.”  Thus a 
“Platonic myth” – by which we understand a narrative that has been, in a sense, philosophically 
pre‑programmed as allegorical, virtually interprets itself – as an eikon of sorts; whereas a “poetic 
myth” appears to have no orientation to loftier reference points at all, and thus presumably 
requires a more nuanced exegesis – as a symbolon of sorts. 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as eikones: they both “[represent] the order of the Universe δι᾽εἰκόνων.”282  What is more, 
and in the most maddening way for those hunting after consistency, he elsewhere claims 
that the Atlantis myth describes “the causal principles of creation …  ‘in images through 
symbols.’”283  This tendency to use terms interchangeably makes Dillon’s task of “trying 
to distinguish the essence of the Pythagorean system from the looser usage that obscures 
it” rather difficult,284  and he finds that this frustration with the inconsistent application 
of terms carries over into the search for a more clear exposition in the writings of 
Iamblichus.  Dillon takes note of the “comprehensive survey” of Pythagorean symbols in 
the Protrepticus,285 but observes also the lack of explanation of the term eikon.  A similar 
lack is noted in the Vita Pythagorica, where the only distinction maintained is that 
between the deployment of symbola and the use of direct instruction, and where all 
reference to the desired three‑tiered system is absent.   
  The present argument is not concerned with exegesis, still less with a precise 
explication of a three‑tiered Pythagorean system of exegesis; nevertheless, it is worth 
noticing the particular life of such terms in an exegetical context: after all, the very 
purpose of the three‑fold system, as Proclus lays it out, is finally to enable a purified 
soul’s contemplation of intelligibles.  This fact suggests that eikon / symbolon as terms of 
exegesis might reasonably be seen as continuous with eikon / symbolon as terms of 
metaphysics.  I do not mean to assert too neat a parallel; nevertheless, it is arresting that 
the loose application of the terms in Proclus is also arguably present in the De Mysteriis, 
where we find a similar, somewhat frustrating interchangeability of terms. In this 
connection I will suggest that there is a parallel between the exegete’s eikon as an outward 
narrative that reasonably reflects the lineaments of a prototype, and the use of the term 
eikon in theurgic contexts to reconceptualize the symbolon as a straightforwardly 
perceptible thing.  That is, eikon is symbolon under the aspect of its plain visibility.  All 
                                                       
282 Dillon (1976) 249. 
283 ἐν εἰκόσι διά τινων συμβόλων (94, 27f.); Dillon (1976) 249; 253. 
284 258.  Elsewhere he notes the “sad fact” that if one “checks assidusously through Diehl’s index 
[of in Ti.] under eikon and symbolon right through Book I of the commentary one will find the two 
terms used indiscriminately for characters, events, and even words and phrases” (254). 
285 XXI. 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may perceive the “image,” thought not all may perceive the “image” as a “symbol.”  In a 
sense, the distinction observed by Proclus between eikon as the “simplest” manifestation 
and symbolon as a sign of deeper mystery might simply be a mirror of this metaphysical 
preoccupation.   In the De Mysteriis, of course, the “text” under exegesis is not a dialogue 
of Plato, but rather all of material reality, which presents through symbols the images 
that manifest divine power.   
In the De Mysteriis, whether or not they may always appear adequately 
distinguished, the terms eikon and symbolon may be taken to express ideas entirely 
consistent with Iamblichus’ monist outlook.  Gregory Shaw, identifying them with 
Platonic formal principles, neatly traces an arc of thought from the Chaldean Oracles to 
Iamblichus’ metaphysics of theurgy, suggesting that when  
Platonic Forms were transformed by the Middle Platonists into the 
“thoughts” of the creator and these, in turn, were understood to be 
“powers” extending in the cosmos, it was perhaps inevitable that 
these demiurgic powers would be “discovered” in their manifest 
expressions and adapted in some manner to benefit embodied 
souls.286 
 
Shaw goes on to identify the Iamblichean doctrine of synthemata as the “practical 
culmination of this development.”  Symbola and synthemata are synonymous in the 
Chaldean oracles, and are understood to be “sown … throughout the cosmos” by the 
Demiurge. Likewise, as Ruth Majercik points out, they may be regarded as analogous to 
the forms, which in Middle Platonist thought are understood to be the “thoughts of the 
Father” disseminated through the world.287  Also crucial is the idea, already present in 
the Oracles, that the symbolon / synthema is anagogic as well as cosmogonic: they both 
enform the world and summon the soul to the transcendent source of reality.288  That is 
to say, symbola preserve both a generative and hieratic function: forms manifest as 
                                                       
286 (1995) 165. See also Dillon (1977) 55. 
287 Chaldean Oracles fr. 108., esp. Majercik (1989) on fr. 108; See Shaw (1995) 162. 
288 Chaldean Oracles fr. 109; see Shaw (1995) 162. 
122 
symbola are engaged by the theurgist in his hieratic work.289  
  If we thus understand material reality to be straightforwardly a manifestation of 
transcendent forms – where the world in its particularity is proportioned by 
demiurgically mediated principles – then it follows for Iamblichus that specific outward 
instances of materiality stand into proximity to those informing principles.  In essence, 
any material surface can be seen as a veil held before formal principle.  Of course, for 
Iamblichus, not just any object or surface will do – though he invokes a curious and 
wide range; he frequently insists on a gnosis, presumably a knowledge of the form 
underlying any object, that would be required for standing as a serious adept or initiate.  
Passages in the De Mysteriis such as those indicating a need for a precise knowledge of 
the particular objects or locales associated with given divinities perhaps hint at what 
such gnosis amounts to – certainly moreso than passages cataloging objects that would 
appear to critics as magical charms, such as “little pebbles, rods, or certain woods, 
stones, wheat and barley meal” – passages akin to lists found in the Greek Magical Papyri, 
where certain items are also acknowledged as “symbols.”290  Where such knowledge is 
obtained, the material world can supply a great variety of keys to unlock the world of 
transcendent principle, enabling the soul’s assimilation.  In this context we should note 
Iamblichus’ qualification of such catalogs of charms, such as his careful explanation that 
the theurgic art,  
discovering in general … in accordance with the properties of each of 
the gods, the receptacles adapted to them … in many cases links 
together stones, plants, animals, aromatic substances, and other such 
things that are sacred, perfect and godlike, and then from all these 
composes an integrated and pure receptacle.291 
                                                       
289 Shaw (1995) notes that Smith (1974) demurs at the identity of form and symbolon / synthema, 
arguing rather that the latter terms for Proclus and Iamblichus relate to form merely analogically 
(107 n.11).  Surely convicing is Shaw’s reply that a “cosmological” understanding of forms wold 
be “proper to a philosophic discourse,” while an “anagogic” understanding would be germane to 
a theurgic discourse – essentially positing symbolon / synthema as form theurgically considered (in 
accordance with Iamblichus’ own insistence on careful distinction between “theological,” 
“theurgical,” and “philosophical” discourse.  Cf. DM 7.3‑5). 
290 DM 141.11‑12.  See Struck (2004), p. 214, who notes parallels at PGM 4.559, 7.786, 4.230‑40, 8.13. 
291 Ταῦτα τοίνυν κατιδοῦσα ἡ θεουργικὴ τέχνη, κοινῶς τε οὑτωσὶ κατ’ οἰκειότητα ἑκάστῳ τῶν 
θεῶν τὰς προσφόρους ὑποδοχὰς ἀνευρίσκουσα, συμπλέκει πολλάκις λίθους βοτάνας ζῷα 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This claim comes in the aftermath of his wish that no one marvel “if … we speak of a 
pure and divine form of matter,” issuing from the “father and creator of all.”292  Such 
matter gains its perfection from being derived of the creator, and is thus “suitable to the 
reception of the gods.”  Certain instances of material manifestation are suitable as 
“receptacles” (ὑποδοχαί) of divine presence, and it is the task of the skilled theurgist to 
learn and know these instances – and what is more, to possess a knowledge adequate to 
orchestrating the varieties of divine receptacle in a single theurgic ritual, as the passage 
appears to suggest with its claim that “from all these” the craft “composes an integrated 
and pure receptacle” (ἀπὸ πάντων τούτων ὑποδοχὴν ὁλοτελῆ καὶ καθαρὰν 
ἀπεργάζεται).  As Shaw puts it, “As cause of a specific order, the god contained all its 
symbols and the theurgist had to re‑create the entire collection in his ritual.”293  The 
knowledge required for such a project should be coextensive with an awareness of the 
correspondences between symbolon / synthema as formal links disseminated through 
reality and the manifest “images” (eikones) of those hidden principles, the object or 
material surface that the theurgist recognizes as manifesting a hidden principle.   Such 
an approach supplies the theoretical understanding for explaining what theurgic 
“knowledge” might look like, where eikon and symbolon are not merely facets of a 
literary technique aiming to make transcendent reality noetically intelligible for the 
theurgist; they are components rather of a theory of manifestation – of viewing the world 
as a divine “text” conceived in terms of an outward “imaging” of inner principles, such 
                                                                                                                                                                    
ἀρώματα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἱερὰ καὶ τέλεια καὶ θεοειδῆ, κἄπειτα ἀπὸ πάντων τούτων ὑποδοχὴν 
ὁλοτελῆ καὶ καθαρὰν ἀπεργάζεται (DM 233.9‑12). 
292 ἐὰν καὶ ὕλην τινὰ καθαρὰν καὶ θείαν εἶναι λέγωμεν … ἀπὸ … τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ δημιουργοῦ 
τῶν ὅλων (DM 232.13‑233.233.1). 
293 (1995) 166‑7.  Shaw goes on to note the same idea as expressed by Proclus in his On the Hieratic 
Art of the Greeks [Peri tês kath’ Hellenas Hieratikês Technês] in CMAG, 6:150, 5‑10: “Hence, in the 
mixture of many things the theurgists united the aforementioned [divine] elements and made the 
unity derived from the many things resemble that unity which is whole prior to the many.”  
Shaw goes on to note Proclus’ conviction that without the proper assemblage of elements related 
to a given god, the theurgist cannot successfully invoke him.  This argument he finds similar to 
“Iamblichus’ teaching that one must honor all the powers or the gods must not be reached (DM 
228, 19‑229, 7).” 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that to come into the precincts of the material, theurgic image is absolutely equivalent to 
coming into proximity to the underlying divine, formal principles themselves.  
  An early passage in the De Mysteriis may be a bit terminologically cloudy – with 
Iamblichus suggesting that certain “works of theurgy” function like symbols, or that they 
“preserve some other image” – where the terms symbolon and eikon are employed 
somewhat loosely; however, Iamblichus importantly makes explicit the analogy 
between the theurgic eikon and  the manifestation of invisible form in the natural world: 
Of the works of theurgy that are performed on any given occasion, 
some have a cause that is secret and superior to all rational 
explanation, others are like symbols consecrated from all eternity to 
the higher beings, others preserve some other image, even as nature 
in its generative role imprints (upon things) visible shapes from 
invisible reason‑principles.294 
 
These rites, rather ambiguously described as being “like symbols” (ὡς σύμβολα), are 
indissolubly linked to the  gods; other, presumably similar rites “preserve some other 
image” (εἰκόνα τινὰ ἄλλην ἀποσώζει).  However imprecise the usage, it seems clear 
that “symbols” and “images” here are not precisely the same.  Even granting that to 
speak of some “other image” might suggest “image” as an alternative reading for 
“symbol” – a kind of casual variatio – what appears more striking is the close 
juxtaposition of “image” with a Platonic formulation for the physical manifestation of 
form.  In the Timaeus, Plato describes the work of the Demiurge as it brings to 
completion the array of creatures to inhabit the world by “molding” (ἀποτυπούμενος) 
the nature of each in accordance with its “paradigm.”295  In the Iamblichean passage, 
“nature … imprints [ἀπετυπώσατο] (upon things) visible shapes from invisible reason‑
principles,” where the “visible shapes” appear to correspond more or less to “image.”  
                                                       
294 Τῶν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἑκάστοτε ἐπιτελουμένων τὰ μὲν ἀπόρρητόν τινα καὶ κρείττονα 
λόγου τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχει∙ τὰ δ’ ὡς σύμβολα καθιέρωται ἐξ ἀιδίου τοῖς κρείττοσι∙ τὰ δ’ εἰκόνα 
τινὰ ἄλλην ἀποσώζει, καθάπερ δὴ καὶ ἡ γενεσιουργὸς φύσις τῶν ἀφανῶν λόγων ἐμφανεῖς 
τινας μορφὰς ἀπετυπώσατο (DM 37.6‑10). 
295 τοῦτο δὴ τὸ κατάλοιπον ἀπηργάζετο αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παραδείγματος ἀποτυπούμενος 
φύσιν (Tim. 39E, 6‑7).  See Shaw (1995) 163‑64, especially 163, n.4, for other instances of 
Iamblichus’ use of this verb (ἀποτυπόω) to describe the endowment of matter with form. 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In any case, what matters is the emergence of a coherent metaphysical framework, 
which the analogy to the Timaeus with respect to form and manifestation in the natural 
world supplies: eikones manifest “invisible reason principles” (τῶν ἀφανῶν λόγων) just 
as “visible shapes” (ἐμφανεῖς τινας μορφὰς) do in nature (ἡ γενεσιουργὸς φύσις).  The 
eikon gives perceptible expression to the unseen principle. 
  In a much later passage, Iamblichus clarifies his reverence for the Egyptian 
hieratic arts, and in so doing makes some of these connections more explicit.  
The following difficulties require the same theosophical Muse for 
their solution, but first of all, I would like to explain to you the 
mode of theology practiced by the Egyptians.  For these people, 
imitating the nature of the universe and the demiurgic power of 
the gods, display certain [images] of mystical arcane and invisible 
intellections by means of symbols, just as nature copies the unseen 
principles in visible forms through some mode of symbolism, and 
the creative activity of the gods indicates the truth of the forms in 
visible [images].296 
 
The Egyptians in their theurgic practice are thus understood to imitate “the nature of the 
universe” in their production of religious arcana, in a manner that suggests a parallel 
with the earlier passage where “image” supplies a visible manifestation of formal 
principle.   This passage actually adds a dimension to the discussion insofar as it 
explicitly parallels hieratic and cosmogonic activity: the Egyptians create sacred images 
in the same manner as the Demiurge.  They do so “just as nature copies [ἀπετυπώσατο] 
the unseen principles in visible forms through some mode of symbolism” (ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ 
φύσις τοῖς ἐμφανέσιν εἴδεσι τοὺς ἀφανεῖς λόγους διὰ συμβόλων τρόπον τινὰ 
ἀπετυπώσατο).  Interestingly, moreover, the very same muddling of terminology that 
                                                       
296  Τῆς δ’ αὐτῆς θεοσόφου Μούσης κἀκεῖνα δεῖται εἰς τὴν διάλυσιν τὰ ἀπορήματα∙ πρότερον 
δέ σοι βούλομαι τῶν Αἰγυπτίων τὸν τρόπον τῆς θεολογίας διερμηνεῦσαι∙ οὗτοι γὰρ τὴν 
φύσιν τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τὴν δημιουργίαν τῶν θεῶν μιμούμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ τῶν μυστικῶν καὶ 
ἀποκεκρυμμένων καὶ ἀφανῶν νοήσεων εἰκόνας τινὰς διὰ συμβόλων ἐκφαίνουσιν, ὥσπερ 
καὶ ἡ φύσις τοῖς ἐμφανέσιν εἴδεσι τοὺς ἀφανεῖς λόγους διὰ συμβόλων τρόπον τινὰ 
ἀπετυπώσατο, ἡ δὲ τῶν θεῶν δημιουργία τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ἰδεῶν διὰ τῶν φανερῶν εἰκόνων 
ὑπεγράψατο. (DM 249.9‑250.5)  I have altered the translation of Clarke, et al., here in the interest 
of my own terminological consistency. They have translated εἰκόνας and εἰκόνων in the passage 
as “signs.” 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Dillon finds so maddening in Proclus occurs in this very passage.  We are told that just 
as “nature” (ἡ φύσις) copies the “unseen principles” (τοὺς ἀφανεῖς λόγους) in “visible 
forms” (τοῖς ἐμφανέσιν εἴδεσι) all “through some mode of symbolism” (διὰ συμβόλων 
τρόπον τινὰ), in just this same way, the Egyptians in their symbolic rites display 
“certain [images]” (εἰκόνας τινὰς) of “invisible intellections” through the use of symbola 
(διὰ συμβόλων).  This formulation – like that of Proclus – may seem to leave rather 
vague the precise relationship of eikon to symbolon, leaving open as it does what it means 
to display an image “through” symbols, but it is surely significant that the image is what 
the Egyptians manifest outwardly just as visible forms are what physical Nature “copies” 
or imprints.  Since in each case symbola assume a mediating role in the creation of 
outward image, we may infer that they participate in the formal dimension.  Thus, that 
the Egyptian practitioners are understood to be imitating the work of the demiurge in 
the cosmos – as the present passage makes clear (τὴν δημιουργίαν τῶν θεῶν 
μιμούμενοι) – is itself an allusion to the Egyptian capacity to identify and direct form in 
the manipulation of symbolon to “create” reality.  Iamblichus elsewhere shows his 
commitment to the idea that religious rites draw the practitioner into precisely this kind 
of cooperative harmony with divine entities.  For this model of praxis to be viable, he 
must maintain the first principle that image and form are linked: the eikon is understood 
as a manifestation mediating the hidden principles or symbola.   
  The above passages already present a possible riposte to Porphyry’s charges that 
theurgy merely attempts to manipulate the gods who are themselves subject to passions, 
by suggesting a way in which the theurgist might be understood as coming into 
cooperative harmony with the work of the Demiurge.297  Elsewhere Iamblichus further 
distances theurgy from such charges by wedding it ever more closely to demiurgic 
activity:  
Was not this cult established by law at the beginning 
intellectually, according to the ordinances of the gods?  It imitates 
the order of the gods, both the intelligible and that in the heavens.  
It possesses eternal measures of what truly exists and wondrous 
                                                       
297 For a thorough discussion of theurgy as cooperative demiurgy, see Shaw (1995) 45‑57. 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tokens, such as have been sent down hither by the creator and 
father of all, by means of which unutterable truths are expressed 
through secret symbols, beings beyond form brought under the 
control of form, things superior to all images reproduced through 
images, and all things brought to completion through one single 
divine cause, which itself so far transcends passions that reason is 
not even capable of grasping it.298 
 
As we have seen, theurgic cult is an imitation of a divine order (μιμεῖται δὲ τὴν τῶν 
θεῶν τάξιν) in which humans are summoned to participate.  Far from being a mere 
manipulation of transcendent forces from below, it is received from above, “according to 
the ordinances of the gods.”  It “possesses eternal measures of what truly exists” (μέτρα 
τῶν ὄντων ἀίδια) which here seem to parallel “wondrous tokens” (συνθήματα 
θαυμαστά),299 which themselves appear reflect Iamblichus’ adoption of the forms of 
Middle Platonism and the Chaldean Oracles.  These synthemata are the means for giving 
outward expression (literally, voice) to truths otherwise “unutterable” (τὰ μὲν 
ἄφθεγκτα). What is somewhat more interesting is that this outward expression is  
realized “through secret symbols,” which are themselves curiously “unutterable” (διὰ 
συμβόλων ἀπορρήτων).  What is challenging here is that both synthemata (“wondrous 
tokens”) and symbola (“secret symbols”) appear to function as means in the same process 
– that of manifesting hidden truths in the world.  Here it would appear that Iamblichus, 
                                                       
298 οὐχ αὕτη μὲν κατὰ θεσμοὺς θεῶν νοερῶς τε κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἐνομοθετήθη; μιμεῖται δὲ τὴν τῶν 
θεῶν τάξιν, τήν τε νοητὴν καὶ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ. Ἔχει δὲ μέτρα τῶν ὄντων ἀίδια καὶ συνθήματα 
θαυμαστά, οἷα ἀπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ πατρὸς τῶν ὅλων δεῦρο καταπεμφθέντα, οἷς καὶ τὰ 
μὲν ἄφθεγκτα διὰ συμβόλων ἀπορρήτων ἐκφωνεῖται, τὰ δὲ ἀνειδέα κρατεῖται ἐν εἴδεσι, τὰ δὲ 
πάσης εἰκόνος κρείττονα δι’ εἰκόνων ἀποτυποῦται, πάντα δὲ διὰ θείας αἰτίας μόνης 
ἐπιτελεῖται, ἥτις τοσοῦτον κεχώρισται τῶν παθῶν, ὥστε μηδὲ λόγον αὐτῆς δυνατὸν εἶναι 
ἐφάπτεσθαι  (DM 65.2‑11). 
299 Along with Clarke, et al., (79 n.112) I read συνθήματα (Thomas Gale’s conjecture) for the 
ἐνθήματα of the MSS, although I resist understanding συνθήματα merely as “the various 
magical substances and combinations of substances that form the basis for theurgic practice,” 
since the passage seems to point to their transcendent origin.  They are described as having been 
“sent down hither from the father of all,” which would make them analogous to form in Middle 
Platonism; furthermore, they precede in the sequence the expression of the inexpressible through 
symbols.  In context, they seem analogous to form – to the “eternal measures” that parallel them 
in this passage, and to the symbola of the Chaldean Oracles, explained by Majercik (1989) to be 
synonymous to symbola (note on fr. 108). 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contintuing the in the Middle Platonist and Chaldean tradition, is pairing synthema and 
symbolon, where symbolon is the “theurgic” side or conceptual obverse of synthema, i.e., 
what form in effect “becomes” when engaged by the theurgist in his act of cooperative 
demiurgy: a form transformed into an active link enabling the theurgist’s participation 
in shaping the manifest cosmos.300   Thus this articulation further develops the 
demiurgic‑hieratic parallel first evident in the passage in praise of Egyptian priests.  
That is to say, rather than adducing the phenomenal world and its demiurgic formation 
as an analogy for theurgy, Iamblichus has begun to write of theurgic practice and cosmic 
creation as if the were the same process.  Quite plainly, when Iamblichus writes of “beings 
beyond form brought under the control of form” and “things superior to all images 
reproduced through images” – all of which transpires through the ultimate single 
agency of “one single divine cause” – his language can now be applied with equal force 
both to theurgic practice and the demiurgic work of creation.   Here, although the 
language of imprinting “invisible intellections” and “unseen principles” has given way 
to  “unutterable truths” – a move toward a new language that other thinkers would 
                                                       
300 This idea of viewing symbolon and synthema as parallel is supported elsewhere (DM 246.12‑
247.5), where we read of the theurgist’s cosmic mastery “through the power of the ineffable 
synthemata” (διὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν ἀπορρήτων συνθημάτων) – a mastery which is obtained for 
him by “knowledge of the ineffable symbols” (ἀπορρήτων συμβόλων ἡ γνῶσις).  The present 
passage (DM 65.2‑11) would suggest rather that it is the “knowledge” of the ineffable synthemata 
– which are after all descended from the paternal Mind – which grants access to the effective 
“power” of the ineffable symbola.  Casual inversions such as these suggest that we are probably 
correct in viewing symbolon and synthema as obverse terms – one perhaps “theurgic,” the other 
perhaps “philosophical” – applying with equal force to the world of form.  The complete second 
passage reads:  
“The theurgist, through the power of the arcane symbols, commands cosmic entities no longer as 
a human being or employing a human soul but, existing above them in the order of the gods, 
uses threats greater than are consistent with his own proper essence – not, however, with 
implication that he would perform that which he asserts, but using such words to instruct them 
how much, how great and what sort of power he holds through his unification with the gods, 
which he gains through knowledge of the ineffable symbols.” Ὁ θεουργὸς διὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν 
ἀπορρήτων συνθημάτων οὐκέτι ὡς ἄνθρωπος οὐδ’ ὡς ἀνθρωπίνῃ ψυχῇ χρώμενος ἐπιτάττει 
τοῖς κοσμικοῖς, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐν τῇ τῶν θεῶν τάξει προϋπάρχων μείζοσι τῆς καθ’ ἑαυτὸν οὐσίας 
ἐπανατάσεσι χρῆται∙ οὐχ ὡς ποιήσων πάντα ἅπερ διισχυρίζεται, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ τῶν 
λόγων χρήσει διδάσκων ὅσην καὶ ἡλίκην καὶ τίνα ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν διὰ τὴν πρὸς θεοὺς 
ἕνωσιν, ἣν παρέσχηκεν αὐτῷ τῶν ἀπορρήτων συμβόλων ἡ γνῶσις.  (DM 246.12‑247.5) 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embrace, a language of the material world as giving expression or “voice” to a “word” 
and supplying articulation to what would otherwise be transcendent silence – it is 
nevertheless clear that we are in the same philosophical territory.  The same 
presuppositions about form‑principle and material manifestation apply, the only 
difference being that Iamblichus has now elided theurgy completely with what had 
previously seemed merely analogous: theurgy is now creation in which symbol‑synthema 
manifests eikon. 
  Elsewhere – in a passage crucial to our understanding of Iamblichean terms – we 
see Iamblichus engage directly the problem of perceiving divinity in the sensible world.  
Here Porphyry, in asserting that any visions associated with theurgy should be 
presumed deceptive and implying that theurgy entails a false confidence in perception, 
attempts to undermine confidence in the eikon as a “true” manifestation of reality.   For 
Porphyry, the argument that divinity and transcendence can be reliably manifest in the 
sensible world is the fool’s precondition for the viability of encosmic coercion or 
manipulation.  Simply put, the idea of “visions” makes possible the idea of magic, 
within which category Porphyry plainly regards theurgy.  As Iamblichus’ reply points 
out, the heart of such (erroneous) arguments is the fiercely dualist conclusion that only 
the unfettered intellect can touch upon the divine.   Although he seems ready to concede 
a certain prudent skepticism where “visions” are concerned, the logical pressure of his 
own position simply requires him to defend the reality of divine visions, since his 
commitment to the idea of material symbolon / eikon as manifestation of divine reality 
flows from the basic premise that the transcendent is actually linked to the sensible 
world: 
Granting, then, that ignorance and deception are faulty and 
impious, it does not follow on this that the offerings made to the 
gods and divine works are invalid, for it is not pure thought that 
unites theurgists to the gods.  Indeed what, then, would hinder 
those who are theoretical philosophers from enjoying a theurgic 
union with the gods?  But the situation is not so: it is the 
accomplishment of acts not to be divulged and beyond all 
conception, and the power of the unutterable symbols, 
understood solely by the gods, which establishes theurgic union. 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Hence, we do not bring about these things by intellection alone; 
for thus their efficacy would be intellectual, and dependent upon 
us.  But neither assumption is true.  For even when we are not 
engaged in intellection, the symbols themselves, by themselves 
perform their appropriate work, and the ineffable power of the 
gods, to whom these symbols relate, itself recognizes the proper 
images of itself, not through being aroused by our thought.    For 
it is not in the nature of things containing to be aroused by those 
contained in them, nor of things perfect by things imperfect, nor 
even of wholes by parts.  Hence it is not even chiefly through our 
intellection that divine causes are called into actuality; but it is 
necessary that these and all the best conditions of the soul and our 
ritual purity to pre‑exist as auxiliary causes; but the things which 
properly arouse the divine will are the actual divine symbols.  
And so the attention of the gods is awakened by themselves, 
receiving from no inferior being any principle for themselves of 
their characteristic activity.301   
 
In response to Porphyry, Iamblichus argues that “we do not bring these things 
about by intellection alone”; it is rather “the power of the unutterable symbols, 
understood solely by the gods, which establishes theurgic union.”  The divine symbola – 
in this passage made expressly parallel to synthemata in terms of their role – “by 
themselves perform their appropriate work.”  What is more, in a move suggestive of the 
blurring of definitional boundaries discussed above, Iamblichus notes that divine 
                                                       
301  Ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ἡ ἄγνοια καὶ ἀπάτη πλημμέλεια καὶ ἀσέβεια, οὐ μὴν διὰ τοῦτο ψευδῆ ποιεῖ 
καὶ τὰ οἰκείως τοῖς θεοῖς προσφερόμενα καὶ τὰ θεῖα ἔργα, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἔννοια συνάπτει τοῖς 
θεοῖς τοὺς θεουργούς∙ ἐπεὶ τί ἐκώλυε τοὺς θεωρητικῶς φιλοσοφοῦντας ἔχειν τὴν θεουργικὴν 
ἕνωσιν πρὸς τοὺς θεούς; νῦν δ’ οὐκ ἔχει τό γε ἀληθὲς οὕτως∙ ἀλλ’ ἡ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀρρήτων 
καὶ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν νόησιν θεοπρεπῶς ἐνεργουμένων τελεσιουργία ἥ τε τῶν νοουμένων τοῖς 
θεοῖς μόνον συμβόλων ἀφθέγκτων δύναμις ἐντίθησι τὴν θεουργικὴν ἕνωσιν. Διόπερ οὐδὲ τῷ 
νοεῖν αὐτὰ ἐνεργοῦμεν∙ ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω νοερὰ αὐτῶν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἀφ’ ἡμῶν ἐνδιδομένη∙ 
τὸ δ’ οὐδέτερόν ἐστιν ἀληθές. Καὶ γὰρ μὴ νοούντων ἡμῶν αὐτὰ τὰ συνθήματα ἀφ’ ἑαυτῶν 
δρᾷ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον, καὶ ἡ τῶν θεῶν, πρὸς οὓς ἀνήκει ταῦτα, ἄρρητος δύναμις αὐτὴ ἀφ’ 
ἑαυτῆς ἐπιγιγνώσκει τὰς οἰκείας εἰκόνας, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῷ διεγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ἡμετέρας 
νοήσεως∙ οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν τὰ περιέχοντα ὑπὸ τῶν περιεχομένων οὐδὲ τὰ τέλεια ὑπὸ τῶν 
ἀτελῶν οὐδ’ ὑπὸ τῶν μερῶν τὰ ὅλα ἀνακινεῖσθαι. Ὅθεν δὴ οὐδ’ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων νοήσεων 
προηγουμένως τὰ θεῖα αἴτια προκαλεῖται εἰς ἐνέργειαν∙ ἀλλὰ ταύτας μὲν καὶ τὰς ὅλας τῆς 
ψυχῆς ἀρίστας διαθέσεις καὶ τὴν περὶ ἡμᾶς καθαρότητα ὡς συναίτια ἄττα προϋποκεῖσθαι 
χρή, τὰ δ’ ὡς κυρίως ἐγείροντα τὴν θείαν βούλησιν αὐτὰ τὰ θεῖά ἐστι συνθέματα∙ καὶ οὕτω 
τὰ τῶν θεῶν αὐτὰ ὑφ’ ἑαυτῶν ἀνακινεῖται, ὑπ’ οὐδενὸς τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων ἐνδεχόμενά τινα 
εἰς ἑαυτὰ ἀρχὴν τῆς οἰκείας ἐνεργείας.  (DM 96.9‑97.7) 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power, “to whom these [synthemata] relate,” recognizes in the synthemata “the proper 
images [eikonas] of itself.”  Here the eikon almost appears to be drawn into the 
definitional ambit of the symbolon‑synthema, a gesture that suggests Iamblichus’ subtle 
intention to blur the distinction between essence and manifestation.  The image is to be 
understood as a divine thing alongside the form.  In this rather rhapsodic treatment, 
human cooperation is present, though relegated to the level of pre‑existent “auxiliary 
causes,”302 so as to make clear transcendent reality’s independence from human 
contrivance while retaining a place for the theurgist’s gnosis, which at its most basic is 
presumably an awareness of the eikones and symbola that sort with particular divinities.  
Theurgy is divine activity, in which the theurgist may be summoned into assimilation 
with divine agencies by the proper invocation of eikones / symbola known by divine 
power as “the proper images of itself,” to which divine power responds by summoning 
“divine causes…into actuality,” and essentially being actively present itself.  
Plainly then, it has been necessary for Iamblichus to defend the legitimacy of 
divine visions – the sensible experience of images in the world, on the grounds that his 
articulation of theurgy relies on the premise that image is the face of a link to the divine, 
symbolon‑synthema of the divine, which is always the site of particular transcendent 
actualization in the world.   Within the limits of such an outlook, the possibility of 
visions must be defended, as indeed all possible instances of theophany.  Visions could 
                                                       
302 It is a charge that Iamblichus is frequently at pains to refute, as he does when Poprhyry has 
suggested the incoherence of claiming to invoke the gods as superiors, only then to boss them 
about as inferiors: “On the one hand, it is performed by men, and as such observes our natural 
rank in the universe; but on the other, it controls divine symbols, and in virtue of them is raised 
up to union with the higher powers, and directs itself harmoniously in accordance with their 
dispensation, which enables it quite properly to assume the mantle of the gods.  It is in virtue of 
this distinction, then, that the art both naturally invokes the powers from the universe as 
superiors, inasmuch as the invoker is a man, and yet on the other hand gives them orders, since it 
invests itself, by virtue of the ineffable symbols, with the hieratic role of the gods.” τὸ μὲν ὡς 
παρ’ ἀνθρώπων προσαγόμενον, ὅπερ δὴ τηρεῖ καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν τάξιν ὡς ἔχει φύσεως ἐν τῷ 
παντί, τὸ δὲ κρατυνόμενον τοῖς θείοις συνθήμασι καὶ ἄνω μετέωρον δι’ αὐτῶν τοῖς κρείττοσι 
συναπτόμενον, περιαγόμενόν τε ἐμμελῶς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκείνων διακόσμησιν, ὃ δὴ δύναται 
εἰκότως καὶ τὸ τῶν θεῶν σχῆμα περιτίθεσθαι. Κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην οὖν διαφορὰν εἰκότως καὶ 
ὡς κρείττονας καλεῖ τὰς ἀπὸ τοῦ παντὸς δυνάμεις, καθόσον ἐστὶν ὁ καλῶν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ 
ἐπιτάττει αὐταῖς αὖθις, ἐπειδὴ περιβάλλεταί πως διὰ τῶν ἀπορρήτων συμβόλων τὸ 
ἱερατικὸν τῶν θεῶν πρόσχημα. (DM 184.1‑10) 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go wrong, to be sure, thought presumably for the theurgist of adequate gnosis this would 
not be the case.  From Iamblichus’ perspective, theurgy is defensible within the 
intellectual framework of image and form – of eikon and  symbolon‑synthema – manifestation 
and actualization of divine power, a position only possible within the terms of a durable 
metaphysical monism.   
As we proceed to Christian articulations of sacramental theory, the simple 
question to bear in mind is whether such approaches reflect the idea that the symbolon, 
or the complex of eikon – symbolon, as an actualization of trancendent principle, functions 
as a link to corresponding divinity – whether the symbol channels access to transcendent 
principle.  First we shall consider whether for Origen, a thinker preceding Iamblichus by 
some years, a divine symbolon might manifest a divine image, opening access on the 
plane of material reality to a god conceived as ultimate rational principle, and fully 
realized and projected into material existence.    Christian ideas about the Logos and its 
incarnation would supply the conceptual material enabling an interrogation of eucharist 
in precisely such terms.
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Chapter IV: Origen and the Adaptation of Pagan Cult 
 
1. Introduction: The Logos, the Rational Creature and Material Cult
 
In Origen’s view, rational beings are fallen from their true life and constrained by 
the limits of embodied experience.  They require healing and ascent that can be 
mediated only by the divine Logos, which itself has taken on flesh to effect this 
mediation.  The soul’s condition is thus remedied by a re‑orientation toward the Logos, 
effected through a scripturally and ecclesiastically mediated encounter, in which the 
attainment of knowledge is, for Origen, a kind of therapy enabling the soul’s ascent and 
re‑assimilation to the divine Logos from which its life derives.  Origen’s thought thus 
may appear to work within a familiar Platonic scheme, where embodied experience is 
often narrated as a confinement to an illusory world, ascent from which is the rational 
creature’s ideal end.  His language often draws upon the reservoir of this tradition, in 
which matter itself is regarded with ambivalence if not outright hostility, and in which 
the aim of the philosophical life is escape from the hindrances imposed on the soul by 
embodiment.  We should be cautious, though, in too neatly attributing to Origen this 
Platonic narrative of the “soul” and its fall, not least because more extreme dualism sits 
uneasily alongside Christianity’s commitment to embodiment.  In keeping with this 
Christian tradition, Origen must retain a certain dualist rejection of the material world 
and the body, while simultaneously respecting the body and material reality as the site 
of the soul’s remedy.  Such commitments give rise in Origen’s thought to what might 
best be termed a variation on the Platonic narrative of the soul’s fall – a variation that is 
more monist, more open to a favorable view of material reality than an initial 
“Platonizing” reading of his work might suggest.  Such a reading yields the insight that 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in Origen’s view, human individuals – human “souls” – have no proper existence 
without material embodiment.  Deriving from this conviction is the possibility of 
reconciling an incarnate god, rationally conceptualized as Logos, with human beings 
conceived as essentially incarnate rational creatures, rather than as fallen incorporeal 
“souls” encased in a material element.  I shall argue in this chapter that such an 
alignment of embodied rational beings with an embodied Logos is extended by Origen 
into the material sacramentalism of the church, a project that he sustains in some 
measure by resorting to cultic terminology that was already laden with assumptions 
about materiality, and that would later find its more full theoretical development in the 
work of thinkers like Iamblichus.  Particularly important in this regard is the fact that 
Origen insinuates his appropriation of pagan cult language into a vigorous polemic 
against magic and daemonic cult.  That is, at precisely the point where Origen’s rhetoric 
most vigorously asserts difference, his argument moves deftly to appropriate language 
and categories suggestive of likeness, as if the very volume of the polemic where 
calibrated to obscure the act of appropriation. 
By no means do I mean to suggest that Origen is consciously a proto‑theurgist, or 
that his thought should be seen as lineally antecedent to the more developed theories of 
Iamblichus later in the third century.  The differences in orientation between the two 
men are considerable and obvious: the ardent, militant Christian apologist on the one 
hand, eager to sweep away the false religions of the Mediterranean and to replace them 
with the Christian novelty that he touts as older and more venerable still than anything 
traditional cults could offer; and the conservative pagan on the other, grieved at the 
decline of traditional cults, and concerned to close the widening breach between elite, 
philosophical practice and the time‑honored religious cults of the ancients.  That said, 
there are considerable and interesting parallels, as well. Both thinkers are opposed to 
elitism in the philosophical‑religious life, and undertake to vindicate practices for the 
common person; both are occupied with the problem of material reality and 
embodiment as both obstacle and aid to the aspiring soul, and believe likewise that 
paths lie open for the ascent of rational beings from their earthbound condition; both 
135 
believe that the reality of embodiment dictates religious engagement with material 
reality, within a context of carefully disciplined religious cult, which serves as a 
mechanism making possible that ascent.  Also, much like Iamblichus in his response to 
Porphyry, Origen must answer a critique by a redoubtable intellectual foe, the second 
century philosopher Celsus, who had impugned Christianity as a vulgar, degraded 
menace to the shared cultural values of the Mediterranean world, a set of superstitions 
and fideisms unworthy of serious philosophical consideration.  Celsus objected 
particularly to Christianity’s commitment to divine incarnation and universal bodily 
resurrection, and as a corollary, found absurd any claims that materiality might mediate 
divinity rather than hinder its reception.  As a response – in a manner that is broadly 
similar to the approach adopted by Iamblichus – Origen must find a way of casting 
Christianity as acceptable, and indeed superior, within the philosophical terms of his 
age, a task that he approaches by way of a cosmology that views material reality as a 
good, even inseparable element of a created order.  Matter itself is reconfigured in a way 
that allows for its positive role in incarnation, in resurrection – and most critically for 
this discussion – in the developing sacramental system in the church.  He furthermore 
develops a theory of human nature and human person, as well as a theory of the 
incarnate Logos that would have the effect of rescuing embodiment from dualism, and of 
redeeming material reality itself from its straitened place within more dualist thought.   
Such parallels are mostly broad, and the likenesses that I mean to sketch here are 
mostly of a narrow, theoretical nature, and are best viewed from a perspective informed 
by the insight that religious thinkers of this age drew upon a broad range of shared 
ideas in their several efforts toward articulating their cultic commitments. To read 
Origen in this way we must simply disregard ancient and modern disputes over the 
perceived problem of his Hellenism, with their implicit challenge that “Christianity” is 
proportionally diminished by the addition of each new quantum of “Hellenism.”  Such a 
polarity, whose origins I have previously described as founded upon a persistent myth 
of Christian origins, with its assumption that “pure” Christianity emerges when 
“paganism” is peeled away, actually may obscure insight when applied to a thinker like 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Origen, who was anything but timid about his investment in Greek intellectual 
traditions.  With the elimination of such useless taxonomies, we may examine with 
greater care the ways in which Origen’s thought may constitute an adaptive engagement 
with the same questions that vexed his contemporaries, and the ways in which it may 
not differ in its theoretical basis from solutions already posed by traditional religious 
and philosophical culture.  
 In basic outline, the issues to be considered here are: (2) Origen’s cosmology and 
spiritual anthropology, in which human beings are conceived not as incorporeal 
individual identities subsisting in a Platonic shadowland prior to embodiment, but 
rather unitively, as rational natures for whom embodiment is an essential component of 
discrete existence.  Within such a scheme, human beings as identities or persons have no 
proper existence or life as incorporeals, and are therefore not conceived merely as body‑
soul composites in the world.  Nevertheless, Origen retains a conceptual distinction 
between “rational” soul and material nature, enabling him to insist on the universality of 
embodiment while explaining the “rational” element as the point of contact between 
rational beings and the incorporeal Logos of God, and indeed as the pivot of human 
identity.  Such a view of the human condition entails the conclusion that matter, insofar 
as it is considered in itself, is not evil – since to conceive of rational creatures without it 
is impossible – and prepares the way for a theory of the incarnate Logos that may be 
understood in terms of universal access to divine life for all rational, embodied 
creatures, and whose logic produces justification of material sacrament.  (3) Origen’s 
attempt to defend embodiment on traditional Platonic ground, an aim that he pursues 
by way of caricaturing Celsus as an anti‑traditionalist whose thought fails to grasp the 
vindications of embodied reality that the Platonic tradition contains.  Such an argument, 
not achieved without a certain legerdemain, enables (4) Origen’s move to found the first 
step of the rational being’s ascent on embodiment’s very universality, invoking the Logos 
incarnate as endorsement of the body as a site of holiness and sanctification, and 
materiality as a manifestation of transcendence.  Central to this argument is Origen’s 
conception of the rational soul as created “in the image of God,” a point which, 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combined with a prior assumptions concerning the qualitative superiority of some 
bodies over others, serves both to elevate the standing of the human body, and more 
importantly, to link the embodied rational creature to its prototype, the Logos itself, 
whose image the rational creature bears, and who becomes embodied precisely in order 
to bridge the distance separating embodied souls and divine transcendence.  Such a 
view of divine incarnation and spiritual anthropology enables (5) Origen’s replacement 
of traditional religious forms with a Christian variant, a process that – crucially – retains 
much of the basic content of prior attitudes to cult, despite Origen’s replacement of 
mediating daemons with non‑mediating angels, and the supplanting of mediating 
daemonic rites with eucharistic mediation, conceived as an extension of the incarnation of 
the Logos, but indebted also to traditional, pagan religious notions, expressed in terms of 
symbol and image.  In connection with this position I shall also argue that Origen’s 
explicit rejection of magical and theurgic acts is actually accompanied by the retention of 
much of the intellectual framework attending such acts, including especially the idea of 
the symbolon as a divine presence. 
In the end, Origen retains an idea of cultic efficacy that is predicated on the 
“symbolic” function of materiality in religion rites – a function that is common to both 
pagan and Christian rites as he describes them; however, in his conception, Christian 
rites retain “symbolic” efficacy while pagan rites must lose it, a fact stemming from 
Christianity’s embrace of an incarnate Logos, which serves to liberate matter to function 
“symbolically” in a way that, according to Origen, pagans cannot claim.  Nevertheless, 
the language and thought about cult that he chooses to employ reflect a traditional 
understanding of the operations of cult. 
 
2. Cosmology and Spiritual Anthropology: Corporeality and Rational Beings 
 
To understand Origen’s view of materiality in mediating the ascent of rational 
creatures to God, we must first situate his understanding of the rational soul with the 
frame of his cosmological outlook.  In essence, Origen does not view matter as an 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obstacle to the soul’s return to God; to the contrary, his view of the fallen rational 
creature tends so sharply toward a monist unity of rational essence and matter that he 
can scarcely even conceive of the soul as stable in a bodiless state.  Put more simply, in 
Origen’s view, there are no souls, properly speaking, without bodies.  The “soul” is 
rather a construct that receives its definition and content from the conviction that 
rational human nature has suffered a “fall” from rational divine life into materiality, a 
fall that is understood as the very creation of the material world.303  Prior to this fall, 
there are only rational principles, the logoi that constitute the framework and basis for all 
material creation to follow, and that subsist in the life of God – indeed whose life is 
indistinguishable from divine life.304  As such, although Origen will often describe 
grosser embodied states in pejorative terms, he does not see material embodiment per se 
as an evil; he sees it rather as the condition of every soul, whatever the stage of its 
journey back toward the divine life characteristic of the providential, pre‑material 
creation.  In such a view matter is conceived as an index, rather than a cause of the soul’s 
condition.305    
The crucial distinction in Origen’s construction of the “fall” as creation is 
between God’s providential and his constructional creation, that is, between the “creation” 
of the rational principles (logoi) and relations that stand prior to material cosmic creation, 
and which make the latter possible, eternally sustaining it.306  To grasp this providential, 
                                                       
303 Edwards (2002) argues that Origen embraced body, soul, and spirit as discrete components of 
humanity, and suggests that he resisted allegorizing these components since they formed the 
theoretical basis for his approach to exegesis.  They seem quite literally to be the “parts” of a 
person that can be disassembled.  He further notes that some texts, frequently concerned with the 
fate of “souls” immediately after death, do not hesitate in farming them out to certain psychic 
topographies.  The Dialogue with Heracleides apportions the spirit of the crucified Christ to God, 
his soul to Hades, and his body to the tomb.  As to whether the soul is actually incorporeal in such 
scenarios of literal fracturing is a question that Origen leaves open, as Edwards notes (dial. 7.1‑
8.17.  Edwards [2002] 89). 
304 For this reading of pre‑lapsarian human nature in terms of logoi, the rational principles and 
relations subsisting in the Wisdom of God, I am heavily indebted to P. Tzamalikos’ Origen: 
Cosmology and Ontology of Time (2006) 39‑118. 
305 Cf. Scott (1991) 140. 
306 See the detailed exposition of Tzamalikos (2006) 39‑64.  “We have a creation of logoi, that is, of 
relations, of possibilities, of principles and constitutive and cohesive causes, of laws and 
139 
pre‑material creation is to understand what is in some sense both the origin and 
destination of rational creatures.  It is a creation that is understood to take place within 
the divine life, where certain divine “objects of contemplation” (θεωρήματα) or 
“concepts” (ἐννοήματα) come to subsist within the divine Wisdom, adorning Wisdom 
in their multiplicity and embracing the “reasons” (λόγοι) of all things.  In this 
providential creation, the will of God brings about a repletion of Wisdom with these 
incorporeal principles.  Wisdom, embracing these incorporeal principles that are 
conceived as the framework of the material world, is herself a conception of the Son – 
that is, a way of conceiving the Son of God based on the hierarchy of scriptural 
predicates applied to the Son and carefully delineated in Origen’s exegesis307 – the Son 
who is the “invisible image of the invisible God,”308 and who is thus conceptualized as 
the “Wisdom” of God and the “Word” (Logos) of God, who shares perfectly in the 
Father’s divinity without diminishing it,309 pre‑existing the creation of the material 
cosmos and dwelling eternally with God.310  This is not to assert a simple identity, as if 
                                                                                                                                                                    
causalities of all kinds” (44). Tzamalikos further notes C.Cels. 6.65, where Origen argues that 
material creation is held in existence by the continual willing of the Logos.   
307 See Tzamalikos (2006) 58‑61. 
308 Princ. 1.2.6.  Translation is that of Butterworth (1966) throughout.  While citation of the Princ. 
runs up against the perennial problem of Rufinus rather free translation, composed as part of an 
effort to defend Origen against later detractors, it should be noted that modern studies, while 
acknowledging its liberties, have found little that appears to be deliberate distortion.  Fragments 
taken from the writings of Jerome or Justinian, however, and often included in Koetschau’s text 
and Butterworth’s translation, ought plainly to be read with greater caution.  See Edwards (2002) 
5.  I shall proceed form the assumption that the case for any given point is stronger where 
material from Princ. is demonstrably akin to surviving Greek texts. 
309 They are foolish “who imagine for themselves certain emanations, splitting the divine nature 
into parts and, so far as they can, dividing God the Father.” qui prolationes quasdam sibi ipsi 
depingunt, ut divinam naturam in partes vocent et deum patrem quantum in se est dividant (Princ. 
1.2.6.172‑174). 
310 The is construed Son as divine agent, but is ever qualified as co‑eternal: “We recognize that 
God was always the Father of his only‑begotten son, who was born indeed from and draws his 
being from him, but is yet without any beginning, not only of that kind which can be 
distinguished by periods of time, but even of that other kind which the mind alone is wont to 
contemplate in itself and perceive, if I may say so, with the bare intellect and reason.” …nos 
semper deum patrem novimus unigeniti filii sui, ex ipso quidem nati et quod est ab ipso trahentis, sine ullo 
tamen initio, non solum eo, quod aliquibus temporum spatiis distingui potest, sed ne illo quidem, quod sola 
apud semet ipsam mens intueri solet et nudo, ut ita dixerim, intellectu atque animo conspicari. (Princ. 
140 
“Son,” “Wisdom” and “Logos” were mere synonyms, although at times Rufinus’ 
rendering of De Principiis suggests something of a straightforward alignment.311   Rather, 
Wisdom and Logos, as scriptural conceptions of the one Son, entail no distinction in 
essence, but rather in aspect.  Origen places these conceptions in a descending order, 
starting with Wisdom and Logos, and descending through “life,” “truth,” “justice,” and 
so forth, where each subordinate conception is subsumed by the higher, and defined as a 
more focused and refined aspect of the higher.  Thus it is possible to say that “the Logos 
is the Wisdom of God manifested in such a way that she can be perceived by rational 
creatures.  Creation contains rationality, and it is through this rationality that creation 
manifests God’s wisdom.”312  Thus it is possible to see Origen’s careful working out of 
relations between Son, Word, and Wisdom as central to his larger account of divine 
creativity.   Thus it is entirely fitting to describe the logoi as “precious stones” adorning 
the “body of Wisdom”313 or to speak of Wisdom herself as “multi‑embroidered” bearing 
the “objects of contemplation as a decoration.”314  Likewise sensible is a passage in De 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1.2.2).   For an economical discussion of earliy Christian Logos‑theology, and Origen’s place 
within it, see Jenson (1997): Justin Martyr is an earlier expositor for whom the Logos is a 
mediating principle, “subordinate in divinity … God from the viewpoint of temporal beings but 
temporal from the viewpoint of God,” and who can therefore inform and engage the temporal 
world in a manner that the timeless, transcendent God does not.  Origen contributes to this 
theology by developing the notion that the Logos is the actualization of God’s own perfect self‑
knowledge whose own susbsistence is therefore defined in terms of his contemplation of the 
Father, and whose “generation,” furthermore, is eternal.  The Word of Gos is thus made an 
eternal hypostasis generated timelessly within the very life of God – ideas that would be central 
to subsequent Christian theological reflection (Jenson 97‑99). 
311 Such as  he makes the Father unintelligible without the Son as co‑eternal Word: “Let him who 
assigns a beginning to the Word of God or the wisdom of God beware lest he utters impiety 
against the unbegotten Father himself, in denying that he was always a Father and that he begat 
the Word and possessed Wisdom in all previous times or ages….” Qui autem initium dat verbo dei 
vel sapientiae dei, intuere ne magis in ipsum ingenitum patrem impietatem suam iactet, cum eum neget 
semper patrem fuisse et genuisse verbum et habuisse sapientiam in omnibus anterioribus vel temporibus 
vel saeculis…. (Princ. 1.2.3).   
312 Tzamalikos (2006) 59.  “Again, the Logos is God’s wisdom that creates life and rationality.”  
Tzamalikos goes on carefully to note that “there is no difference in essence between Wisdom and 
Logos; neither is there any ontological classification of them, simply because there is no 
substantial distinction between them at all.  The distinction is only an intellectual one.” 
313 C.Cels. 6.77.  Text cited in Tzamalikos (2006) 54. 
314 Cf. Eph. 3.10; C.Cels. 5.37.  Texts cited in Tzamalikos (2006) 53. 
141 
Principiis where Wisdom is conceptualized as Logos precisely insofar as she “fashions 
beforehand and contains within herself the species and causes of the entire creation,” 
functioning as  a kind of pre‑existent template, within the reasons of all creation come 
into their proper relations.315  Wisdom is thus not only an agent for the creation of the 
material world, but also the divine venue for the creation of rational nature prior to the 
material world’s generation.316   This “prior,” providential creation, conceptually 
preceding the creation of the cosmos itself, and the theoretical place of Wisdom within 
it, is further elaborated in a fragment from the Commentary on John: 
The Son of God is also called Wisdom (σοφία), made as a beginning 
of his ways towards his works, according to the Proverbs; which 
means that wisdom existed only in relation to him, of whom she was 
wisdom, having no relation to anyone else at all; but the Son of God 
himself became God’s benevolent decision and willed to bring 
creatures into being.  This wisdom then willed to establish a creative 
relation to the future creatures; this is precisely the meaning of the 
saying that she was made the beginning of God’s ways.317 
 
Here Wisdom is a subsisting divine hypostasis who becomes (γενόμενος) divine 
benevolence insofar as God wills the existence of creatures (κτίσματα).  This initial 
creation, in which Wisdom moves out of that exclusive relation (σχέσις) to that one 
                                                       
315 “Now just as we have learned in what sense wisdom is the ‘beginning of the ways’ of God and 
is said to have been created, in the sense, namely, that she fashions beforehand and contains 
within herself the species and causes of the entire creation, in the same manner also must wisdom 
be understood to be the Word of God.” Quali autem modo intelleximus sapientiam ʹinitium viarumʹ 
dei esse, et quomodo creata esse dicitur, species scilicet in se et rationes totius praeformans et continens 
creaturae: hoc modo etiam verbum dei eam esse intellegendum est (Princ. 1.2.3). 
316 “This Son, then, is also the truth and the life of all things that exist; and rightly so.  For the 
things that were made, how could they live, except by the gift of life?  Or the things that exist, 
how could they really and truly exist, unless they were derived from the truth?  Or how could 
rational beings exist, unless the Word or reason had existed before them? Hic ergo filius etiam 
omnium quae sunt veritas est et vita; et recte. Nam quomodo viverent quae facta sunt, nisi ex vita? vel 
quomodo veritate constarent ea quae sunt, nisi ex veritate descenderent? vel quomodo rationabiles esse 
possent substantiae, nisi verbum vel ratio praecederet? (Princ. 1.2.4) 
317 λέγεται δὲ καὶ σοφία ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ υἱός, ἀρχὴ ὁδῶν τοῦ θεοῦ κτισθεῖσα κατὰ τὴν τῶν 
Παροιμιῶν γραφήν, ὅτι ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ σοφία, πρὸς τὸν οὗ ἐστι σοφία ὑπάρχουσα, οὐδεμίαν 
σχέσιν πρὸς ἕτερόν τινα εἶχεν, ἀλλ’ εὐδοκία θεοῦ γενόμενος τὰ κτίσματα ὑπάρξαι 
ἠβουλήθη. ἠθέλησεν οὖν ἀναλαβεῖν αὕτη ἡ σοφία σχέσιν δημιουργικὴν πρὸς τὰ ἐσόμενα καὶ 
τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ δηλούμενον διὰ τοῦ ἐκτίσθαι αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν τοῦ θεοῦ  (frJohn I. Text quoted 
and translated in Tzamalikos [2006] 48). 
142 
“whose wisdom she is,” and into a relationship with “creatures,” is demarcated from a 
second, in which “this Wisdom” (αὕτη ἡ σοφία) wills to take up a further, demiurgic 
relation (σχέσις δημιουργική) to creatures yet to be (τὰ ἐσόμενα).  It is view given 
deeper substance elsewhere in the commentary, where Origen argues that  
if someone is able to comprehend a bodiless existence comprised of 
the various objects of contemplation which embrace the principles 
[λόγους] of the universe – an existence which is living and animate, 
as it were – he will understand the wisdom of God prior to all 
creation, which appropriately says of herself, “God created me the 
beginning of his ways for his works.”  It is because of this creation 
that the whole creation has been able to subsist, since it has a share in 
the divine wisdom according to which it has been created….318 
 
The coeternal Son is thus conceptualized as Wisdom, an incorporeal essence (ἀσώματος 
ὑπόστασις) comprised of “intricate objects of contemplation” (ποικίλων θεωρημάτων) 
that contain all the governing principles (λόγοι) of creation, and timelessly subsisting in 
a manner that transcends the created world (ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν κτίσιν).  The passage 
furthermore makes explicit the claim that this prior world – the world of pure rational 
principles and relations – is a “creation” that is the necessary precondition for the 
subsistence of the cosmos: it is the “creation” by means of which “creation” subsists (Δι’ 
ἣν κτίσιν δεδύνηται καὶ πᾶσα κτίσις ὑφεστάναι).319 
                                                       
318 Εἰ δέ τις οἷός τέ ἐστιν ἀσώματον ὑπόστασιν ποικίλων θεωρημάτων περιεχόντων τοὺς τῶν 
ὅλων λόγους ζῶσαν καὶ οἱονεὶ ἔμψυχον ἐπινοεῖν, εἴσεται τὴν ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν κτίσιν σοφίαν τοῦ 
θεοῦ καλῶς περὶ αὑτῆς λέγουσαν∙ «Ὁ θεὸς ἔκτισέ με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἔργα αὐτοῦ». Δι’ 
ἣν κτίσιν δεδύνηται καὶ πᾶσα κτίσις ὑφεστάναι, οὐκ ἀνένδοχος οὖσα θείας σοφίας, καθ’ ἣν 
γεγένηται (commJohn 1, 34.  Text quoted and translated in Tzamalikos [2006]). 
319 See also C. Cels. 5.39.  In his Expositio in Proverbia, Origen further elaborates, depicting the 
Wisdom of God as “a subsistent being who exists before the aeons and existed before creation as 
a timeless being; when she established a relation to creatures, then she became the beginning of 
God’s ways, both of the constructional and providential; so this beginning has been yoked 
together with the creatures, as she became their beginning, relating herself to them by creating 
them; yet this wisdom is timeless and exists as a substantial subject with God before all aeons.” 
Οὐσία οὖσα ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ σοφία, πρὸ αἰώνων γεγένηται, καὶ πρὸ κτίσεως ἀΐδιος ἦν∙ ὅτε δὲ 
σχέσιν πρὸς τὰ γεννητὰ ἐδέξατο, τότε ἀρχὴ τῶν ὁδῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ γέγονε τῶν ποιητικῶν καὶ 
προνοητικῶν∙ σύζυγος οὖν ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῖς κτίσμασιν ὧν γέγονεν ἀρχὴ, τουτέστιν ἡ πρὸς τὰ 
γεννητὰ σχέσις∙ ἡ δὲ σοφία ἀΐδιος, οὐσιωδῶς πρὸ αἰώνων παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ ὑπάρχουσα (exProv 8, 
text quoted in Tzamalikos [2006] 39). 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 It should already be evident how such reasoning naturally applies to particular 
beings in the created order, as well.  If we conceive of creation as, in a primary sense, 
“the concepts  of God” which are, in a secondary sense, “somehow substantified and 
[come] into actuality,” then it is a straightforward matter that all existing things are 
traceable in their origins to created logoi subsisting in the divine life – that “one by one 
the reasons of those ruled are in God’s Logos and in his Wisdom.”320  That is, every 
existing being derives from and subsists under governing rational principles that are 
created within the life of God, and contemplated as adorning constituents of divine 
Wisdom.  Crucially, these “reasons” subsisting in a primary state are not “essences” – 
i.e., they are not “essentialized” or “substantified” (οὐσιωμένων) until their 
participation in the created cosmos.  That is to say, the rational, embodied creature in the 
world has as his point of origin an incorporeal principle in the life of God, though it is 
not a life of a fully individuated essence or hypostasis.  Origen’s is not a world of 
incorporeal essences occupying a pre‑material Platonic shadowland prior to declining 
into material bodies.321  Indeed, he rejects such a claim categorically in his treatment of 
Jesus’ claim to be “not of this world.”  Origen here notes that it is difficult to explain 
Jesus’ meaning, and he hesitates to try, lest one incur the “risk of giving some men the 
impression that we are affirming the existence of certain imaginary forms which the 
Greeks call ‘ideas.’  For it is certainly foreign to our mode of reasoning to speak of an 
incorporeal world that exists solely in the mind’s fancy or the substantial region of 
                                                       
320τὰ ἐννοήματα τοῦ Θεοῦ … οὐσιωμένων πως ἐπακολουθεῖν καὶ εἰς ἔργον ἐρχομένων … οἱ 
καθ’ ἕνα λόγοι τῶν διοικουμένων εἰσὶν ἐν τῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγῳ καὶ τῇ Σοφίᾳ αὐτοῦ (commEph, 
Fr. VI, pp.240‑41, text quoted in Tzamalikos [2006] 49). 
321 Origen’s distinction is between the γένεσις of providential creation and the γέννησις or κτίσις 
of the constructional creation.  See frMatt 11, selPs 32.  To be sure, the providential creation entails 
the “making of the substance” of rational creatures – a making that is “in Wisdom” (selPs 32, PG 
12.1305); but this is entirely distinct from the creation of discrete essences, as Origen makes 
explicit in his description of a “living Wisdom” that mediates the creation of distinct, living, 
material beings: “And it must be said that after having created a living Wisdom, so to speak, he 
entrusted her to present, from the types in her, shape and form to existing things and to matter, 
and I attend especially to whether this holds true also for individual essences.” Καὶ λεκτέον ὅτι 
κτίσας, ἵν’ οὕτως εἴπω, ἔμψυχον σοφίαν ὁ θεός, αὐτῇ ἐπέτρεψεν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ τύπων τοῖς 
οὖσι καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ <παρασχεῖν καὶ> τὴν πλάσιν καὶ τὰ εἴδη, ἐγὼ δὲ ἐφίστημι εἰ καὶ τὰς οὐσίας 
(commJohn 1.19, cited in Tzamalikos [2006] 85‑86, 88). 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mind.”322  Origen’s conception of human nature in its providential condition must be 
grasped in light of this understanding.  The creation of humankind in the “image of 
God”323 does not involve molding from earth and is therefore not material, being rather 
“greater than all bodily existence.”324  This non‑material humanity, which still transcends 
the category of essence at this particular stage, Origen explicitly defines elsewhere in a 
manner that excludes the notion of individual hypostases, arguing that it is not human 
individuals but rather human nature that is created within the Wisdom of God: “The 
story of Adam and his sin will be interpreted philosophically by those who know that 
Adam means anthropos (man) in the Greek language, and that in what appears to be 
concerned with Adam Moses is speaking of the nature of man.”325  Here, in the scriptural 
language describing the death of all humanity in Adam we are to understand “the 
divine word as speaking not so much about an individual as of the whole race.”326  
Origen can be seen to preserve this tendency to abstract this original humanity from its 
bodily manifestations wherever other texts give him occasion to comment on Genesis, in 
which he locates a distinction between abstracted human nature and particular human 
identities that is preserved in the Hebrew distinction between man‑woman (particular 
human identities) and male‑female (universal human nature).   In reflecting back on 
Genesis in his Commentary on Matthew, Origen notes that   
“in the case of those who are formed “after the image,” the words were 
not “husband and wife” but “male and female.” But we have also 
observed this in the Hebrew, for man is indicated by the word “is,” 
                                                       
322 ne forte aliquibus praebeatur occasio illius intellegentiae, qua putent nos imagines quasdam, quas Graeci 
ideas nominant, adfirmare: quod utique a nostris rationibus alienum est, mundum incorporeum dicere, in 
sola mentis fantasia vel cogitationum lubrico consistentem (Princ. 2.3.6. Text cited in Tzamalikos [2006] 
94). 
323 See Gen. 1.26‑27. 
324 τὸ ‘κατ’ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ’ … κρεῖττον πάσης σωματικῆς ὑποστάσεως (dial; BGF, v.16, p. 374; 
citation from Tzamalikos [2006] 40).  The same distinction, framed in terms of Paul’s 
differentiation between the inner and outer man, may be found in the Commentary on the Canticle 
Prologue 2.4‑5. See Tzamalikos (2006) 41. 
325 οὕτω δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας αὐτοῦ φιλοσοφήσουσιν οἱ ἐγνωκότες ὅτι 
καθ’ ἑλλάδα φωνὴν ὁ Ἀδὰμ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς δοκοῦσι περὶ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ εἶναι 
φυσιολογεῖ Μωϋσῆς τὰ περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως (C. Cels 4.40; cf. 7.50). 
326 οὐχ οὕτως περὶ ἑνός τινος ὡς περὶ ὅλου τοῦ γένους ταῦτα φάσκοντος τοῦ θείου λόγου 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but male by the word “zachar,” and again woman by the word “essa,” 
but female by the word “agkeba.” For at no time is it “woman” or 
“man” “after the image,” but the superior class, the male, and the 
second, the female.327 
 
Thus, quite straightforwardly, fully individuated man and woman are not the elements 
bearing the divine image, which is reserved for the separate category of male‑female.  
Only an abstracted humanity is in the “divine image,” properly speaking, and as such, 
the Son as Logos and Wisdom, is conceivable both as the perfect image of God328 to which 
the rational human being can be assimilated, and as a repository of all rational principles 
and relations that constitute God’s providential creation.329  Within the parameters of 
such a scheme, there are as yet no human individuals per se, and as such no question of 
embodiment can even arise.  Man “in the image” is a kind of pure rationality, 
transcendent not only of “soul” but of identity itself; identity, on the other hand, is 
conceivable only in the fall, and may be predicated only of embodied rational 
creatures.330  Origen may thus be seen to stake out a position that excludes dualism.  
                                                       
327 ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν κατ’ εἰκόνα οὐκ ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνὴ εἴρηται, ἀλλὰ «ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ». τοῦτο δὲ καὶ 
ἐν τῷ Ἑβραϊκῷ τετηρήκαμεν∙ ἀνὴρ μὲν γὰρ δηλοῦται τῇ ΙΣ φωνῇ, ἄρρεν δὲ τῇ ΖΑΧΑΡ∙ καὶ 
πάλιν γυνὴ μὲν τῇ ΕΣΣΑ φωνῇ, θῆλυ δὲ τῇ ΟΥΝΚΗΒΑ∙ οὐδέποτε γὰρ γυνὴ κατ’ εἰκόνα οὐδὲ 
ἀνήρ, ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν διαφέροντες ἄρρεν οἱ δὲ δεύτεροι θῆλυ (CommMatt 14, 16).  Tzamalikos 
(2006) 42. 
328 “The Father’s image is reproduced in the son, whose birth from the father is as it were an act of 
his will proceeding from the mind.” imago patris deformatur in filio, qui utique natus ex eo est velut 
quaedam voluntas eius ex mente procedens (Princ. 1.2.6.163‑164). “Rather, must we suppose that as an 
act of will proceeds from the mind without either cutting off any part of the mind or being 
separated or divided from it, in some similar fashion has the Father begotten the Son, who is 
indeed his image…. Magis ergo sicut voluntas procedit e mente et neque partem aliquam mentis secat 
neque ab ea separatur aut dividitur: tali quandam specie putandus est pater filium genuisse, imaginem 
scilicet suam…. (Princ. 1.2.6.178‑183). 
329 Edwards notes that it is this distinction between a primary creation of the “inner man,” and a 
secondary creation of the outer, embodied man, that gives rise to the assumption that the initial 
creation must have been of incorporeal souls, and hence the assumption of Origen’s 
straightforward Platonism (2002) 89. 
330 Reading the passage on the incorporeality of the Trinity, Edwards argues that the soul even at 
its highest – as “pure mind” prior to the fall – must be conceieved as at least tenuously embodied, 
an argument adduced in support of the claim that Origen believed in no prior world of incorporeal 
souls: “If strict incorporeality is so deciduous, it follows that there can be no timeless realm – at 
least no peopled realm of pure intelligences such as commonly alleged to have been posited by 
Origen….” (2002) 96.  This account, though, while correct in judging that there is no prior realm 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When we think of rational creatures, we introduce a division between an incorporeal 
element and a corporeal element that is purely an intellectual exercise.  As Origen 
stresses, “it is only in idea and in thought that a material substance is separable from 
[rational beings], and although this substance seems to have been produced for them or 
after them, yet they have never lived, nor do they live without it.”331  Such rational 
creatures are therein completely distinct from the divine life, since “life without a body 
is found in the Trinity alone.”332 
  For Origen, reality in its wholeness may be described as three‑tiered: (1) the 
transcendent life of God; (2) God’s “providential” creation in which God creates all of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
that is “peopled,” properly speaking, does not take into account Origen’s narrative of the 
providential creation, which is by no means an outlook that requires belief in “an infinite series of 
worlds before the present one,” as Edwards implies it does.  He does glance at Origen’s idea of 
created logika, but argues that their neuter gender precludes their serious standing as discrete 
identities, which is surely correct, though he sees no connection between them and the  principles 
and relations that are the constituents of human nature prior to the “fall” and creation of distinct 
human beings.  He rejects logika on the further grounds that Origen denies a Platonic world of 
“forms” or “ideas,” which is also true; but the logika need not be simply forms or the “ideas” of 
God to be created principles that subsist in the life of divine Wisdom prior to “falling“ to bring 
about the coherence of emodied rational beings (96). 
331 It was hardly unprecedented in Origen’s time to conceive of human identity in terms of 
“mind” or “soul,” and yet to deny the possibility of incorporeal existence for such.  “Aristotle … 
urged the pursuit of contemplation on the grounds that the mind is what we truly are, and yet his 
premiss that every nature is a composite of form and matter forbade him to endorse the Platonic 
notion of a separable soul.” Other thinkers, too – Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus – in 
various ways and to varying extents, saw the human being principally as “soul” rather than as 
composite, but were nevertheless bedeviled by a need to keep the soul, or at least part of it, in some 
kind of attenuated embodiment   (Edwards [2002] 95, citing Nicomachean Ethics 1178a). 
332 [necessitas consequentiae ac rationis coartat intellegi] … materialem vero substantiam opinione quidem 
et intellectu solo separari ab eis et pro ipsis vel post ipsas effectam videri, sed numquam sine ipsa eas vel 
vixisse vel vivere: solius namque trinitatis incorporea vita existere recte putabitur (Princ. 2.2.2. Text 
quoted in Tzamalikos [2006] 94‑95).  Scott (1991) comes very close to Tzamalikos’ view, 
suggesting, for instance, that Origen “regarded it as an essential characteristic of any created 
rational nature that it exist in a body,” and offering this interpretation as a riposte to Jerome and 
Justinian, who proposed that Origen believed in a thoroughly incorporeal soul that fell into 
embodiment through sin, to be returned to thorough incorporeality in the final reconciliation.  
God, in this reading of Origen, “is an incorporeal unity” while “rational creation is always 
material multiplicity.” Furthermore, Origen himself uses the term “incorporeal” to designate only 
the soul’s separation from an earthly body, not to designate its absolute condition (153‑54).  See 
also Edwards (2002), who affirms embodiment even for “mind,” and denies the possibility of any 
prior existence for human beings that is incorporeal. 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the principles an relations that will function as the armature of “subsequent” material 
creation, and which “live” only in the divine life as the adornments of divine Wisdom; 
(3) the “fallen” world of material creation. 333  Within this scheme, when we speak of 
rational beings we must do so bearing in mind that we are speaking not of pre‑existing 
hypostases who through a defect have fallen from their proper or original standing; 
rather, we are speaking of beings who have no discrete essential existence prior to the 
coming to be of a material creation.  The rational creature is thus conceived in unitive 
terms, with the sole reservation that the incorporeal “element” – understood 
theoretically and not as a constituent part – represents the point of affinity between God 
and the world.334 
  Origen is notoriously evasive about presenting the details of the fall, and in 
sketching a thoroughgoing theory of the soul, but he is quite open about the grounds of 
his reservations.  He fears lest he reveal ultimate mysteries in speaking of such matters, 
even if he should accurately enunciate a “true doctrine.”335  It is clear, though, that he 
views the incorporeal principles that have their life “in Wisdom” as not consubstantial 
with God.336  At the same time, these created incorporeals cannot be conceived of as not 
living, as might be suggested by the Philonic notion of “ideas” or “forms” in the mind of 
God.  As Tzamalikos rightly points out, such an idea renders the very idea of a “fall” 
absurd.337  The incorporeal principles must in some sense be living and Origen seems to 
construct their paradoxical life as the timeless life of Christ – a life that is so participatory 
that it is not defined as discrete identity, though it is not consubstantial either.338  It is not 
a paradox that can be easily resolved, but it is sufficient to note that it is from this state 
that the “fall” occurs.  Contra Celsum, in the context of a discussion of the advent of evil, 
                                                       
333 Tzamalikos (2006) 70‑71. 
334 ibid. 95. 
335 ibid. 66‑69; see especially commJohn 20.2. 
336 See commJohn 13.25.  Text cited in Tzamalikos (2006) 72. 
337 Tzamalikos (2006) 73.  Indeed, Origen argues in commJohn that the destruction that the fallen 
devil’s destruction of the human race – here again distinguished from individual creatures – is an 
actual “death” of something “living”; as Origen puts it, “Strictly speaking, no one can be said to 
be dead unless he lived before” (commJohn 20.25.  Text quoted in Tzamalikos [2006] 77‑78). 
338 ibid. 74. 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supplies a celebrated locus, in which Origen describes the fall as a “moulting” from the 
body of Wisdom, wherein “one” falls away and is subsequently followed by others who 
decline by his pernicious lead.339  In De Principiis, Origen presents an allegorical reading 
of Ezekiel, in which the Prince of Tyre is said to have been “stainless in [his] days … until 
the time that iniquities were found in [him.]”  Where previously he was “in the midst of 
fiery stones,” he is cast down from “the mountain of God.”340  Contra Celsum picks up the 
imagery, where Origen assimilates a mystical theory of resurrection to Jesus’ own 
descriptive language of his body as a “temple.”  The “righteous,” in this scheme, are 
“every sort of chosen and precious stone,” and the “temple” of the resurrected Lord 
“will be rebuilt with living and precious stones.”  Origen continues, “This obscurely 
refers to the doctrine that each of those who are united in the same logos … is a precious 
stone of the entire temple of God.”341  Often in the Greek texts the language describing 
the fall of “one” is less pejorative, though this is not uniformly the case.  Where Rufinus’ 
Latin refers to “an adverse power,” Origen elsewhere refers simply to “one,” who “fell 
from bliss.”  Classing this “one” as one among many “rulers” (ἀρχόντων), he notes that 
“while he was in divine reality, he fell.”342  In Contra Celsum, it is in the train of this 
“one,” now evil (πονηρός), that others follow.  Those who follow are re‑fashioned in the 
image of this first one who fell, who was “earthly” and deserved to be something 
molded by the Lord, made to be mocked by his angels, and who is thus the one “from 
whom the images of that earthly man come and receive their imprint.”343  As Tzamalikos 
puts it, “As far as we [sc. humans] are concerned, our true substance, too, is in our being 
according to the image of the creator, but the substance resulting from guilt is in the 
thing molded, which was received from the dust of the earth.”344  Crucially, though, this 
advent of bodily nature, despite its adaptation to a mythos of a fallen devil, is not 
                                                       
339 C.Cels. 6.43  
340 Princ. 1.4.4.  Text quoted in Tzamalikos (2006) 75. 
341 C.Cels. 8.19, 20.  Text quoted in Tzamalikos (2006) 80. 
342 commJohn 32.18.  Text quoted in Tzamalikos (2006) 75‑76. 
343 commJohn 20.22.  Text quoted in Tzamalikos (2006) 78. 
344 78. 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described in strictly pejorative terms.  A material world is a necessary thing; it is 
“material because of those who need material life.”345 
  The present argument does not intend to resolve all of the mysteries of the fall, as 
Origen conceives it.  What is clear, though, and what is reinforced by Origen’s imagery, 
is that what falls is equivalent to the ornaments that adorn the body of Wisdom in the 
providential creation, which are not differentiated individual hypostases prior to the fall, 
which is the event that precipitates “multitude of number,” “schism,” and “division.”346  
That is to say, for Origen the fall is simply not a straightforward narrative of “pre‑
existing personal incorporeal rational creatures, which received a body.”347  Even when 
Origen adopts the Platonic metaphor of “moulting” in Contra Celsum, he is careful to 
distinguish his outlook from Plato’s, claiming that is has “an ineffable and mystical 
sense, which is higher than the notion of Plato who holds that the soul comes down and 
moults ‘until it finds something solid.’”348  In fact, he deliberately rejects the notion of a 
transcendent world of independent essences, rather viewing such differentiation as 
characteristic of the material creation.  For Origen, individual essences are created only 
when rational principles fall from God, and even then their essence is defined in terms 
of relation  to God.  The fallen creature in its rational being is changeable in its 
responsiveness to God, by virtue of its mind and will, which stand in affinity to the 
Logos who is the source of its being.  In like manner, the material body, too, is 
changeable, adaptable to the condition of the rational being and to the purposes of 
God.349   The essence of the creature, then, is not conceived as a preceding entity that is 
subsequently clothed in flesh, but rather in terms of a rational relating to divine Logos, 
where the degree of the relation or affinity is indicative of the material quality of the 
being.  Thus we may conclude that whatever is of a personal, individual essence is 
always corporeal; that the subsistence of any independent person is – conceptually 
                                                       
345 commJohn 19.20.  Text quoted in Tzamalikos (2006) 78.  Cf. Scott (1991) 140. 
346 Tzamalikos (2006) 79.  See Scott (1991) 153‑54. 
347 ibid. 81. 
348 C.Cels. 4.40.  Text quoted in Tzamalikos (2006) 81; cf. Phaedr. 246B. 
349 See Princ. 3.6.7.  Text cited in Tzamalikos (2006) 91. 
150 
understood – a weaving together of the corporeal and the non‑corporeal, where the two 
terms denote a conceptual distinction rather than an actual dualism.   
  Although rational beings are understood to exist in unitive rather than in 
composite terms, they are nevertheless conceived in terms of elements.  The conceptual 
element that is common to every rational being is the “rational essence” (λογικὴ οὐσία) 
that supplies an affinity to God.  “Soul” is Origen’s term for “a state of mind applying to 
human being only;”350 hence it is possible to define a “man” as a “soul using a body.”  
When confronting the implicit dualism in such a statement, though, we ought to bear in 
mind Origen’s claim elsewhere that although soul and body may be construed as  
“contrary by nature,” (φύσει ἐναντία) a human being is in reality “one unity” (μίαν 
κρᾶσιν).351   
Such an understanding of the human person as a unity that properly exists only 
in a state of fallen embodiment – such that Origen may say elsewhere that a rational 
being is “an existence which rationally capable of feeling and movement”352 – may help 
us in grasping why it is that elsewhere Origen seems to construe the term “soul” as if it 
were applicable only to a fallen condition, such as in his explanation in De Principiis of 
beings whose ardor “cooled” such that they fell away from divine contemplation.  
“Soul” (psyche) in this construction becomes for Origen a term etymologically derived 
from the idea of “coolness,” and represents not so much the soul’s original state as the 
condition into which it falls: 
If therefore the things which are holy are termed fire and light and 
fervent things while their opposites are termed cold, and the love of 
sinners is said to grow cold, we must ask whether perhaps even the 
word soul, which in Greek is Psyche, was not formed from psychesthai, 
with the idea of growing cold after having been in a divine or better 
state, and whether it was not derived from thence because the soul 
seems to have grown cold by the loss of its first natural and divine 
                                                       
350 Tzamalikos (2006) 97. 
351 commJohn 13L.  Text quoted in Tzamalikos (2006) 97. 
352 Princ. 8.8.2.  Text quoted in Tzamalikos (2006) 96. 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warmth and on that account to have been placed in its present place 
with its present designation.353 
 
As the argument unfolds, it becomes evident that Origen views rational “souls” in their 
original state principally as “mind,” – nous / mens – a view that is perhaps not surprising 
given his view of the “providential” creation just surveyed.  Though he frequently 
seems willing to invoke language suggestive of classical models of the soul’s partition, 
as if viewing the mind (nous / mens) as the soul’s higher part, 354 its “rational essence,” he 
hesitates to apply the term “soul” to such a condition.  Bodiless rationality cannot be 
“soul,” a term theoretically reserved for a fallen condition: “When the mind departed 
from its original condition and dignity it became or was termed a soul (anima), and if 
ever it is restored and corrected it returns to the condition of being a mind (mens).”355  At 
times he is open even to explaining the fallen soul in terms of the accumulation of other 
faculties, such that it functions as “a kind of medium between the weak flesh and the 
willing spirit” – not quite mind, but certainly not flesh.356 
Though such an outlook may be redolent of certain traditional concerns over 
which “parts” of the soul are proper to the material world, and which to the world of 
                                                       
353  Si ergo ea quidem, quae sancta sunt, ignis et lumen et ferventia nominantur, quae autem contraria 
sunt, frigida, et ʹcaritasʹ peccatorum dicitur ʹrefrigescereʹ, requirendum est ne forte et nomen animae, quod 
graece dicitur ψυχή, a refrigescendo de statu diviniore ac meliore dictum sit et translatum inde, quod ex 
calore illo naturali et divino refrixisse videatur, et ideo in hoc quo nunc est et statu et vocabulo sita sit. 
(Princ. 2.8.3). 
354 He inquires whether it is the soul, properly speaking, that may be saved, or even whether it 
may be “called a soul” when it is saved: si cum ad beatitudinem venerit, iam anima non dicetur? 
(2.8.2)  He further speculates that “perhaps that which is being saved is called a soul, but when it 
is saved it will be called by the name of its more perfect part.” ita fortassis etiam hoc quod salvatur 
anima dicitur; cum autem iam salva facta fuerit, ex perfectioris partis suae vocabulo nuncupabitur  (2.8.3).  
Origen is in part concerned to reconcile his own psychology to Pauline distinctions between soul 
(anima) and spirit / mind (spiritus / mens), noting that “Paul … joins and associates the mind 
rather than the soul with the Holy Spirit…. He does not say, I will pray with the soul, but with 
the spirit and the mind.” Paulus … mentem magis quam animam spiritui sancto coniungit et sociat….  
Et non dicit quia anima orabo, sed ʹspiritu et menteʹ  (Princ. 2.8.2).  
355 … mens de statu ac dignitate sua declinans, effecta vel nuncupata est anima; quae si reparata fuerit et 
correcta, redit in hoc, ut sit mens (Princ. 2.8.3). 
356 unde videtur quasi medium quiddam esse animam inter ʹcarnem infirmamʹ et ʹspiritum promptumʹ 
(Princ. 2.8.4). 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intelligibles,357 Origen’s thought surely strives to move beyond such tendencies toward 
partition.  Informed by his unitive view of the human person, where the disposition of 
“rational natures” becomes the index of their relation to God, he rather envisions a 
cosmos layered with fallen rational beings, where each ascending tier of reality – from 
the Devil and demons, to angels and archangels – is characterized by a degree of 
heightened participation in rationality, and where ascent to God – just as further descent 
– remains possible, with the responsibility for such ascent resting upon the free will of 
each rational soul.  In the course of explaining how rational beings, subjected to 
”corrections” (emendationes) supplied by still higher powers (angels and still loftier 
agents), may thereby advance to higher levels of reality, Origen concludes that  
it appears to follow from this … that every rational nature can, in the 
process of passing from one order to another, travel under each order 
to all the rest, and from all to each, while undergoing the various 
movements of progress or the reverse in accordance with its own 
actions and endeavors and with the use of its own power of free 
will.358   
 
Jerome states the matter differently, in manner that seems deliberately calculated to 
rouse the specter of metempsychosis, but the sense of fluidity is nonetheless maintained: 
“souls that are born on this earth of ours would either come from the lower world again 
to a higher place and assume a human body, in consequence of their desire for better 
things, or else would descend to us from better places.”359  The Origenist cosmos 
                                                       
357 He does subscribe to the Christian distinction between mind (nous), which is fallen, and 
unfallen spirit (pneuma), just as he is Platonic in viewing the mind as incorporeal.  Scott (1991) 
116; Cf. Crouzel (1956) 131, Bettencourt (1945) 9. 
358 Ex quo … hoc consequentia ipsa videtur ostendere, unamquamque rationabilem naturam posse ab uno 
in alterum ordinem transeuntem per singulos in omnes, et ab omnibus in singulos pervenire, dum accessus 
profectuum defectuum ve varios pro motibus vel conatibus propriis unusquisque pro liberi arbitrii facultate 
perpetitur (Princ. 1.6.3). 
359 … [animae] quae in ista terra nostra nascuntur animae, uel de inferno rursum meliora cupientes ad 
superiora ueniunt et humanum corpus adsumunt uel de melioribus locis ad nos usque descendunt…. 
(Princ. 4.3.10, Koetschau = Jerome, Ep. ad Avitum [124] 11).  It is interesting to note the subtle 
difference between the translation of Rufinus (Princ. 1.6.3) and this fragment, since the former 
allows for straightforward ascent and descent between “orders,” while Jerome, in quite a 
different vein, speaks of souls coming from below “to assume a human body,” phrasing that seems 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appears, then, to be a dynamic place, characterized by a great deal of movement toward 
and away from the divine Logos by rational creatures of all grades.   
It is Origen’s emphasis on rationality as the decisive factor linking the human soul 
to higher rational beings and finally to God‑Logos – sustained by his conviction that all 
rational beings are created from the rational principles and relations (λόγοι) created 
within the life of the divine Logos, making them thus the image of the divine image – 
that accounts for his outlook’s optimistic lineaments.  Rational beings are inherently 
capable of choosing in accordance with their affinity to the Logos and therefore of 
returning to God.  Origen regards this position as strengthened by a commitment to the 
shared substantiality of all created rational souls.  From the premise that “everyone who 
shares in anything is undoubtedly of one substance and one nature with him who shares 
in the same thing,” it follows that “the substance and the soul of man will be 
incorruptible and immortal,” since this is beyond doubt the condition of the “heavenly 
powers,” who participate in the “intellectual light” of the “divine nature.”360  Since the 
rational souls of humans are similarly derived, they too are not destructible in their 
substance; but almost more importantly, it also follows from this careful alignment of 
rational natures – framed almost as identity of rational natures361 – that  
even if the mind through carelessness should fall away from the pure 
and perfect reception of God into itself, it nevertheless always 
possesses within some seeds as it were of restoration and recall to a 
better state, which become operative whenever the inner man, who is 
also termed the rational man, is recalled into the image and likeness 
of God who created him.362 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
calibrated to tease the implication of metempsychosis out of Origen’s thought.  For grounds for 
rejecting metempsychosis in Origen’s thought, see Edwards (2002) 97‑101. 
360 Omnis, qui participat alicuius, cum eo, qui eiusdem rei particeps est, sine dubio unius substantiae est 
unius que naturae … incorrupta sine dubio et inmortalis erit etiam animae humanae substantia…. 
caelestes virtutes … intellectualis [lux], id est divinae naturae….  (Princ. 4.4.9). 
361 He denies, however, a precise identity between human rational natures and God, 
acknowledging instead only a “certain kinship” (mart.  47.  Quoted in Scott [1991] 152). 
362 … etiamsi per neglegentiam decidat mens ne pure et integre in se recipiat deum, semper tamen habeat in 
se velut semina quaedam reparandi ac revocandi melioris intellectus, cum ʹad imaginem et similitudinemʹ 
dei, qui creavit eum, ʹinterior homoʹ, qui et rationabilis dicitur, revocatur (Princ. 4.4.9). 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Thus, in a very basic sense, the rational soul – by virtue of its inherent participation in 
divine nature – controls its own destiny even in its fallen, embodied condition: 
All this shows that no one is stainless by essence or by nature, nor is 
anyone polluted essentially.  Consequently it lies with us and with 
our own actions whether we are to be blessed or holy, or whether 
through sloth and negligence we are to turn away from blessedness 
into wickedness and loss….363   
 
Within the parameters of such a view, it is clear that Origen does not see the 
material creation as a hindrance to the soul’s ascent so much as failures internal to 
rational natures themselves.  His commitment to a vision of the cosmos populated by 
varieties of rational natures, all of varying condition, profoundly shapes his view of the 
manifest world itself, prompting him to see the differentiation and variety encountered 
in the natural world precisely in terms of his narrative of fallen souls.  Quite explicitly he 
accounts for “the great diversity of the world” by means of the “variety and diversity of 
the motions and declensions of those who fell away from that original unity and 
harmony in which they were first created by God.”364  In a manner that reflects his 
optimistic view of the rational soul’s potential, such created differentiation is viewed in 
generally favorable terms.  Through the providence of God, this variety of creatures, 
“diverse though the motions of their souls may be … nevertheless combine to make up 
the fullness and perfection of a single world, the variety of their minds tending to one 
end, perfection.”365  God has ordered the world in order to preserve, simultaneously, the 
free will of individual souls, and the coherent stability of the world, the divine aim being 
“the salvation of his entire creation.”366 Origen here invokes the Stoic idea of the World 
Soul as a useful support.  As varied as the world may appear, it is nevertheless properly 
                                                       
363 per hoc ostenditur neque substantialiter vel naturaliter esse aliquem inmaculatum neque substantialiter 
esse pollutum.  Et per hoc consequens est in nobis esse atque in nostris motibus, ut vel beati et sancti 
simus, vel per desidiam et neglegentiam ex beatitudine in malitiam perditionemque vergamus…. (Princ. 
1.5.5). 
364 [tanta] huius mundi [diversitas] … [diversitas] ac [varietas] motuum atque prolapsuum eorum, qui ab 
illa initii unitate atque concordia, in qua a deo primitus procreati sunt, deciderunt…. (Princ. 2.1.1) 
365 … diversis licet motibus animorum, unius tamen mundi plenitudinem perfectionem que consumment, 
atque ad unum perfectionis finem varietas ipsa mentium tendat (Princ. 2.1.2). 
366 pro salute universarum creaturarum suarum (Princ. 2.1.2). 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conceived as “an immense, monstrous animal, held together by the power and reason of 
God as by one soul.”367   
It should occasion no surprise that in explaining matter theoretically, and in 
deriving from that explanation a graded taxonomy of material bodies, Origen arrives at 
conclusions consistent with this providential outlook.  In a manner consistent with the 
view of rational natures already adumbrated, he proposes that souls are always 
conjoined to bodies, and that they are separable only in theory.   In defining matter per 
se, Origen adopts a conventional view: “Now by matter we mean that which underlies 
bodies, namely, that from which they take their existence when qualities have been 
applied to or mingled with them.”  He goes on to explain that the four qualities of “heat, 
cold, dryness, and wetness,” when applied to “hyle or matter” in various proportions, 
are what “produce the different kinds of bodies.”368  He qualifies his discussion by 
noting that to postulate “matter” as such is a purely theoretical project, arguing that 
although it “has an existence in its own right without qualities, yet it is never actually 
found subsisting apart from them.”369 That is to say, matter without form can be 
theoretically asserted within a narrative of creation artificially sequenced for the benefit 
                                                       
367 … velut animal quoddam inmensum atque inmane opinandum puto, quod quasi ab una anima virtute 
dei ac ratione teneatur (Princ. 2.1.3). 
368 Materiam ergo intellegimus quae subiecta est corporibus, id est ex qua inditis atque insertis qualitatibus 
corpora subsistunt…. calidam, frigidam, aridam, humidam…. ὕλῃ, id est materiae…. diversas corporum 
species efficiunt (Princ. 2.1.4).  Though he uses the Aristotelian term, his conception clearly echoes 
that of the Timaeus, where matter is carefully distinguished from qualities as “mother and 
receptacle of the visible and perceptible generated world … a certain form, invisible and 
shapeless, capable of receiving all, partaking in the intelligible in the most puzzling and elusive 
way;” τὴν τοῦ γεγονότος ὁρατοῦ καὶ πάντως αἰσθητοῦ μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν … ἀνόρατον 
εἶδός τι καὶ ἄμορφον, πανδεχές, μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατά πῃ τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ 
δυσαλωτότατον…. (Ti. 51A).  Origen never denies the peripatetic theory of matter, in which 
“prime matter is is the substrate of the properties which unite with it to constitute the sensible 
particular,” although one can perceive here the rudiments of a defense of an idealist thery, in 
which matter is is nothing prior to “a congeries of properties” (Edwards [2002] 94‑95).  He may 
have had a preference for the latter approach, since all agree that properties are created by God.  
Such a theory would therefore have the virtue of compelling even those who assert the 
uncreatedness of matter to embrace its createdness by God, since without properties nothing can 
be said to be (See Princ. 4.7[34]. p. 358.1‑8 Koetschau, text cited in Edwards [2002] 63). 
369 Haec tamen materia quamvis … secundum suam propriam rationem sine qualitatibus sit, numquam 
tamen subsistere extra qualitates invenitur (Princ. 2.1.4). 
156 
of discourse, but in actuality there is never a moment in the world’s eternal coming‑to‑
be in which it exists without form, or fails to manifest varied qualities.  In a turn that 
parallels this classical difficulty in pondering matter without form, and that surely 
derives from his refusal to posit the existence of individual, incorporeal rational 
identities, Origen here appears to encounter difficulty in separating material 
embodiment from “soul,” as he directly poses the question, “whether it is possible for 
rational beings to endure altogether without bodies when they have reached the height 
of holiness and blessedness, – a thing which to me indeed seems very difficult and well‑
nigh impossible – or whether it is necessary that they should always be joined to 
bodies.”370  Thus, in much the same way that “pure” matter is posited only theoretically, 
merely for the convenience of discourse, so Origen appears inclined to understand the 
separation between the soul’s bodiless and embodied existence as merely a theoretical 
one.371  If only the persons of the Trinity may be properly described as bodiless, he 
argues, 
then logical reasoning compels us to believe that, while the original 
creation was of rational beings, it is only in idea and thought that a 
material substance is separable from them, and that though this 
substance seems to have been produced for them or after them, yet 
never have they lived or do they live without it; for we shall be right 
in believing that life without a body is found in the Trinity alone.372 
 
This passage of Rufinus’ Latin is reminiscent of the Greek material considered 
above: the created order is not characterized by dualism, and insofar as rational 
                                                       
370 …si possibile est penitus incorporeas remanere rationabiles naturas, cum ad summum sanctitatis ac 
beatitudinis venerint, quod mihi quidem difficillimum et paene inpossibile videtur; an necesse est eas 
semper coniunctas esse corporibus (Princ. 2.2.1). 
371 An assertion that he makes pointedly later: “This, however, should be noted, that a substance 
never exists without quality, and that it is by the intellect alone that this substance which 
underlies bodies and is capable of receiving quality is discerned to be matter” Verumtamen illud 
scire oportet, quoniam numquam substantia sine qualitate subsistit, sed intellectu solo discernitur hoc, 
quod subiacet corporibus et capax est qualitatis, esse materia (Princ. 4.4.7). 
372 …necessitas consequentiae ac rationis coartat intellegi principaliter quidem creatas esse rationabiles 
naturas, materialem vero substantiam opinione quidem et intellectu solo separari ab eis et pro ipsis vel post 
ipsas effectam videri, sed numquam sine ipsa eas vel vixisse vel vivere: solius namque trinitatis incorporea 
vita existere recte putabitur (Princ. 2.2.2). 
157 
beings exist, they are not compounds that are divisible into elements, except in 
theory.  There is no bodiless existence of rational creatures.   
This endorsement of perpetual embodiment naturally entails the view 
that matter be infinitely plastic, and that it be qualitatively adaptable to fallen 
rational beings in all of their respective degrees, such that 
when [material substance] ministers to more perfect and blessed 
beings, it shines in the splendor of ‘celestial bodies’ and adorns either 
the ‘angels of God’ or the ‘sons of the resurrection’ with the garments 
of a ‘spiritual body.’  All these beings go to make up the diverse and 
varied condition of the world.373 
 
All grades of being in Origen’s continuous arc of rational beings are thus conceived as 
“embodied” in some sense, and Origen has deployed a theory of matter to justify such a 
claim – a claim that the very multiplicity and variation experienced in the world justifies.  
“Bodily substance,” Origen insists, “is capable of change and can pass from any given 
quality into any other.”  This claim he bases on the universal experience that 
from water and earth, air and heat, various kinds of fruit are 
produced in the various kinds of trees, and that fire, air, water and 
earth are changed alternately into one another and that one element is 
resolved into another in virtue of a sort of mutual relationship, and 
further that from the food of men or of animals the substance flesh 
                                                       
373 …cum vero perfectioribus ministrat et beatioribus, in fulgore ʹcaelestium corporumʹ micat et ʹspiritalis 
corporisʹ indumentis vel ʹangelos deiʹ vel ʹfilios resurrectionisʹ exornat, ex quibus omnibus diversus ac 
varius unius mundi conplebitur status (Princ. 2.2.2).  According to his later critic Methodius (De Res.  
1.22.4f., text cited in Scott [1991] 154), Origen did hold theories about the soul’s material “vehicle” 
(ὄχημα) that would enclose it as a “garment” (περιβολή) after death.  As A. Scott (1991) notes, 
“this was the only body of the soul before its incorporation and after its departure from the body 
of the flesh,” noting further that Origen held every being in heaven to have some sort of body, 
generally regarded as like that of the stars.  The “astral” or “aetherial” body of the resurrected 
human being is not theoretically distinguished from the bodies of stars, angels, or even that of the 
risen Christ, and is termed indiscriminately “ethereal,” (αἰθέριος) “heavenly” (οὐράνιος) and 
“luminous” (αὐγοειδής) [154‑57].  It is further noted that Origen assigns the term skhema to the 
visible souls of Samuel and Lzarus in the underworld, and that he assigns the eidos of the body to 
soul after death, suggesting the for Origen, the body, in some form, “is the guarantee of personal 
dignity, the premiss of immortality in the only life that God vouchsafes to us” – an 
understanding that excludes any incorporeal life (Edwards [2002] 109). 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comes into existence and that the seminal moisture is changed into 
solid flesh and bones.374 
 
The experience of the world as a place of variety, multiplicity, flux, and change seem to 
requires the conclusion that physical embodiment, too, can be conceived as a fluid, 
plastic kind of condition, and one that can be therefore reasonably predicated on the 
condition of any given soul. 
Origen’s views thus appear to stem from two philosophical perspectives.  On the 
one hand – from a purely theoretical angle – just as form and matter are separable only 
in theory, so body and soul are separable only theoretically.  On the other – from 
something of an empirical angle – he observes physical bodies in the world to be  
manifold, and characterized by a great deal of flux and change, and speculates that we 
may therefore assign bodies of varying grades to corresponding souls.  Both speculative 
metaphysics and empirical observation play a role; but it is also clear that Origen 
intends to honor his scriptural commitments.  Here, the Pauline narrative of resurrection 
militates against the idea of incorporeal existence.  When Origen speculates that, “if all 
things can exist without bodies, doubtless bodily substance will cease to exist when 
there is no use for it,”375 his reflection on Paul’s descriptions of “corruption” putting on 
“incorruption” in I Cor. prevents his endorsing such a view.  To this mystical account of 
resurrection, in which the corrupt and mortal body may be qualitatively changed by the 
soul’s exposure to the incorrupt and immortal “wisdom and word and righteousness of 
God,” Origen applies the sliding scale of material embodiment that he has been 
developing, arguing that the apostle’s claims are really to be understood in terms of a 
distinction between “carnal” and “spiritual” matter: 
                                                       
374 …cum etiam ex aqua et terra, aere vel calore per diversa arborum genera diversos proferri ostendimus 
fructus, vel cum ignem, aerem, aquam terram que mutari in semet ipsa invicem ac resolvi aliud in aliud 
elementum mutua quadam consanguinitate docuimus, sed et cum de escis vel hominum vel animalium 
probavimus substantiam carnis existere vel humorem seminis naturalis in carnem solidam ossaque 
converti. Quae omnia documento sunt quod substantia corporalis permutabilis sit et ex omni in omnem 
deveniat qualitatem (Princ. 4.4.6). 
375 Si autem omnia possunt carere corporibus, sine dubio non erit substantia corporalis, cuius usus nullus 
existet (Princ. 2.3.2). 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Referring in the first place to bodily matter in general, that matter 
which, in whatever form it is found, whether carnal as now or as 
hereafter in the subtler and purer form which is called spiritual, the 
soul always makes use of, he says, ‘This corruptible must put on 
incorruption.’376  
 
Here is a scriptural warrant for more subtle, ethereal embodiment.  Responding to an 
anticipated objection that the final overthrow of death must entail the assumption of a 
bodiless state, Origen first entertains the idea that souls “must first be supposed to abide 
in bodies more pure and subtle” – bodies which are deathless; but curiously, he does not 
deploy this idea as a principal basis for his claim to perpetual embodiment.  Somewhat 
paradoxically, he advances instead the idea of flux and instability that he finds inherent 
in his own model, instability that is contingent on the rational, free will that triggers the 
souls fall in the first instance: 
It will be seen to be a necessity that, if bodily nature were to be 
destroyed, it must be restored and created a second time.  For it is 
apparently possible that rational creatures, who are never deprived of 
the power of free will, may once again become subject to certain 
movements.377 
 
Elsewhere he furthers this claim that a pure disembodiment is a state almost too 
unstable to be maintained, suggesting that 
                                                       
376 <ad> generalem primo causam respiciens materiae corporalis, cuius materiae anima usum semper habet 
in qualibet qualitate positae, nunc quidem carnali postmodum vero subtiliori et puriori, quae spiritalis 
appellatur, ait: ʺNecesse est corruptibile hoc induere incorruptionemʺ…. (Princ. 2.3.2).  Origen  
interprets Paul’s description of an “incorruption” that is to be put on (I Cor. 15.53‑56) as refering 
to a purified soul, as if Paul had said, “This body, with its corruptible nature, must receive the 
clothing of incorruption, that is, a soul that possesses in itself incorruption….” necesse est naturam 
hanc corruptibilem corporis indumentum accipere incorruptionis, animam habentem in se incorruptionem 
(Princ. 2.3.2.63‑64).  Once vested with a remedied soul, such a body, “which one day we shall 
possess in a more glorious form … will … in addition to being immortal, become also 
incorruptible.” quod aliquando gloriosius habebimus, tunc ad id quod inmortale est accedit, ut etiam 
incorruptibile fiat (66‑68).  
377 Videbitur enim esse necessarium ut, si exterminata fuerit natura corporea, secundo iterum reparanda sit 
et creanda; possibile enim videtur ut rationabiles naturae, a quibus numquam aufertur liberi facultas 
arbitrii, possint iterum aliquibus motibus subiacere…. Or, in the surviving Greek fragment, where 
there is no specific mention of free will: “I think that there will then be a dissolution of bodily 
nature into non‑existence, to come into existence a second time if rational beings should fall 
again.” (Princ. 2.3.3; Justinian Ep. ad Mennam [Mansi IX.529]). 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if bodily nature were to be destroyed, it must be restored and created 
a second time.  For it is apparently possible that rational creatures, 
who are never deprived of the power of free will, may once again 
become subject to certain movements… These  movements would 
again undoubtedly be followed by a variety and diversity of bodies, 
out of which a world is always composed; for it could never exist 
except as a result of variety and diversity, and this can in no way be 
produced apart from bodily matter.378 
 
Paradoxically, as Origen points out, such freedom is granted by God precisely so that 
souls will not develop an excessive confidence in their own faculties, and will retain the 
awareness that God’s grace only is responsible for their being drawn perpetually toward 
reconciliation.  Thus the possibility or reality of a “second” fall exists beneficially  for 
purposes of the soul’s continued pedagogy.379   
  What emerges from these speculations appears at times to be a vision of 
successive levels of being, superimposed one upon another at varying removes from a 
divine apex, between which souls may ascend and descend depending on their 
respective dispositions toward God. Such a view makes sense of Origen’s idea that God 
created the world as a place where fallen souls might undergo a temporary sojourn 
conducive to further ascent – or descent, as the case might warrant.  Given the potential 
in every rational soul for re‑orientation toward the Logos, and given the plasticity of 
matter and it’s adaptability to the condition of given souls, the conclusion for Origen is 
                                                       
378 si exterminata fuerit natura corporea, secundo iterum reparanda sit et creanda; possibile enim videtur ut 
rationabiles naturae, a quibus numquam aufertur liberi facultas arbitrii, possint iterum aliquibus motibus 
subiacere, indulgente hoc ipsum deo, ne forte, si inmobilem semper teneant statum, ignorent se dei gratia et 
non sua virtute in illo fine beatitudinis constitisse; quos motus sine dubio rursum varietas corporum et 
diversitas prosequetur, ex qua mundus semper adornatur, nec umquam poterit mundus nisi ex varietate ac 
diversitate constare; quod effici nullo genere potest extra materiam corporalem (Princ. 2.3.3.131‑142). 
379 Elsewhere, Origen appears to make the case for a complete dissolution of the body, at the high 
point of the soul’s purification, but even here he seems to leave open the possibility of seeing this 
phenomenon as only one phase of a continuing, cyclical process: “It must needs be that the 
nature of bodies is not primary, but that it was created at intervals on account of certain falls that 
happened to rational beings, who came to need bodies; and again, that when their restoration is 
perfectly accomplished these bodies are dissolved into nothing, so that this is forever happening” 
(Frag. 40 Koetschau = Justinian, Ep. ad Mennam [Mansi IX.532]). 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naturally a whole spectrum of embodiment, in which every rational being, whatever its 
standing, may possess a suitable “covering”: 
Since … rational nature is changeable and convertible, so of necessity 
God had foreknowledge of the differences that were to arise among 
souls or spiritual powers, in order to arrange that each in proportion 
to its merits might wear a different bodily covering of this or that 
quality; and so, too, was it necessary for God to make a bodily nature, 
capable of changing at the Creator’s will, by an alteration of qualities, 
into everything that circumstances might require.380 
 
The assignment of a certain kind of body may thus be reasonably understood as 
proportionate to the degree of a soul’s remove from the Logos.  The lower the soul’s 
descent, the more “earthly” its body, and yet by no means should material bodies be 
conceived as an evil or a hindrance.  Matter is rather a neutral substrate whose bodily 
quality is the index of a rational creature’s assimilation to the Logos, and always capable 
of being shed in favor of a more spiritualized form.  Absent the possibility of a stable, 
bodiless state, matter’s very destiny thus becomes a kind of spiritualization, in which 
redeemed humanity is naturally assumed to be embodied, much as the angels are.    
Such a view of the universal embodiment of all rational creatures naturally leads, 
in the Contra Celsum, to a defense of Christianity that is grounded precisely in the 
universal experience of embodiment.  This re‑orientation of the rational soul to God, 
Origen argues, can and must be mediated by an embodied encounter with the Logos.381 
                                                       
380 quoniam … mutabilis et convertibilis erat natura rationabilis, ita ut pro meritis etiam diverso corporis 
uteretur indumento illius vel illius qualitatis, necessario sicut diversitates praenoscebat deus futuras vel 
animarum vel virtutum spiritalium, ita etiam naturam corpoream faceret, quae permutatione qualitatum 
in omnia, quae res posceret, conditoris arbitrio mutaretur (Princ. 4.4.8). 
381 Frede (1997) supplies a thorough, economical treatment of the difficulties involved in 
identifying Celsus, and of the motives that may have given rise to his On the True Doctrine.  
Origen appears to know little of Celsus apart from what the latter document contained, as is 
suggested by his initial uncertainty over which of two figures of previous generations might have 
authored the work (C.Cels. 1.8).  He finally ascribes it to a long dead Epicurean who may have 
authored a treatise against magic (C.Cels. praef. 4; 1.68), and who is presumably the same 
Epicurean Celsus mentioned by Lucian as the author of such an anti‑magical treatise (Alexander 
25; 61; 21).  He often seems unsure of this identification, however, as when he accuses Celsus of 
concealing his Epicureanism to avoid the charge of atheism (C.Cels. 1.8; 3.35).  Celsus’ views seem 
to mark him rather as a Platonist thinker concerned to refute Christian claims on the incarnation 
and the resurrection of the body; and more broadly, to attack what he perceives in Judaism and 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This conviction that all rational beings, by virtue of the initial “creation” of 
human nature within the divine Logos, are capable of being “healed” by an encounter 
with that Logos is what gives Origen’s argument for Christianity much of its demotic 
flavor.  It is axiomatic to him, as to Iamblichus, that the confinement of philosophical 
insight to a narrow and elite set effectively cuts off the greater part of humanity from 
access to the transcendence which is the soul’s proper destiny.  Naturally he grants that 
“if every man could abandon the business of life and devote himself to philosophy, no 
other course ought to be followed but this alone”382 – but such a course is impossible, for 
“partly owing to the necessities of life and partly owing to human weakness, very few 
people are enthusiastic about rational thought [λόγος].”  He forthrightly prescribes 
Christian belief and discipline as remedy to this difficulty.383  Christianity offers 
approaches no less profound than those employed by philosophers: “We explain the 
obscure utterances of the prophets, and the parables in the gospels, and innumerable 
other events or laws which have a symbolical meaning.”384  Origen preserves for himself 
an elite place by virtue of his standing as a practitioner of these obscure interpretive arts, 
and his Christianity will disclaim none of them; but it will nevertheless embrace all of 
humanity, a conviction grounded in the belief that the essence of every rational being 
lies in its relation to the divine Logos in which it was created. 
Origen is thus required to construct Christianity as a system of thought and 
disciplines simultaneously demotic and arcane, but he insists on ascribing to his project 
a universality that derives from the shared rational nature of human beings: 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Christianity as an arrogant, parochial rejection of the shared religious and intellectual traditions 
of the Mediterranean world, which find their ideal repository in the Hellenism that sustains, and 
which is in turn sustained by, the political regime of the Roman Empire (Texts cited in Frede, 223‑
27; 232‑33; 237‑39). 
382 εἰ μὲν οἷόν τε πάντας καταλιπόντας τὰ τοῦ βίου πράγματα σχολάζειν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν , 
ἄλλην ὁδὸν οὐ μεταδιωκτέον οὐδενὶ ἢ ταύτην μόνην (C.Cels. 1.9).   
383 “What better way of helping the multitude could be found other than that given to the nations 
by Jesus?” ποία ἂν ἄλλη βελτίων μέθοδος πρὸς τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς βοηθῆσαι εὑρεθείη τῆς ἀπὸ 
τοῦ Ἰησοῦ τοῖς ἔθνεσι παραδοθείσης; 
384 ἐξέτασις τῶν πεπιστευμένων καὶ διήγησις τῶν ἐν τοῖς προφήταις αἰνιγμάτων καὶ τῶν ἐν 
τοῖς εὐαγγελίοις παραβολῶν καὶ ἄλλων μυρίων συμβολικῶς γεγενημένων ἢ 
νενομοθετημένων. 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Or are you, Greeks, to be allowed to call adolescent boys and 
slaves and stupid men to study philosophy, while if we do this 
our action does not arise from love to our fellow‑men, although 
we desire to heal every rational soul by the medical treatment of 
the Logos and to reconcile them to God, the Creator of all 
things?385 
 
Here we see applied the now familiar insight that every “rational nature” (πᾶσαν 
λογικὴν φύσιν) has a presumptive connection to the Logos of God.  Quite 
straightforwardly, this connection entails the conclusion that all such rational creatures 
may receive healing from the Logos (τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἰατρικῇ), and that they might 
thereby be assimilated (οἰκειῶσαι) to God.  This universalizing argument enables Origen 
to argue, a fortiori, that the Logos’ accessibility to the lowly, makes it the more attainable 
for the learned: 
For the word promises to heal even such people if they come, and 
makes all men worthy of God.  It is a lie that those who teach the 
divine word [λόγος] want to convince only the foolish, dishonourable, 
and stupid, and only slaves, women, and little children.  Not only does 
the gospel [λόγος] call these that it may make them better, but it 
also calls people much superior to them.  For the Christ is the 
Saviour of all men and especially of believers, whether intelligent 
or simple‑minded.386 
 
Here the Logos is both as the content of what is taught, and the summoning and healing 
agent; it is simultaneously message and healing messenger, whose very universal 
accessibility means that even the average person can have – in the world – access to 
philosophical formation which is itself a divine encounter enabling ascent to God.  
                                                       
385 Ἢ ὑμῖν μέν, ὦ Ἕλληνες, ἔξεστι μειράκια καὶ οἰκότριβας καὶ ἀνοήτους ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ 
φιλοσοφίαν καλεῖν∙ ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες οὐ φιλανθρώπως αὐτὸ πράττομεν, τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ 
λόγου ἰατρικῇ πᾶσαν λογικὴν φύσιν θεραπεῦσαι βουλόμενοι καὶ οἰκειῶσαι τῷ 
δημιουργήσαντι πάντα θεῷ; 
386 Kαὶ γὰρ τοὺς τοιούτους προσελθόντας ἐπαγγέλλεται θεραπεύειν ὁ λόγος, πάντας ἀξίους 
κατασκευάζων τοῦ θεοῦ. Ψεῦδος δὲ καὶ τὸ μόνους ἠλιθίους καὶ ἀγεννεῖς καὶ ἀναισθήτους 
καὶ ἀνδράποδα καὶ γύναια καὶ παιδάρια πείθειν ἐθέλειν τοὺς διδάσκοντας τὸν θεῖον λόγον. 
Καὶ τούτους μὲν γὰρ καλεῖ ὁ λόγος, ἵνα αὐτοὺς βελτιώσῃ∙ καλεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς πολλῷ τούτων 
διαφέροντας∙ ἐπεὶ «σωτήρ ἐστιν πάντων ἀνθρώπων» ὁ Χριστὸς καὶ «μάλιστα πιστῶν», εἴτε 
συνετῶν εἴτε ἁπλουστέρων (C.Cels. 3.48‑49). 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Origen was surely right to regard such claims as somewhat broad‑minded by ancient 
intellectual standards.387 
Because Christianity presents an embodied Logos whose teaching is calibrated to 
the capacities of all people, it is possible to claim that only Jesus was able “to give the 
educated a conception of God which could raise their soul from earthly things,” while 
he likewise  enabling simple people “to live a better life,” by granting access to 
“doctrines about God such as they had the capacity to receive,”388 since he “came down 
to the level even of the more defective capacities of ordinary men and simple women 
and slaves, and, in general, of people who have been helped by none but by Jesus 
alone.”389  The gains offered by Jesus are thus not a novelty, but rather an extension 
throughout humanity of the wisdom previously reserved for the few.  In context, Origen 
is responding here to the celebrated claim for divine inaccessibility in Plato’s Timaeus,390 
adduced by Celsus as a warrant against the nonsensical idea that God may now be 
                                                       
387 Origen presumably takes this approach perhaps not so much because Celsus was an 
intellectual elitist, but rather to defend Judaism and Chrisitianity from Celsus’ charge that they 
are narrow, parochial, and arrogant.  In Celsus’ view, these are movements that undermine the 
very basis of the Roman political regime by undermining the ecumenical philosophical and 
religious assumptions that that constitute a kind of contract for its stable continuity.  Celsus’ 
“true account” is a narrative of shared cultural assumptions that derive from the wisdom of 
ancient sages whose insights are reflected and approximated in the similar convictions and 
practices of Mediterranean and peripheral cultures (Greek, Egyptian, Babylonian).  Intellectuals 
in the Empire to some extent saw their role in terms of preserving and elaborating this wisdom of 
the ancients, within its ideal receptacle of Hellenism.  Celsus’ contempt for Christianity is 
founded in his recognition that its adherents refuse the reciprocities that such a cultural 
arrangement entails; they cannot acknowledge the beliefs and practices – the particular gods and 
cults – of others as legitimate manifestations that accord with this “true account.”  Therefore they 
are seen as threats to the very cultural order that the Empire sustains and that sustains the 
Empire (Frede [1997] 229‑230; 237‑39).  It is in this light that we should grasp the horror of 
Origen’s attack even on refined prose, whose practitioners “confine what should be of benefit to 
the community to a very narrow and limited circle.” Even “the beautiful and refined style of 
Plato … benefits but a few…..” (C.Cels. 6.1‑2).  
388 …βέλτιον αὐτοὺς βιοῦν μετὰ δογμάτων ὧν ἐδύναντο περὶ θεοῦ χωρεῖν (C.Cels. 7.41). 
389 ἀλλὰ δι’ ὑπερβάλλουσαν φιλανθρωπίαν ἔχοντα μὲν διδόναι τοῖς συνετωτέροις θεολογίαν, 
ἐπᾶραι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῶν τῇδε πραγμάτων δυναμένην, οὐδὲν <δ’> ἧττον συγκαταβαίνοντα 
καὶ ταῖς ὑποδεεστέραις ἕξεσιν ἰδιωτῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἁπλουστέρων γυναικῶν οἰκετῶν τε καὶ 
ἁπαξαπλῶς τῶν ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἢ Ἰησοῦ μόνου βεβοηθημένων…. (C.Cels. 7.41). 
390 “Now to discover the maker and father of this universe would be difficult; and having 
discovered him, to explain him to all would be impossible.” τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα 
τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν (Ti. 28c). 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accessed by virtually anyone.  Origen turns the argument for inaccessibility precisely for 
the needfulness of material divine incarnation: 
I admit that Plato’s statement which he quotes is noble and 
impressive.  But consider whether there is not more regard for the 
needs of mankind when the divine word introduces the divine 
Logos, who was in the beginning with God, as becoming flesh, 
that the Logos, of whom Plato says that after finding him it is 
impossible to declare him to all men, might be able to reach 
anybody….  But we affirm that human nature is not sufficient in 
any way to seek for God and to find Him in His pure nature, 
unless it is helped by the God who is object of the search.  And He 
is found by those who, after doing what they can, admit that they 
need him, and shows himself to those whom he judges it right to 
appear, so far as it is possible for God to be known to man and for 
the human soul which is still in the body to know God.391 
 
In this formulation, God, by a “divine word” (ὁ θεῖος λόγος) summons into activity the 
Logos that is God, and that is also “flesh.”  To put it with the economy that actually 
characterizes the passage, “The divine word introduces the God‑Word‑becoming‑flesh 
(τὸν … θεὸν λόγον γινόμενον σάρκα)” – a formulation deliberate in its casting the 
Logos as a divine hypostasis, and likewise rendering God accessible to those “still in the 
body,” presumably even those of “defective capacities.”  Origen simply takes Plato’s 
claim for divine inaccessibility and turns it on its head, arguing that if God cannot be 
reached by unassisted human intelligence, God’s own intervention is necessary: the 
Logos must become a Logos‑in‑flesh so that divine teaching may be conveyed and healing 
effected for rational beings whose very existence is anchored to embodiment.392  In this 
                                                       
391 Μεγαλοφυῶς μὲν οὖν καὶ οὐκ εὐκαταφρονήτως τὴν ἐκκειμένην λέξιν ὁ Πλάτων 
προφέρεται. Ὅρα δὲ εἰ μὴ φιλανθρωπότερον ὁ θεῖος λόγος εἰσάγει τὸν «ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν 
θεὸν» θεὸν λόγον γινόμενον σάρκα, ἵνα εἰς πάντας δυνατὸς ᾖ φθάνειν ὁ λόγος, ὃν καὶ τὸν 
«εὑρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν» φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων…. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀποφαινόμεθα ὅτι οὐκ 
αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ὁπωσποτανοῦν ζητῆσαι τὸν θεὸν καὶ εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν καθαρῶς, 
μὴ βοηθηθεῖσα ὑπὸ τοῦ ζητουμένου, εὑρισκομένου τοῖς ὁμολογοῦσι μετὰ τὸ παρ’ αὐτοὺς 
ποιεῖν ὅτι δέονται αὐτοῦ, ἐμφανίζοντος ἑαυτὸν οἷς ἂν κρίνῃ εὔλογον εἶναι ὀφθῆναι, ὡς 
πέφυκε θεὸς μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ γινώσκεσθαι ἀνθρώπου δὲ ψυχὴ ἔτι οὖσα ἐν σώματι γινώσκειν 
τὸν θεόν (C.Cels. 7.41‑42). 
392 Celsus is plainly revolted by the idea of incarnation, since as a doctrine it undermines the 
normative Platonist belief in the remoteness and  inaccessibilty of God.  This common tendency 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formulation, Origen reinforces the absolutely crucial idea that “rational essence” alone is 
not sufficient leverage to enable ascent to higher tiers of being, and that a timeless divine 
hypostasis, conceptualized as Logos, must assume material embodiment in order to 
reach rational beings whose existence is material.  Thus, no matter the degree of 
irrational maladjustment, God can reach man, “so far as it is possible for God to be 
known to man and for the human soul which is still in the body to know God (ὡς 
πέφυκε θεὸς μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ γινώσκεσθαι ἀνθρώπου δὲ ψυχὴ ἔτι οὖσα ἐν σώματι 
γινώσκειν τὸν θεόν).” 
  In such a formulation, embodiment is transformed into the occasion for 
experiencing the healing offered by God.  Celsus, just as he finds the doctrine of 
incarnation loathsome and incomprehensible, is likewise inimical to any claims on the 
body’s behalf, insisting rather on a radical separation of rational ascent from embodied 
experience.  In the face of this kind of dualism, Origen directly advances the argument 
that embodiment in no way entails such a clear separation from the life of God rationally 
conceived.  It is rather precisely the experience of the divine in the body that he strives to 
defend: 
Then Celsus thinks that he ought not to discuss this with people 
who hope for a reward for their body, as they are absolutely and 
irrationally bound to a thing which cannot grant fulfillment of 
their hopes.  He calls them boorish and unclean, saying that they 
are destitute of reason [χωρὶς λόγου] and come together for 
sedition.  But if he is one who loves his fellow‑men he ought to 
help even those who are most boorish.  There is no limit 
prescribed for helping one’s fellow‑men so that the more boorish 
men are excluded just like the irrational animals [ἀλόγων ζῴων].  
No. Our maker created us to be equally helpful to all men.  
Therefore it is worthwhile discussing these things both with 
boorish people, in order to convert them as far as possible to a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
to remove God from interaction with the world presumably gives rise to “a compensating 
tendency … to introduce mediating entities between the first principle and the world,” and “to 
fill the chasm between God and men with a hierarchy of spiritual beings” (Frede [1997] 230).   
The introduction of such mediating principles gives a trinitarian flavor to much philsophy of the 
time, pagan as well as Christian.  Celsus sees incarnation as a gratuitous destruction of such an 
outlook, arguing that there is simply no reason consistent with a proper understanding of God 
that he would assume a body on earth (C.Cels. 4.2ff., cited in Frede [1997] 228‑231). 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more refined life, and with unclean people, to make them cleaner 
as far as possible, and with those who hold any view whatever 
being destitute of reason and sick in their soul, that they may no 
longer do anything without reason [χωρὶς λόγου] and may not be 
sick in their soul.393 
 
In plain evidence here is the idea of rationality as the factor uniting all humanity in their 
receptivity to the rational divine, framed in terms of his own Logos theology as a 
vigorous riposte to the dualism that he finds characterizing Celsus’ thought.  To the 
latter, it is foolish even to attempt communication with those who embrace the body, a 
“thing” (πρᾶγμα) that is obviously hopeless.394  Those who place hope in it are in fact 
dirty; they are “unclean” and “rustic” (ἀγροίκους καὶ ἀκαθάρτους).  Origen, argues not 
only that such impediments are all the more reason to help them, but strives to 
underscore an incoherence in Celsus position: to disqualify some on the grounds that 
they are “without reason” (χωρὶς λόγου) is essentially  unreasonably to class them as 
“irrational animals.”  For Origen, being “destitute of reason” is simply not a defining 
condition; in fact, it makes nonsense of his definition of a human being.  Such destitution 
is really rather analogous to illness.  Those who are ill in mind – those who “think” 
(φρονοῦσι) “apart from reason” (χωρὶς λόγου) may be healed just as those who are ill in 
body.  Such people, far from suffering a permanent debility, may yet be taught to act in 
accordance with reason and to experience corresponding health as rational beings.  As in 
earlier passages, the Logos both summons to healing (ἐπαγγέλλεται θεραπεύειν ὁ 
λόγος), and serves as the very source of that healing for every “rational nature” (τῇ ἀπὸ 
τοῦ λόγου ἰατρικῇ πᾶσαν λογικὴν φύσιν θεραπεῦσαι).  It is a system of elegant 
                                                       
393 Εἶτ’ οἴεται μὴ διαλέγεσθαι δεῖν τοῖς τὰ περὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐλπίζουσιν ὁ Κέλσος ὡς 
συντετηκόσιν ἀλόγως πράγματι ἀδυνάτῳ τυχεῖν τῶν ἐλπιζομένων ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, ἀγροίκους καὶ 
ἀκαθάρτους αὐτοὺς καλῶν καὶ χωρὶς λόγου συνόντας τῇ στάσει, δέον ὡς φιλάνθρωπον καὶ 
τοῖς ἀγροικοτέροις βοηθεῖν. Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ κοινωνικὸν περιγέγραπται ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων 
ζῴων οὕτω καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγροικοτέρων ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ ἴσης ὁ ποιήσας ἡμᾶς πρὸς 
πάντας ἀνθρώπους πεποίηκε κοινωνικούς. Ἄξιον οὖν διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀγροίκοις καὶ ὅση 
δύναμις μετάγειν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὸ ἀστειότερον καὶ ἀκαθάρτοις καὶ ποιεῖν αὐτούς, ὡς οἷόν τε 
ἐστί, καθαρωτέρους καὶ τοῖς χωρὶς λόγου ὅ τι ποτ’ οὖν φρονοῦσι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν νοσοῦσιν, ἵνα 
μηκέτι χωρὶς λόγου τι πράττωσι μηδὲ τὴν ψυχὴν νοσήσωσι (C.Cels. 8.50). 
394 See Frede (1997) 231. 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economy in which all who are “without logos” can now have logos by means of the 
generous condescension of God. 
 
3. The Defense of Materiality on Platonic Ground 
 
  Origen’s outlook may be regarded as basically monist.  Although the essence of 
the human is understood in terms of a rational nature’s relation to God, human beings 
are nevertheless inconceivable as discrete hypostases without embodiment.  It is 
precisely this condition that necessitates the coming of the Logos in flesh as part of a 
divine economy of redemption.  All of this notwithstanding, Origen plainly feels pressed 
to defend his outlook on more traditional philosophical grounds.  That is, no matter his 
degree of departure from more dualist strains of thought, he strives to maintain an air of 
devotion to some of the more revered insights of Platonism.  His defense of the material 
body takes shape to some degree within these limits.   
In Contra Celsum, this project entails an insistence on Christian conformity to the 
demanding doctrines the Celsus sets down as normative.  Toward this end, Origen cites 
a pastiche of passages from Plato’s Republic and Timaeus, presented with a framing 
commentary by Celsus, suggesting that we are to view the principles that they enunciate 
as central to Celsus’ On the True Doctrine:   
Being and becoming are, respectively, intelligible and visible.  Truth is 
associated with being, error with becoming.  Knowledge concerns truth, 
opinion the other.  Thought is concerned with what is intelligible, and 
sight with what is visible.  For Mind knows that which is intelligible, the 
eye that which is visible.  Accordingly, what the sun is to visible things, 
being neither the eye nor sight, but the cause of the eye’s vision and of the 
existence of sight and of the possibility of seeing visible things, which is 
the cause of all sensible things becoming, and is in fact itself the thing 
which enables itself to be seen, this is what God is to intelligible things.  
He is neither mind nor intelligence nor knowledge, but enables the mind 
to think and is the cause of the existence of intelligence and of the 
possibility of knowledge, and causes the existence of all intelligible things 
and of truth itself and of being itself, since he transcends all things and is 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intelligible by a certain indescribable power.395   
 
Here a sharp distinction is drawn between the world of intelligibles and the perceptible 
world of sense, with the relationship of God to intelligibles elaborated in terms of an 
analogy to the sun’s relationship to visible things in the material world.  Celsus’ 
perspective on this outlook is then presented: 
These doctrines I have set forth for men of intelligence.  If you 
understand any of them, you are doing well.  And if you think that some 
spirit came down from God to foretell the divine truths, this may be the 
spirit which declares these doctrines.  Indeed, it was because men of 
ancient times were touched by this spirit that they proclaimed many 
excellent doctrines.  If you are unable to understand them, keep quiet and 
conceal your own lack of education, and do not say that those who see are 
blind and those who run are lame, when you yourselves are entirely 
lamed and mutilated in your souls and live for the body which is a dead 
thing.396 
 
His exasperation is unmitigated, admitting of no ambiguity in terms of what is real and 
what unreal; what is true and what is false; what is knowledge and what is mere opinion.397 
The line between the world of the mind and the world of sense is sharply drawn and 
                                                       
395 Οὐσία καὶ γένεσις νοητόν, ὁρατόν∙ μετὰ οὐσίας μὲν ἀλήθεια, μετὰ δὲ γενέσεως πλάνη. 
Περὶ ἀλήθειαν μὲν οὖν ἐπιστήμη, περὶ δὲ θάτερον δόξα∙ καὶ νοητοῦ μέν ἐστι νόησις, ὁρατοῦ 
δὲ ὄψις. Γινώσκει δὲ νοητὸν μὲν νοῦς, ὁρατὸν δὲ ὀφθαλμός. Ὅπερ οὖν ἐν τοῖς ὁρατοῖς ἥλιος, 
οὔτ’ ὀφθαλμὸς ὢν οὔτ’ ὄψις ἀλλ’ ὀφθαλμῷ τε τοῦ ὁρᾶν αἴτιος καὶ ὄψει τοῦ δι’ αὐτὸν 
συνίστασθαι καὶ ὁρατοῖς τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι, πᾶσιν αἰσθητοῖς τοῦ γίνεσθαι, καὶ μὴν αὐτὸς αὑτῷ 
τοῦ βλέπεσθαι, τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐκεῖνος, ὅσπερ οὔτε νοῦς οὔτε νόησις οὔτ’ ἐπιστήμη, 
ἀλλὰ νῷ τε τοῦ νοεῖν αἴτιος καὶ νοήσει τοῦ δι’ αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ τοῦ δι’ αὐτὸν 
γινώσκειν καὶ νοητοῖς ἅπασι καὶ αὐτῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ αὐτῇ οὐσίᾳ τοῦ εἶναι, πάντων ἐπέκεινα 
ὤν, ἀρρήτῳ τινὶ δυνάμει νοητός (C. Cels. 7.45); cf. Resp. 534a, 508b; Ti. 29c. 
396 Ταῦτ’ εἴρηται μὲν ἀνθρώποις νοῦν ἔχουσιν∙ εἰ δέ τι αὐτῶν καὶ ὑμεῖς συνίετε, εὖ ὑμῖν ἔχει. 
Καὶ πνεῦμα εἴ τι οἴεσθε κατιὸν ἐκ θεοῦ προαγγέλλειν τὰ θεῖα, τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ 
ταῦτα κηρύττον, οὗ δὴ πλησθέντες ἄνδρες παλαιοὶ πολλὰ κἀγαθὰ ἤγγειλαν∙ ὧν εἰ μὴ 
δύνασθε ἐπαΐειν, σιωπᾶτε καὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀμαθίαν ἐγκαλύπτετε καὶ μὴ λέγετε τυφλώττειν 
τοὺς βλέποντας καὶ χωλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς τρέχοντας, αὐτοὶ πάντῃ τὰς ψυχὰς ἀποκεχωλευμένοι 
καὶ ἠκρωτηριασμένοι καὶ τῷ σώματι ζῶντες, τουτέστι τῷ νεκρῷ…. (C. Cels. 7.45) 
397 The world of true, transcendent essential being (oὐσία) is invisible and stable; the world of 
becoming (γένεσις) is visible and unstable.  The transcendent world of being is approached via 
the mind (νοῦς); the sublunary world of becoming via the eye (ὀφθαλμός).  Truth, knowledge, 
stable intelligibles (ἀλήθεια, ἐπιστήμη, νοητά), are identified with the world of being; error, 
mere opinion, unstable visibles (πλάνη, δόξα, ὁρατά) with the world of becoming. 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rigorously policed, characterizing the shifting material world in a manner reminiscent of 
accounts of the soul’s embodiment in the Platonic corpus.  The posture is not so far 
removed from that of the Phaedo, where, we recall, the soul’s inversion produces a 
failure to perceive the ultimate unreality of the physical world, and confines it to an 
irrational, debased, material existence; likewise in the Phaedrus, Plato locates intellectual 
perception of the forms in the condition prior to the soul’s embodiment, and 
characterizes embodiment as an entrapment that lulls the soul’s higher intellect.  In these 
constructions, the soul is “compelled to adopt … the same habits and mode of life” as 
the body, and as such has no part in the communion with the divine and pure and 
absolute.”398  Very much in this vein, Celsus argues that the embrace of embodiment 
entails commitment to an order devoid of any basis for true knowledge, tainted by a 
delusive material flux that threatens to entice the soul with false judgments and 
misperceptions, and suited as a philosophical home only for those who “live for the body 
which is a dead thing.”  People who so live are dirty and potentially seditious.  They 
mistake the material world for true reality, and cannot plausibly have any part of that 
other world, where the divine sun illumines intelligibles. 
  In counterpoint to this understanding, Origen will develop an argument to prove 
his outlook’s consistency with such lofty views.  As a first gesture toward establishing 
the credentials of Christian believers, he undertakes to show that material reality is 
continuous with transcendence, doing so in a manner that strives to cross the boundary 
that Celsus is urgent to secure: 
It is not merely a matter of theory when [believers] distinguish 
between being and becoming and between what is intelligible and 
what is visible, and when they associate truth with being and by 
all possible means avoid the error that is bound up with 
becoming.  They look, as they have learnt, not at the things which 
are becoming, which are seen and on that account temporal, but at 
the higher things, whether one wishes to call them ‘being,’ or 
things ‘invisible’ because they are intelligible, or ‘things which are 
not seen’ because their nature lies outside the realm of sense‑
                                                       
398 Phaed. 83c, d; cf. Phaedr. 250c. 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perception.399 
 
Believers too, then, recognize both the distinction between material and non‑material 
realms, and the principle that true reality lies beyond material reality’s manifestation.   
They understand that, at best, the “things” of material reality are passing and temporal 
(πρόσκαιρα).  Nevertheless, Origen intends to argue, with his suggestion that Christians 
perceive the relation that may be sketched between the seen and the unseen, that they 
actually embrace a more sophisticated view than Celsus.  They go beyond his 
distinctions, perceiving material, visible, realities as the referents of an unseen world of 
truth and knowledge and stable intelligibles.  Created things thus facilitate a rational 
ascent, even to contemplation of the divine simplicity: 
It is in this way also that the disciples of Jesus look at the things 
that are becoming, so that they use them as steps to the 
contemplation of the nature of intelligible things.  ‘For the 
invisible things of God,’ that is, the intelligible things, ‘are 
understood by the things that are made’ and ‘from the creation of 
the world they are clearly seen’ by the process of thought.  And 
when they have ascended from the created things of the world to 
the invisible things of God they do not stop there.  But after 
exercising their minds sufficiently among them and 
understanding them, they ascend to the eternal power of God, 
and, in a word, to His Divinity.400 
 
By this account, uncreated, invisible things can be understood analogically from 
experience of created visible things; but Origen does not stop merely with the idea of 
suggestive analogy.  Even among those “unseen things of God” (ἐν τοῖς ἀοράτοις τοῦ 
                                                       
399 οὐχ ἵνα λέξεσι μόναις οὐσίαν ἀπὸ γενέσεως χωρίζωσι καὶ νοητὸν ἀπὸ ὁρατοῦ, καὶ τὴν μὲν 
ἀλήθειαν τῇ οὐσίᾳ συνάπτωσι τὴν δὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πλάνην παντὶ τρόπῳ φεύγωσι, 
σκοποῦντες, ὡς ἔμαθον, οὐ τὰ γενέσεως, ἅπερ ἐστὶ «βλεπόμενα» καὶ διὰ τοῦτο «πρόσκαιρα», 
ἀλλὰ τὰ κρείττονα, εἴτ’ οὐσίαν αὐτά τις βούλεται καλεῖν εἴτε διὰ τὸ νοητὰ τυγχάνειν 
«ἀόρατα» εἴτε διὰ τὸ ἔξω αἰσθήσεως εἶναι αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν «μὴ βλεπόμενα». (C. Cels. 7.46) 
 
400 Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῖς γενέσεως ἐνορῶσιν οἱ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ μαθηταί, ὥστε οἱονεὶ ἐπιβάθρᾳ χρῆσθαι 
αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὴν κατανόησιν τῆς τῶν νοητῶν φύσεως∙ «Τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα» τοῦ θεοῦ «ἀπὸ 
κτίσεως κόσμου», τουτέστι τὰ νοητά, «τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα» ἐν τῷ νοεῖσθαι «καθορᾶται». 
Καὶ οὐχ ἵστανταί γε ἀναβάντες ἀπὸ τῶν τοῦ κόσμου κτισμάτων ἐν τοῖς ἀοράτοις τοῦ θεοῦ∙ 
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἱκανῶς ἐκείνοις ἐγγυμνασάμενοι καὶ συνιέντες αὐτὰ ἀναβαίνουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀΐδιον 
δύναμιν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἁπαξαπλῶς τὴν θεότητα αὐτοῦ…. (C. Cels. 7.46).  Cf.  Rom 1.18‑20. 
172 
θεοῦ) intellects do not simply come to rest, but progress ever upward to God’s “unseen 
power,” (ἐπὶ τὴν ἀΐδιον δύναμιν) and finally, unambiguously and simply, to his 
divinity (ἐπὶ … ἁπαξαπλῶς τὴν θεότητα αὐτοῦ).  
Origen obviously grasps that this argument, advanced against the firmly dualist 
formulations adopted by Celsus, is a view of ascent that many philosophers would find 
congenial.  It reflects, in fact, the kind of cosmology we have seen to be characteristic of 
Plato in his more moderate moments, such as in the Timaeus, where the soul, after 
negotiating the initial shock of embodiment, stabilizes in its revolutions so that the mind 
prevails over the initial chaos.  When such stability is “reinforced by right educational 
training, the man becomes wholly sound and faultless, having escaped the worst of 
maladies….”401  In like manner, Plato’s Laws suggests a worldview in which the proper 
orientation of the higher soul (the rational nous) to God – “the measure of all things” –  
in accordance with the principle that “like is dear to like,” is precisely what secures a 
stable earthly order.402  Origen’s view is certainly more akin to this outlook, where the 
rational soul, though impaired by embodiment, is nevertheless naturally drawn to its 
creator, and gradually learns to reject lower things: 
And the rational soul, which at once recognizes that which is, so 
to speak, akin to it, discards the images which it has hitherto 
thought to be gods, and assumes its natural affection for the 
creator.403 
 
Here we can detect resonances of Origen’s anthropology, wherein the logos‑partaking 
“rational soul” (ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ) or “rational nature” (λογικὴ φύσις) has a presumed 
connection or kinship to the divine. Origen’s plain intention here is to advertise his 
outlook as in keeping with a more “proper” Platonic outlook.  Celsus, in turn, must 
come out looking like the apostate.  If Christian hopes are to be termed “vain,” argues 
Origen, the it must be granted that “the Pythagoreans and the Platonists are led away 
                                                       
401 συνεπιλαμβάνηταί τις ὀρθὴ τροφὴ παιδεύσεως, ὁλόκληρος ὑγιής τε παντελῶς, τὴν 
μεγίστην ἀποφυγὼν νόσον, γίγνεται (ibid. 44C). 
402 τῷ μὲν ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον…φίλον….  πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον (Lg. 716c). 
403 Καὶ εὐθέως ὡσπερεὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ἐπιγνοῦσα ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ ἀπορρίπτει μὲν ἃ τέως 
ἐδόξαζεν εἶναι θεοὺς φίλτρον δ’ ἀναλαμβάνει φυσικὸν τὸ πρὸς τὸν κτίσαντα. (C. Cels. 3.40) 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with vain hopes in believing the doctrine that the soul can ascend to the vault of heaven 
and in the region above the heavens gaze on the things seen by the blessed 
spectators.”404 
In this approach, Origen is plainly trying to derive legitimacy from occupying 
Platonic ground, vindicating materiality much like Iamblichus, and presenting Celsus as 
a more radically dualist thinker than perhaps he actually is, particularly in his regarding 
every manifestation of materiality as qualitatively alike.  In characterizing Celsus’ 
aversion to matter, Origen cites his most uncompromising statements on the question, 
retaining the colorful examples, such as the assertion that the bodies of bats, worms, 
frogs, and men are qualitatively indistinguishable.  As Celsus puts it, “The soul is God’s 
work, but the nature of the body is different.  In fact, in this respect there will be no 
difference between the body of a bat, or a worm, or a frog, or a man.  For they are made 
of the same matter, and they are equally liable to corruption.”405  In contrast to this view, 
Origen attempts rather to defend distinctions within material embodiment.  He counters 
that heavenly bodies are divine, although they are material and therefore – under 
Celsus’ construction – liable to perish: 
To this argument of his I reply that, because the same matter 
underlies the nature of a bat, or a worm, or a frog, or a man, these 
bodies will not differ from one another, obviously these bodies 
will be no different from sun or moon or stars or heaven, or 
anything else which is called by the Greeks a visible god.  For the 
same matter which underlies all bodies is strictly speaking 
without qualities and shape, though by what agencies Celsus 
thinks it receives its qualities I do not know, since he will not 
accept the view that anything corruptible is God’s work.406   
                                                       
404 οἱ τὸν Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος παραδεξάμενοι περὶ ψυχῆς λόγον, πεφυκυίας 
ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὴν ἁψῖδα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὑπερουρανίῳ τόπῳ θεωρεῖν τὰ τῶν 
εὐδαιμόνων θεατῶν θεάματα. (C. Cels. 3.80). 
405 ψυχὴ μὲν θεοῦ ἔργον, σώματος δὲ ἄλλη φύσις. Καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν διοίσει νυκτερίδος ἢ 
εὐλῆς ἢ βατράχου ἢ ἀνθρώπου σῶμα∙ ὕλη γὰρ ἡ αὐτή, καὶ τὸ φθαρτὸν αὐτῶν ὅμοιον (C. Cels. 
4.56). 
406 λεκτέον καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον ὅτι εἴπερ, ἐπεὶ ἡ ὕλη ἡ αὐτὴ ὑπόκειται 
νυκτερίδος ἢ εὐλῆς ἢ βατράχου ἢ ἀνθρώπου σώματι, οὐδὲν διοίσει ἀλλήλων ταῦτα τὰ 
σώματα, δηλονότι οὐδὲν διοίσει τὰ τούτων σώματα ἡλίου ἢ σελήνης ἢ ἀστέρων ἢ οὐρανοῦ ἢ 
οὑτινοσοῦν ἄλλου λεγομένου παρ’ Ἕλλησιν αἰσθητοῦ θεοῦ. Ὕλη γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ πᾶσι τοῖς 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Such beliefs concerning embodied divinity, which Origen asserts as common to both 
Greeks and Hebrews, cannot be accommodated within the flattening found to be 
implicit in Celsus’ claim that “the soul is God’s work, but the nature of the body is 
different” – especially if all bodies, regardless of their place in the food chain, are 
regarded as qualitatively alike.  As before, Origen’s strategy is to alienate Celsus’ 
thought from what has been traditionally held.  He presumes that everyone would agree 
that the body of a star is not of the same order as the body of a bat or a frog.407  Only 
Celsus is isolated in his conviction that every instance of materiality is to be regarded as 
if one were confronting abstract, theoretical matter – matter that is viewed pejoratively 
as an uncreated (“not God’s work”) hindrance to the soul.  Origen is thus able to assert 
that such an outlook makes a hash of biblical passages such as “The heavens shall 
perish, but thou remainest; they all shall wax old as a garment, and as a vesture shalt 
thou fold them up and they shall be changed.  But thou art the same.”408  If the matter of 
the “heavens” is created by God, then Celsus may be caricatured as maintaining the 
position that the heavens are nonetheless not superior to the bodies of the lowest 
creatures: 
However, this is a sufficient reply to Celsus’ assertion that the soul 
is God’s work, but the nature of the body is different.  For it follows 
from his view that the body of a bat or a worm or a frog is no 
different from the matter of the aether.409 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
σώμασιν ὑποκειμένη τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ ἄποιος καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος, τὰς ποιότητας οὐκ οἶδα κατὰ 
Κέλσον, τὸν μὴ θέλοντα φθαρτόν τι ἔργον εἶναι τοῦ θεοῦ, ὑπὸ τίνος λαμβάνουσα (C. Cels. 
4.56). 
407 Origen clearly regards the stars a rational, though fallen creatures, who are nevertheless of a 
superior order to humans, as their ethereal bodies amply attest.  He also regarded their 
movements as rationally motivated, and beneficial for the world, an argument posed in 
opposition to the gnostics (Scott [1991] 130‑31; 137; 147). 
408 «Οἱ οὐρανοὶ ἀπολοῦνται, σὺ δὲ διαμενεῖς∙ καὶ πάντες ὡς ἱμάτιον παλαιωθήσονται, καὶ 
ὡσεὶ περιβόλαιον ἑλίξεις αὐτούς, καὶ ἀλλαγήσονται. Σὺ δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς εἶ.» (C. Cels. 4.56).  Cf. Ps. 
102 (101) 27‑28; Heb. 1.11‑12. 
409 Πλὴν ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὸν Κέλσον καὶ ταῦτα ἀποφηνάμενον ὅτι ψυχὴ μὲν θεοῦ ἔργον, σώματος 
δὲ ἄλλη φύσις∙ οὗ τῷ λόγῳ ἠκολούθησε μηδὲν διαφέρειν νυκτερίδος ἢ εὐλῆς ἢ βατράχου 
σῶμα τοῦ αἰθερίου σώματος (C. Cels. 4.56). 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Again blending Greek and Hebrew wisdom, Origen here simply reduces Celsus to the 
absurdity of arguing the equivalence of star‑body and frog‑body.  Against such dualist 
simplicity Origen finds it easier to assert a complexity based in qualitative distinctions: 
“a philosophy [λόγος] which accounts for the diversity of bodies by the hypothesis that 
different qualities [ποιότητας] are given to them.”  In elaboration of this point he 
continues: 
For we also know that there are ‘both heavenly bodies and earthly 
bodies’ and that there is one glory of heavenly bodies and another 
of earthly bodies, and that not even that of heavenly bodies is the 
same; for there is one glory of the sun and another glory of the 
stars, and even among themselves, ‘one star differs from another 
in glory.’  Therefore also, as we believe in the resurrection of the 
dead, we affirm that changes occur in the qualities of bodies since 
some of them which have been ‘sown in corruption are raised in 
incorruption, and some sown in dishonor are raised in glory….’410 
 
Here the qualitative flexibility of matter that Origen espouses is brought to bear directly 
in defense of Christian doctrine, the central conviction being that matter is actually 
changed when the divine acts upon it;  that it is, in fact, qualitatively different, such that 
any body thus formed or changed by divine activity must be classed differently from 
lower bodies: 
All of us who have accepted the existence of providence maintain 
that the underlying matter is capable of receiving the qualities 
which the Creator wills to give it.  And by God’s will a quality of 
one kind is imposed upon this particular matter, but afterwards it 
will have a quality of another kind, one, let us say, which is better 
and superior.411 
                                                       
410 …λόγον, διαφορὰν διδόντα διὰ τὰς ἐπικειμένας ποιότητας τοῖς σώμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ 
σώματα. Ἴσμεν γὰρ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὅτι ἐστὶ «καὶ σώματα ἐπουράνια καὶ σώματα ἐπίγεια», καὶ 
ἄλλη μὲν «ἐπουρανίων» σωμάτων «δόξα» ἄλλη δὲ «ἐπιγείων», καὶ οὐδὲ τῶν «ἐπουρανίων» ἡ 
αὐτή∙ «ἄλλη» γὰρ «δόξα ἡλίου» «καὶ ἄλλη δόξα ἀστέρων», καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς δὲ τοῖς ἄστροις 
«ἀστὴρ ἀστέρος διαφέρει ἐν δόξῃ». Διὸ καὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν «τῶν νεκρῶν» ἀποδεχόμενοι 
μεταβολάς φαμεν γίνεσθαι ποιοτήτων τῶν ἐν σώμασιν∙ ἐπεὶ σπειρόμενά τινα αὐτῶν «ἐν 
φθορᾷ ἐγείρεται ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ», καὶ σπειρόμενα «ἐν ἀτιμίᾳ ἐγείρεται ἐν δόξῃ»…. (C. Cels. 
4.56) 
411 Περὶ δὲ τοῦ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην δεκτικὴν εἶναι ποιοτήτων, ὧν ὁ δημιουργὸς βούλεται, 
πάντες οἱ πρόνοιαν παραδεξάμενοι κατασκευάζομεν∙ καὶ βουλομένου μὲν θεοῦ ποιότης 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To Celsus, predictably, he attributes the opposite view, that “that the qualities which by 
some unknown agency have been appointed to change from one character to another, 
are not the work of any divine Logos who changes the qualities in matter.”412   
Origen attempts to obtain more leverage for his argument for higher embodiment by 
exploiting Celsus’ claim that “the soul is God’s work.”  Such a claim is inconclusive, argues 
Origen, “for he has not made it clear whether every soul is God’s work, or only the 
rational soul.”413  He then accuses Celsus of failing to confine his argument only to the 
rational soul.414  As we have seen, it is the rational element in the human person that, in 
Origen’s view, establishes the human being in a relation to God – making him thus a 
“work of God.”  If non‑rational souls are thus not God’s work (the concession just 
squeezed from Celsus), then it follows that “it is not true that every body has a nature 
which is different from that of the soul”415 – that is, an animal soul is unlike a human soul 
insofar as it is not the work of God.  Animal souls would thus be nearer in kind to 
debased matter, from which the rational, human souls would be correspondingly 
removed, by virtue of being unique in the distinction of being “God’s work.”  Origen 
exploits this distinction to buttress qualitative distinctions among bodies, arguing that if 
“the body of each animal corresponds to its soul, then obviously the body of a being 
whose soul is God’s work would be superior to a body in which a soul dwells which is 
not God’s work.”  In this way, a principle that we have already seen elaborated – that 
the quality of the body serves as an index of the soul’s standing – becomes the basis for 
                                                                                                                                                                    
τοιαδὶ νῦν ἐστι περὶ τήνδε τὴν ὕλην ἑξῆς δὲ τοιαδί, φέρ’ εἰπεῖν, βελτίων καὶ διαφέρουσα (C. 
Cels. 4.57). 
412 τὰς ποιότητας, οὐκ οἶδ’ ὁπόθεν οὕτω τεταγμένας ἐκ τῶνδε τάσδε γίνεσθαι, οὐχὶ θείου 
τινὸς λόγου ἔργον εἶναι, τὰς ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ποιότητας ἀμείβοντος (C. Cels. 4.57). 
413 οὐ γὰρ ἐσαφήνισε, πότερον πᾶσα ψυχὴ θεοῦ ἔργον ἢ μόνη ἡ λογική (C. Cels. 4.58). 
414 He does seem inclined to attribute such an elevated view of animal souls to Celsus, even 
noting passages in which the latter appears to assert the greater divinity of animal souls, who are 
“dearer to God” and “have a purer idea of the Deity.” θεοφιλέστερα … τοῦ θείου τὴν ἔννοιαν ἔχειν 
καθαρωτέραν (C. Cels. 4.58); however, he finds that the argument is better served if Celsus is 
made to preserve a distinction between two types of soul. 
415 τὸ μηδὲ παντὸς σώματος ἄλλην εἶναι φύσιν (C. Cels. 4.58). 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asserting the superiority of the human body.416  “Thus it will be wrong to say that the 
body of a bat, or a worm, or a frog, will in no respect differ from that of a man.”417  It is 
based on this kind of reasoning, Origen asserts, that people of reasonable wit would 
reverence the bodies of good men upon their decease, while disregarding or even 
defiling the bodies of the base; that they would venerate the tomb of Socrates while 
disregarding that of Anytus.418   
Origen’s final attempt at vindicating material being concerns the Platonic view of 
the material world as eternal.  His tactic is to twist Celsus’ assertion that “no product of 
matter is immortal,”419 making it appear to contradict this fundamental position, and thus 
making of Celsus a denier of the immortality of the world: 
Now if the world is immortal, which is the opinion of those who 
say that only the soul is God’s work and that it originated from a 
bowl, let Celsus show that it did not originate from matter which 
has no qualities, remaining consistent with his opinion that no 
                                                       
416 ἑκάστου ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα ζῴου ἀνάλογον τῇ ψυχῇ, δῆλον ὅτι οὗ ψυχὴ θεοῦ ἔργον ἐστί, 
διαφέροι ἂν τὸ ταύτης σῶμα σώματος, ἐν ᾧ οἰκεῖ ψυχὴ οὐκ οὖσα ἔργον θεοῦ.  Origen 
elaborates this point further elsewhere, elaborating a sliding scale of corespondences even among 
humans.  Invoking the physiognomists Zopyrus, Loxus, and Polemon, he speculates: “Suppose it 
is true that a certain soul which in accordance with certain mysterious principles does not 
deserve to be in the body of a completely irrational being, yet is not worthy to be in that of a 
purely rational being, puts on a monstrous body so that reason cannot be fully developed in on 
one born in this way, whose head is out of proportion to the rest of the body, and is far too small; 
and suppose that another soul receives a body of such a kind that it is slightly more rational that 
the former instance, and another still more so, the nature of the body being more or less opposed 
to the apprehension of reason.  Why then should there not be a certain soul that takes a body 
which is entirely miraculous, which has something in common with men in order to be able to 
live with them, but which also has something out of the ordinary, in order that the soul may 
remain uncontaminated by sin?” Εἰ γὰρ ἥδε μὲν ἡ ψυχή, κατά τινας ἀπορρήτους λόγους ἀξία 
γενομένη μὴ πάντῃ μὲν ἐν ἀλόγου γενέσθαι σώματι οὐ μὴν καὶ καθαρῶς ἐν λογικοῦ, 
ἐνδύεται σῶμα τερατῶδες, ὡς μηδὲ τὸν λόγον συμπληρωθῆναι δύνασθαι τῷ οὑτωσὶ 
γεγενημένῳ καὶ ἀσύμμετρον ἔχοντι τὴν κεφαλὴν τῷ λοιπῷ σώματι καὶ πάνυ βραχυτέραν, 
ἑτέρα δὲ τοιόνδε σῶμα ἀναλαμβάνει, ὡς ὀλίγῳ ἐκείνου γενέσθαι λογικωτέρα, καὶ ἄλλη ἔτι 
μᾶλλον, τῆς φύσεως τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἢ ἐπ’ ἔλαττον ἀντιπραττούσης τῇ τοῦ λόγου 
ἀντιλήψει∙ διὰ τί οὐχὶ καὶ ψυχή τις ἔσται πάντῃ παράδοξον ἀναλαμβάνουσα σῶμα, ἔχον μέν 
τι κοινὸν πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἵνα καὶ συνδιατρῖψαι αὐτοῖς δυνηθῇ, ἔχον δέ τι καὶ 
ἐξαίρετον, ἵνα τῆς κακίας ἄγευστος ἡ ψυχὴ διαμεῖναι δυνηθῇ; 
417 Καὶ οὕτω ψεῦδος ἔσται τὸ μηδὲν διοίσειν νυκτερίδος ἢ εὐλῆς ἢ βατράχου σῶμα παρὰ τὸ 
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (C. Cels. 4.58). 
418 C. Cels. 4.59 
419 ὕλης ἔκγονον οὐδὲν ἀθάνατον (C. Cels. 4.61). 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product of matter is immortal.  But if, since the world is a product of 
matter, the world is not immortal, then is the world mortal and 
destined for destruction or not?  For if it is destined for 
destruction, it will be destroyed although it is God’s work.  Then 
let Celsus tell us what the soul, which is God’s work, will do at the 
destruction of the world.420 
 
  If “no product of matter is immortal,” Origen argues, then such reasoning must 
be applied with equal force to the material world; if such reasoning does so apply – i.e., 
if the material cosmos is mortal – then Celsus must concede the mortality of a God‑
created thing.  Origen throws down his challenge in the expectation that Celsus can 
abandon neither the world’s materiality nor its eternity, which forces a conclusion that 
tends to elevate materiality alongside the created rational soul.   Origen is, of course, 
confusing the case here, refusing to distinguish between matter in the abstract and any 
given “product” of matter.  Celsus might readily grant the eternity of underlying matter 
while denying the eternity of the world’s particular form; but Origen is clearly more 
interested in gaining the point that the world is a divinely created immortal thing – a 
concession that elevates the standing of matter alongside the soul.  If the world is found 
to be God‑created but perishable, he asks, then what of the soul?  Can the God‑created 
soul also die?  Origen’s game is plainly somewhat devious, but it is an interesting 
display of appropriating aspects of Platonic tradition to leverage from Celsus the 
concession that matter, too – and not merely the rational soul – is created by God, and 
that it may be regarded as in some sense everlasting.  Material being is thereby 
vindicated, and the body is implicitly elevated in its standing alongside the immortal, 
rational soul, calling into question Celsus’ conviction on the soul’s unique standing, and 
his rather severe rejection of embodiment.  
                                                       
420 Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀθάνατος ὁ κόσμος, ὅπερ ἀρέσκει καὶ τοῖς θεοῦ ἔργον εἰποῦσι μόνην τὴν ψυχὴν 
καὶ ἀπό τινος αὐτὴν κρατῆρος γεγονέναι λέγουσι, δεικνύτω ὁ Κέλσος οὐκ ἐξ ὕλης ἀποίου 
αὐτὸν γεγονέναι, τηρῶν τὸ ὕλης ἔκγονον οὐδὲν ἀθάνατον∙ εἰ δ’ ἐπεὶ ὕλης ἔκγονόν ἐστιν ὁ 
κόσμος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀθάνατον ὁ κόσμος∙ θνητὸν ὁ κόσμος ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ φθειρόμενον ἢ μή; Εἰ 
μὲν γὰρ φθειρόμενον, ὡς θεοῦ ἔργον ἔσται φθειρόμενον∙ εἶτ’ ἐν τῇ φθορᾷ τοῦ κόσμου τὸ 
ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ ψυχὴ τί ποιήσει, λεγέτω ὁ Κέλσος∙ (C. Cels. 4.61). 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Thus Origen attempts to combat Celsus’ dualist rejection of matter by seizing the 
Platonic ground upon which the latter founds his objections.  If it is granted, in 
accordance with venerable, traditional outlook, that the stars and the aether have 
material bodies, and that a rational soul makes for a higher grade of embodiment, and 
furthermore, that the very fact of matter’s eternity suggests something of divinity and 
immortality, then perhaps Celsus’ vehement rejection of materiality has been somewhat 
undermined. 
 
4. The Incarnation of the Logos: Encountering God in the Body 
 
  As we have already seen in Origen’s spiritual anthropology, it is the very 
decision to conceptualize God as Logos that makes God accessible to the rational 
embodied nature of the human being.  It is a point that Origen often emphasizes: 
But if, because we have understood that ‘in the beginning was the 
Logos, and the Logos was with God,’ we affirm that God is attainable 
by this Logos, and is comprehended not by him alone, but also by any 
man to whom he reveals the Father, we would prove that Celsus’ 
words were untrue when he says Neither is God attainable by reason 
[λόγῳ].421 
 
Origen here transforms the human faculty of reason (λόγος) by resorting to his 
conceptualization of God as Logos as precisely the venue wherein reason subsists: we 
may “reason” our way to God precisely because we are rational creatures created 
through the Logos (or in Wisdom).  But Logos is no mere abstraction in which 
intellectually‑inclined human beings might find themselves mirrored; it is God moving 
out into the created order to reach the rational embodied creatures who stand in need: 
                                                       
421 εἰ δὲ νοήσαντες τὸ «Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ 
λόγος» ἀποφαινόμεθα ὅτι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἐφικτός ἐστιν ὁ θεός, οὐ μόνῳ αὐτῷ 
καταλαμβανόμενος ἀλλὰ καὶ ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς ἀποκαλύψῃ τὸν πατέρα, ψευδοποιήσομεν τὴν 
Κέλσου λέξιν φάσκοντος∙ οὐδὲ λόγῳ ἐφικτός ἐστιν ὁ θεός (C.Cels. 6.65).  As elsewhere: 
“Accordingly, if Celsus asks us how we think we can come to know God, and how we imagine we shall 
be saved by him, we reply that the Logos of God is sufficient; for he comes to those who seek him 
or accept him when he appears to make known and reveal the Father….” 
180 
Accordingly, if Celsus asks us how we think we can come to know God, 
and how we imagine we shall be saved by him, we reply that the Logos of 
God is sufficient; for he comes to those who seek him or accept him 
when he appears to make known and reveal the Father….422 
 
The Logos is thus an agent as well, coming to those who “seek” and “accept” him, and 
presumably making up the lack in their innate reasoning capacities by calibrating his 
activity to the capacities of those open to receiving him.  Central to this idea is the 
affinity between the divine Logos and the rational embodied creature, often expressed by 
Origen in the terms of image.  The restoration of the soul conceived as “in the image” of 
God is accomplished by re‑inscribing it as the proper image of the Logos.   Naturally 
Origen does not mean that the soul crudely replicates God, a point that he makes b 
adducing the model of the soul as the image of the image: 
Then Celsus failed to see the difference between what is ‘in the 
image of God’ and his image.  He did not realize that the image of 
God is the firstborn of all creation, the very Logos and truth, and, 
further, the very wisdom Himself, being ‘the image of his 
goodness,’ whereas man was made ‘in the image of God’….423 
 
Celsus has objected that God “did not make man his image; for God is not like that, nor does 
he resemble any other form at all.”424  To this Origen replies that only the Logos is the 
“image of God,” arguing further that Celsus “failed to understand to what characteristic 
of man the words ‘in the image of God’ apply, and that this exists in the soul.”  It is 
rather the “inner man” – synonymous for Origen with the rational nature – that is in the 
image of the Logos, having being formed through the Logos  in God’s providential 
creation: 
                                                       
422 Διόπερ ἐὰν ἔρηται ἡμᾶς Κέλσος, Πῶς οἰόμεθα γνωρίσειν τὸν θεόν, καὶ πῶς πρὸς αὐτὸν 
σωθήσεσθαι∙ ἀποκρινούμεθα ὅτι ἱκανός ἐστιν ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος, γενόμενος τοῖς ζητοῦσιν 
αὐτὸν ἢ τοῖς ἐπιφαινόμενον αὐτὸν παραδεχομένοις, γνωρίσαι καὶ ἀποκαλύψαι τὸν πατέρα 
(C.Cels. 6.68). 
423 Εἶτά φησιν ὁ Κέλσος, μὴ ἐνιδὼν τῇ διαφορᾷ τοῦ «κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ» καὶ «τῆς εἰκόνος 
αὐτοῦ», ὅτι «εἰκὼν» μὲν «τοῦ θεοῦ» ὁ «πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεώς» ἐστιν ὁ αὐτολόγος καὶ ἡ 
αὐτοαλήθεια ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἡ αὐτοσοφία, «εἰκὼν» οὖσα «τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ», «κατ’ εἰκόνα» 
δὲ τοῦ «θεοῦ» ὁ ἄνθρωπος πεποίηται…. (C.Cels. 6.63). 
424 Οὐδ’ ἄνθρωπον ἐποίησεν εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ∙ οὐ γὰρ τοιόσδε ὁ θεὸς οὔτ’ ἄλλῳ εἴδει οὐδενὶ 
ὅμοιος. (C.Cels. 6.63). 
181 
The remaining possibility is that that which is made in the image 
of God is to be understood of the inward man, as we call it, which 
is renewed and has the power to be formed in the image of the 
Creator, when a man becomes perfect as his heavenly Father is 
perfect, and when he hears ‘Be holy because I the Lord your God 
am holy,’ and when he learns the saying ‘Become imitators of 
God’ and assumes into his own virtuous soul the characteristics of 
God.425 
 
When a human being is transformed in his rational, “inner” nature, his entire physical 
being is transformed as well: “the body of the man who has assumed the characteristics 
of God, in that part which is made in the image of God, is a temple, since he possesses a 
soul of this character and has God in his soul because of that which is in his image.”426  
Here is the very open suggestion that that human body may attain to a higher grade 
whenever the soul, “in that that part which is made in the image,” takes up “the 
characteristics of God” (ἐν τῷ «κατ’ εἰκόνα» … τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ). When we recall the 
dismissive language employed by Celsus in characterizing the body – that it is a “dead 
thing,” – such biblical language underlines the significance for Origen of the material 
body as a site of holiness and transformative, divine activity.  Where the rational soul 
(λογικὴ ψυχή) is shaped by the divine Logos, a process in which a man becomes “holy” 
and an “imitator of God,” it is healed and renewed and brought into a superior state of 
being, the body such a rational being is also transformed and termed appropriately a 
“temple” – an image entirely appropriate for a being that is rationally “in the image” 
(διὰ τὸ «κατ’ εἰκόνα»).427 
  For Origen, it is clear that such sanctifying elevation is made possible only by the 
                                                       
425 Λείπεται δὴ τὸ «κατ’ εἰκόνα» τοῦ «θεοῦ» ἐν τῷ καθ’ ἡμᾶς λεγομένῳ ἔσω ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ 
ἀνακαινουμένῳ καὶ πεφυκότι γίνεσθαι «κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος» νοεῖσθαι, ὅτε γίνεταί τις 
«τέλειος», «ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ὁ οὐράνιος τέλειός ἐστι», καὶ ἀκούει ὅτι «Ἅγιοι ἔσεσθε, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἅγιος 
κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν», καὶ μανθάνων τὸ «Μιμηταὶ τοῦ θεοῦ γίνεσθε» ἀναλαμβάνει εἰς τὴν 
ἑαυτοῦ ἐνάρετον ψυχὴν τοὺς χαρακτῆρας τοῦ θεοῦ∙ (C.Cels. 6.63). 
426 καὶ «ναός» ἐστι τοῦ ἐν τῷ «κατ’ εἰκόνα» ἀνειληφότος τοῦ θεοῦ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ «τὸ σῶμα», τοῦ 
τοιαύτην ἔχοντος ψυχὴν καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ διὰ τὸ «κατ’ εἰκόνα» τὸν θεόν (C.Cels. 6.63). 
427 The point is more forceful when we note that elsewhere, in discussing physical structures, 
Origen argues that the veneration that they receive is in proportion to what lies within: temples 
are valued more highly than brothels; the tomb of Socrates is venerated over the tomb of Anytus. 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Logos’ assumption of flesh: 
 …Because of those who had cleaved to the flesh and become as flesh, 
he became flesh, that he might be received by those incapable of 
seeing him in his nature as the one who was the Logos, who was with 
God, who was God.  And being spoken of under physical forms, and 
being proclaimed to be flesh, he calls to himself those who are flesh 
that he may make them first to be formed like the Logos who became 
flesh, and after that lead them up to see him as he was before he 
became flesh; so that they may be helped and may advance from the 
first stage which is that of the flesh and say: ‘Even if we have known 
Christ after the flesh, yet now we know him so no more.’428 
 
The result of this encounter is that the soul may be then “formed like the Logos,” a 
process that is possible only given the soul’s original standing as the image of the Logos.  
The end attained is an ascent from embodiment, in which the soul “sees” the Logos “as 
he was before he became flesh,” first having obtained, by virtue of an encounter with the 
Logos in the flesh, an advance “from the first stage which is that of the flesh.”  Against 
Celsus’ attack on this doctrine – his implication that such teaching merely trivializes the 
ascent to truth, scathingly made clear in his assertion that “Because he is hard to perceive he 
thrust his own Spirit into a body like ours, and sent him down here, that we might be able to hear 
and learn from him” – Origen insists that the descent of the Logos is not merely a program 
of blithe simplification.  On the contrary, even the incarnate Son must be understood in 
terms of the providential creative acts of God; he remains the one in whom God has 
made all things: 
 Let us grant that God is hard to perceive.  Yet he is not the only being 
hard for a person to perceive.  For the divine Logos is hard to 
perceive; and the same is true of the wisdom in which God has made 
all things.  For who can perceive the wisdom in which God has made 
each individual thing?  Therefore, it was not because God is hard to 
                                                       
428 διὰ τοὺς κολληθέντας τῇ σαρκὶ καὶ γενομένους ὅπερ «σὰρξ» «ἐγένετο» «σάρξ», ἵνα 
χωρηθῇ ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ δυναμένων αὐτὸν βλέπειν καθὸ «λόγος» ἦν καὶ «πρὸς θεὸν» ἦν «καὶ 
θεὸς ἦν». Καὶ σωματικῶς γε λαλούμενος καὶ ὡς «σὰρξ» ἀπαγγελλόμενος ἐφ’ ἑαυτὸν καλεῖ 
τοὺς ὄντας σάρκα, ἵν’ αὐτοὺς ποιήσῃ πρῶτον μορφωθῆναι κατὰ λόγον τὸν γενόμενον 
σάρκα, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὐτοὺς ἀναβιβάσῃ ἐπὶ τὸ ἰδεῖν αὐτόν, ὅπερ ἦν πρὶν γένηται «σάρξ»∙ 
ὥστε αὐτοὺς ὠφεληθέντας καὶ ἀναβάντας ἀπὸ τῆς κατὰ σάρκα εἰσαγωγῆς εἰπεῖν τό∙ «Εἰ καὶ 
Χριστόν ποτε κατὰ σάρκα ἐγνώκαμεν, ἀλλὰ νῦν οὐκέτι γινώσκομεν» (C.Cels. 6.68). 
183 
perceive that he sent a Son who was easy to perceive…. But, as we 
have observed, the Son also is hard to perceive, seeing that he is the 
divine Logos through whom all things were made, who tabernacled 
among us.429 
 
Thus Origen’s program is no mere lowering of the bar.  Rather, the Logos so conceived 
now inhabits that natural world, making possible the first steps of ascent for rational 
beings bearing its imprint. 
Origen predicates the possibility on the embodied Logos on the assumptions that 
we have already seen about the qualitative relationship between bodies and souls, 
pitting the possibility of a divine body for Jesus against the rather grim case of “a certain 
soul which … is not worthy to be in [the body] of a purely rational being,” and which 
therefore “puts on a monstrous body so that reason cannot be fully developed in one 
born this way, whose head is out of proportion to the rest of the body, and is far too 
small….”430  If such correspondences are real, as the physiognomists theorize, then we 
may reasonably posit a “miraculous” body for Jesus, thereby opposing Celsus’ repeated 
slander that Jesus was the product of an adulterous union between Mary and an 
otherwise unknown legionary named “Panthera.”431  Such considerations lead Origen 
                                                       
429 Ἔστω δὴ καὶ δυσθεώρητος ὁ θεός∙ ἀλλ’ οὐ μόνος δυσθεώρητός ἐστι τινί, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ 
μονογενὴς αὐτοῦ. Δυσθεώρητος γὰρ ὁ θεὸς λόγος, δυσθεώρητος δὲ οὑτωσὶ καὶ σοφία ἐστίν, 
ἐν ᾗ τὰ πάντα πεποίηκεν ὁ θεός. Τίς γὰρ δύναται καθ’ ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων τὴν σοφίαν, ἐν ᾗ 
ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων πεποίηκε, <θεωρῆσαι>; Οὐ διὰ τὸ δυσθεώρητος οὖν ὁ θεὸς 
εἶναι ὡς εὐθεώρητον τὸν υἱὸν ἔπεμψεν.... Ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀποδεδώκαμεν, καὶ ὁ υἱὸς δυσθεώρητος, 
ἅτε ὢν λόγος θεός, δι’ οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο, «καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν» (C.Cels. 6.69). 
430 ἥδε μὲν ἡ ψυχή … ἀξία γενομένη … οὐ μὴν καὶ καθαρῶς ἐν λογικοῦ [γενέσθαι 
σώματι] ἐνδύεται σῶμα τερατῶδες, ὡς μηδὲ τὸν λόγον συμπληρωθῆναι δύνασθαι τῷ οὑτωσὶ 
γεγενημένῳ καὶ ἀσύμμετρον ἔχοντι τὴν κεφαλὴν τῷ λοιπῷ σώματι καὶ πάνυ βραχυτέραν…. 
(C.Cels. 1.33). 
431 Suppose that the views of the physiognomists are granted, of Zopyrus, Loxus, or Polemon, or 
anyone else who wrote about these matters and professed to possess some remarkable 
knowledge, that all bodies conform to the habits of their souls; then for the soul that was to live a 
miraculous life on earth and to do great things, a body was necessary, not, as Celsus thinks, 
produced by the adultery of Panthera and a virgin (for the offspring of such impure intercourse 
must rather have been some stupid man who would harm men by teaching licentiousness, 
unrighteousness, and other evils, and not a teacher of self‑control, righteousness, and other 
virtues), but, as the prophets foretold, the offspring of a virgin who according to the promised 
sign should give birth to a child whose name was significant of his work, showing that at his 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into the difficult territory of defining just what it means for the Logos to have a body: “If 
[Jesus] had been born as the Bible says, his body could have been somehow more divine 
than that of the multitude and in some sense the body of God.”432  The equivocation “in 
some sense” (κατά τι σημαινόμενον) marks a certain hesitation that is evident later, 
when Origen suggests that “not even we suppose that the body of Jesus, which could 
then be seen and perceived by the senses, was God.  And why do I say the body?  For 
not even his soul was God….”433  Neither the body nor the soul of Jesus was God, and 
yet his body was “the body of God” in some sense.  Origen’s solution to this problem 
appears to be to assume that the Logos adopts a certain body and elevates its standing 
thereby. By way of analogy Origen suggests a Pythian priestess as a model for the 
manner in which God acts through the body of Jesus: “Similarly in our opinion it was the 
divine Logos and Son of the God of the universe that spoke in Jesus, saying: ‘I am the 
way, the truth, and the life’….”434  The soul and body of Jesus thus appear to be a 
composite instrument employed by the divine Logos, the “Son of the God of the 
universe.” Interestingly, though, Origen strives to close the conceptual gap that he has 
just opened between agent and instrument:  
When we say this, we do not separate the Son of God from Jesus.  For 
after the incarnation the soul and body of Jesus became very closely 
united [ἓν] with the Logos of God… That which was at one time a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
birth God would be with men. Ἐὰν δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν φυσιογνωμονούντων κρατῇ, εἴτε Ζωπύρου 
εἴτε Λόξου εἴτε Πολέμωνος εἴτε οὕτινός ποτ’ οὖν τοιαῦτα γράψαντος καὶ ἐπαγγειλαμένου 
εἰδέναι τι θαυμαστόν, οἰκεῖα τοῖς ἤθεσι τῶν ψυχῶν πάντ’ εἶναι τὰ σώματα, τῇ οὖν μελλούσῃ 
παραδόξως ἐπιδημεῖν τῷ βίῳ καὶ μεγαλοποιεῖν ἔδει γενέσθαι σῶμα οὐχ, ὡς οἴεται Κέλσος, 
ἀπὸ Πανθήρα μοιχεύσαντος καὶ παρθένου μοιχευθείσης—ἐκ γὰρ τοιούτων ἀνάγνων μίξεων 
ἔδει μᾶλλον ἀνόητόν τινα καὶ ἐπιβλαβῆ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διδάσκαλον ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας 
καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν κακῶν γενέσθαι οὐχὶ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν 
ἀρετῶν—, ἀλλ’ ὡς καὶ προφῆται προεῖπον, ἀπὸ παρθένου, κατ’ ἐπαγγελίαν σημείου 
γεννώσης τὸν ἐπώνυμον πράγματος, δηλοῦντος ὅτι ἐπὶ τῇ γενέσει αὐτοῦ μετ’ ἀνθρώπων 
ἔσται θεός (C.Cels. 1.33). 
432 εἰ, ὡς γέγραπται, γεγέννητο, δύναταί πως εἶναι τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ καὶ θειότερον παρὰ τοὺς 
πολλοὺς καὶ κατά τι σημαινόμενον θεοῦ σῶμα (C.Cels. 1.69). 
433 Πρὸς ταῦτα δὲ φήσομεν ὅτι οὐδ’ ἡμεῖς ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὸ βλεπόμενον τότε καὶ αἰσθητὸν 
τοῦ Ἰησοῦ σῶμα εἶναι θεόν. Καὶ τί λέγω τὸ σῶμα; Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὴν ψυχήν (C.Cels. 2.9). 
434 οὕτω καθ’ ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος θεὸς καὶ θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων υἱὸς ἔλεγεν ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ τό∙ «Ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ 
ὁδὸς καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ ἡ ζωὴ» (C.Cels. 2.9). 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composite being in relation to the Logos of God is one with him…. 435 
 
Thus, although the Logos and the body are theoretically conceptualized as separate – just 
as is the case for the rational nature and the body of a human being – the Son of God in 
his embodied state is nevertheless a unity, which to encounter is never anything less 
than the divine Logos, the eternal Son of God.   
  The critical difference in the case of Jesus is that the soul has been displaced by 
the Logos as that factor that determines the body’s quality, a displacement which in turn 
sanctifies both soul and body: 
Let our critics know that he, whom we think and have believed to be 
God and Son of God from the beginning, is the very Logos and 
wisdom and truth itself.  We affirm that his mortal body and the soul 
within him received the greatest elevation not only by communion, 
but by union and intermingling, so that by sharing in his divinity he 
was transformed into God.436 
 
The Logos thus transforms the body and soul of Jesus by becoming one with them, in 
“communion” (κοινωνίᾳ), “union” (ἑνώσει) and “intermingling” (ἀνακράσει).  Only 
the pliancy of matter that is axiomatic to Origen’s thought that makes such an elevation 
possible: 
If anyone should take offense because we say this even of his body, let 
him consider what is asserted by the Greeks about matter, that 
properly speaking it is without qualities, but is clothed with qualities 
such as the Creator wishes to give it, and that often it puts aside its 
former qualities and receives better and different ones.  If this is right, 
why is it remarkable that by the providence of God’s will the mortal 
quality of Jesus’ body should have been changed into an ethereal and 
divine quality?  …We would say that if it is possible for the matter 
underlying all qualities to possess varying qualities, why is it 
                                                       
435 Ταῦτα δέ φαμεν οὐ χωρίζοντες τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦἸησοῦ∙ ἓν γὰρ μάλιστα μετὰ τὴν 
οἰκονομίαν γεγένηται πρὸς τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα Ἰησοῦ … ἕν 
ἐστι τό ποτε σύνθετον πρὸς τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ (C.Cels. 2.9). 
436 ὅμως δὲ ἴστωσαν οἱ ἐγκαλοῦντες ὅτι, ὃν μὲν νομίζομεν καὶ πεπείσμεθα ἀρχῆθεν εἶναι 
θεὸν καὶ υἱὸν θεοῦ, οὗτος ὁ αὐτολόγος ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ αὐτοσοφία καὶ ἡ αὐτοαλήθεια∙ τὸ δὲ 
θνητὸν αὐτοῦ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴν τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον οὐ μόνον κοινωνίᾳ 
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑνώσει καὶ ἀνακράσει τὰ μέγιστά φαμεν προσειληφέναι καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου θειότητος 
κεκοινωνηκότα εἰς θεὸν μεταβεβληκέναι (C.Cels. 3.41). 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impossible for the flesh of Jesus to have changed qualities, and to 
become of such a character as flesh would need to be, if it is to live in 
aether and the realms above it, where it no longer has the properties 
belonging to carnal weakness and those which Celsus calls 
abominable?437 
 
The risk in such a formulation is that it leans toward characterizing Jesus as a sort of 
ethereal cosmic visitor from Gnostic myths.  Origen’s risk in granting that flesh in the 
world is tainted by “carnal weakness,” and that it might fairly be characterized as 
“abominable,” as well as his assigning to Jesus a body of an “ethereal and divine quality” 
would lend support to such a view.  Such notions can give the impression that Origen 
does not view the material manifestation of the Logos as uniformly divine.  The more 
conventionally physical, the less divine; the less conventionally physical, the more 
divine.  
  And yet the incarnation of the Logos is a bridge enabling the first steps of ascent 
for embodied rational beings.  The rational being can come to mirror the Logos, and the 
process is abetted by the Logos’ assumption of flesh.   The human ascent that is thus 
enabled, as will shortly be seen, essentially reverses the trajectory of the Logos: as the 
Logos descends into materiality, taking upon itself the “abominable” body that Celsus 
abhors, so the human soul finally ascends, its body transformed into the “aetherial” 
body, more suited to transcendent realms, and more characteristic of divinity.  
Nevertheless, Origen insists that the Logos is in no way distorted in the descent.  He  is 
likened to the physician who heals our diseases, while immune to them himself.438  He 
effects changes in the souls that receive him, while remaining himself impassible: “If the 
                                                       
437 Ἐὰν δέ τις προσκόπτῃ καὶ περὶ τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ ταῦθ’ ἡμῶν λεγόντων, ἐπιστησάτω 
τοῖς ὑπὸ Ἑλλήνων λεγομένοις περὶ τῆς τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ ἀποίου ὕλης, ποιότητας ἀμφισκομένης, 
ὁποίας ὁ δημιουργὸς βούλεται αὐτῇ περιτιθέναι, καὶ πολλάκις τὰς μὲν προτέρας 
ἀποτιθεμένης κρείττονας δὲ καὶ διαφόρους ἀναλαμβανούσης. Εἰ γὰρ ὑγιῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τί 
θαυμαστὸν τὴν ποιότητα τοῦ θνητοῦ κατὰ τὸ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ σῶμα προνοίᾳ θεοῦ βουληθέντος 
μεταβαλεῖν εἰς αἰθέριον καὶ θείαν ποιότητα;… εἴπερ δυνατὸν ἀμείβειν ποιότητας τὴν 
ὑποκειμένην πάσαις ποιότησιν ὕλην, πῶς οὐ δυνατὸν καὶ τὴν σάρκα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἀμείψασαν 
ποιότητας γεγονέναι τοιαύτην, ὁποίαν ἐχρῆν εἶναι τὴν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ τοῖς ἀνωτέρω αὐτοῦ 
τόποις πολιτευομένην, οὐκέτι ἔχουσαν τὰ τῆς σαρκικῆς ἀσθενείας ἴδια καὶ ἅτινα μιαρώτερα 
ὠνόμασεν ὁ Κέλσος;  (C.Cels. 3.41). 
438 C.Cels. 4.15 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immortal divine word assumes both a human body and a human soul, and by so doing 
appears to Celsus to be subject to change and remoulding, let him learn that the Word 
remains Word in essence.”439  His manifestation is calibrated to the capacities of those 
who receive him: 
But sometimes he comes down to the level of him who is unable to 
look upon the radiance and brilliance of the Deity, and becomes as it 
were flesh, and is spoken of in physical terms, until he who has 
accepted him in this form is gradually lifted up by the Word and can 
look even upon, so to speak, his absolute form.  There are, as it were, 
different forms of the Word.  For the Word appears to each of those 
who are led to know him in a form corresponding to the state of the 
individual, whether he is a beginner, or has made a little progress, or 
is considerably advanced, or has nearly attained to virtue already, or 
has in fact attained it.440 
 
Again equivocating, Origen asserts that the Logos “becomes as it were [οἱονεὶ] flesh,” 
and seems unsure of the stability of the Logos within such an unstable mode of existence.  
The Logos becomes flesh as it were, until the believer is transformed and elevated 
(μετεωριζόμενος) to behold (θεάσασθαι) the divinity of the Logos in its “absolute form” 
(προηγουμένην μορφὴν), unconstrained by grosser bodies.  As often, Origen’s 
struggles with these questions appear to stem from devising an adequate similitude 
between embodied rational beings and the incarnate Logos that reaches them.441  It is 
                                                       
439 Εἰ δὲ καὶ σῶμα θνητὸν καὶ ψυχὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀναλαβὼν ὁ ἀθάνατος θεὸς λόγος δοκεῖ τῷ 
Κέλσῳ ἀλλάττεσθαι καὶ μεταπλάττεσθαι, μανθανέτω ὅτι «ὁ λόγος» τῇ οὐσίᾳ μένων 
λόγος…. (C.Cels. 4.15). 
440 συγκαταβαίνων δ’ ἔσθ’ ὅτε τῷ μὴ δυναμένῳ αὐτοῦ τὰς μαρμαρυγὰς καὶ τὴν λαμπρότητα 
τῆς θειότητος βλέπειν οἱονεὶ «σὰρξ» γίνεται, σωματικῶς λαλούμενος, ἕως ὁ τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν 
παραδεξάμενος κατὰ βραχὺ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου μετεωριζόμενος δυνηθῇ αὐτοῦ καὶ τήν, ἵν’ οὕτως 
ὀνομάσω, προηγουμένην μορφὴν θεάσασθαι. Εἰσὶ γὰρ διάφοροι οἱονεὶ τοῦ λόγου μορφαί, 
καθὼς ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰς ἐπιστήμην ἀγομένων φαίνεται ὁ λόγος, ἀνάλογον τῇ ἕξει τοῦ 
εἰσαγομένου ἢ ἐπ’ ὀλίγον προκόπτοντος ἢ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἢ καὶ ἐγγὺς ἤδη γινομένου τῆς ἀρετῆς 
ἢ καὶ ἐν ἀρετῇ γεγενημένου (C.Cels. 4.15‑16). 
441 This is a point to which Origen frequently returns.  In book 6, we see the same constellation of 
elements: the incapacity of most people to confront the Logos except in a fairly low, embodied 
state; the qualitative pliancy of matter that enables the calibration of the Logos to the receptive 
faculties of both the exalted and the debased; the Transfiguration as an example of vision 
available to the more advanced: “How did he fail to notice that his body differed in accordance 
with the capacity of those who saw it, and on this account appeared in such form as was 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important to bear in mind, even throughout this vindication of higher materiality, that 
the earthly body is nevertheless a site at which one encounters dangers: 
The pure soul, which is not weighed down by the leaden weights 
of evil, is carried on high to the regions of the purer and ethereal 
bodies, forsaking the gross bodies on earth and the pollutions 
attaching to them; whereas  the bad soul, which is dragged down 
to earth by its sins and has not even the power to make a recovery, 
is carried here and roams about….442 
 
Material reality can seriously hinder the rational being’s ascent, as Origen would readily 
grant.  It can become the site of divine activity, thereby benefiting from elevation to “the 
regions of the purer and ethereal bodies” (τοὺς τόπους τῶν καθαρωτέρων καὶ 
αἰθερίων σωμάτων) but only when the rational nature is properly responsive to the 
therapy of the Logos.  The bad soul, on the other hand, is ever dragged down to earth 
and mired in a grosser, more destructive materiality.  Such declining creatures, as we 
shall see, Origen aligns closely with daemons.  In the next section we shall see how his 
rejection of the daemons, and their alignment with debased souls, will be central to 
Origen’s formulation of acceptable cult, a Christian rite that in his view can actually 
facilitate the ascent of rational beings.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
beneficial for the needs of each individual’s vision?  It is not remarkable that matter, which is by 
nature subject to change, alteration, and transformation into anything which the Creator desires, 
and is capable of possessing any quality which the Artificer wishes, at one time possesses a 
quality of which it is said ‘He had not form or beauty,’ and at another time a quality so glorious 
and striking and wonderful that the three apostles who went up with Jesus and saw the exquisite 
beauty fell on their faces.” (πῶς οὐχ ἑώρα τὸ παραλλάττον τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ τοῖς 
ὁρῶσι δυνατὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χρήσιμον τοιοῦτο φαινόμενον, ὁποῖον ἔδει ἑκάστῳ βλέπεσθαι; 
Καὶ οὐ θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσει τρεπτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν καὶ εἰς πάντα ἃ βούλεται ὁ δημιουργὸς 
ὕλην μεταβλητὴν καὶ πάσης ποιότητος, ἣν ὁ τεχνίτης βούλεται, δεκτικήν, ὁτὲ μὲν ἔχειν 
ποιότητα, καθ’ ἣν λέγεται τό∙ «Οὐκ εἶχεν εἶδος οὐδὲ κάλλος», ὁτὲ δὲ οὕτως ἔνδοξον καὶ 
καταπληκτικὴν καὶ θαυμαστήν, ὡς «ἐπὶ πρόσωπον» πεσεῖν τοὺς θεατὰς τοῦ τηλικούτου 
κάλλους συνανελθόντας τῷ Ἰησοῦ τρεῖς ἀποστόλους.) (C.Cels. 6.77).  
442 ἡ μὲν καθαρὰ καὶ μὴ βαρουμένη ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς κακίας μολιβδίδων μετέωρος φέρεται ἐπὶ 
τοὺς τόπους τῶν καθαρωτέρων καὶ αἰθερίων σωμάτων, καταλιποῦσα τὰ τῇδε παχέα σώματα 
καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς μιάσματα, ἡ δὲ φαύλη καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτάδων καθελκομένη ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν 
καὶ μηδ’ ἀναπνεῦσαι δυναμένη τῇδε φέρεται καὶ καλινδεῖται (C.Cels. 7.5). 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5. Exorcising the Daemons: Christianizing Pagan Cult 
 
  Here I shall argue that Origen puts forward in Contra Celsum what might be 
loosely termed a “theory” of eucharist derived mainly from an immediate need to 
assimilate Christian ritual to a pagan religious template, while retaining the vigorous 
rhetoric of difference characteristic of Contra Celsum.  In this context, the fact that some 
of his most arresting statements on behalf of Christian eucharist emerge from arguments 
rejecting daemonic rites favored by Celsus at once suggests that he is engaged in a game 
of rhetorical one‑upmanship, in which he will offer a superior Christian alternative that 
will nevertheless make sense within the same complex of ideas implicitly approved by 
Celsus.  By no means should this be taken to suggest that Origen’s view of eucharist was 
simply and uniformly “pagan”; still less that it can be straightforwardly reduced to the 
an emphasis on the power of material objects as bearers of symbola that is characteristic 
of Iamblichus; rather, this is merely to suggest that Origen’s momentary adoption of 
these categories is exactly the kind of experiment in thought that we should expect from 
an intellectual participant of his time and place. 
Origen for the most part shies away from overt discussion of eucharist,443 in 
much the same way that he avoids the fall of rational beings in excessive detail.  As a 
result, we lack an explicit account of the metaphysics underpinning eucharistic rites.  
What is more, modern research, perhaps deterred by Origen’s reticence, has tended to 
be more liturgiological in nature, and has generated an enormous scholarly output 
aimed at discerning the shapes of various rites.444  Here I shall argue that such 
                                                       
443 The initiated already know, and the unitiated cannot understand, suggests Origen in HomLev 
9.10.  Text quoted in Buchinger (2007) 210. 
444 Note particularly the conclusions of Buchinger, that “the connection of the liturgy of the word 
and the Eucharistic celebration [can] probably be assumed,” and that “a Eucharistic prayer, 
which contains … an epiclesis as well, and perhaps also an explicit statement of offering, is 
anything but obvious in the first half of the third century, though it was to become standard in 
the following century” (2007) 223.  Such concerns over form also shape the major studies like that 
of Bradshaw (2004). 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approaches may tend to obscure passages445 that invite a more probing investigation of 
intellectual content, and especially of the context of traditional pagan cult praxis.  
Admittedly, such an approach supplies us with no ground to make universal 
assumptions about eucharistic theology in the third century, but nor should we expect to 
be able to do so, given the scholarly consensus on the lack of uniformity characteristic of 
eucharistic rites in that age.446   
  Another matter that complicates our consideration of Origen’s reflections on 
eucharist is the interplay between Origen’s Logos‑theology and his biblical hermeneutic.  
He employs the term “Word of God” broadly to designate the “word” of scripture, the 
divine hypostasis and “Word” of God that lies behind scripture and indeed authored it, 
and the incarnate Christ himself, the “Word” of God made flesh.  Such usage generates 
ambiguity, in that he may refer to the words of scripture as if they were food to be 
consumed, or refer to the incarnate Christ as “word,” a state of affairs that renders 
difficult any clear reading of just how eucharistic consumption is to be understood.  This 
latter problem is derives from Philonic models,447 which feature a figurative reading of 
the manna that feeds Israel in the desert as the scriptural word that nourishes when 
properly interpreted.448  Likewise Origen, commenting on the transformative effect of 
the eucharist, understands the consumption of bread as equivalent to the consumption 
of the wisdom of scripture, the Word of God.449  Where Jesus indicates that the “bread” 
he gives “for the life of the world” is his flesh, and insists that “he who eats my flesh and 
                                                       
445 Such as C.Cels. 8.57 – to be considered shortly – where Origen applies the term symbolon to the 
eucharist in a context that is already suggestive of theurgic rites or magic. 
446 Buchinger notes even that despite the warranted conclusion that the Eucharistic mysteries 
were “celebrated as a liturgy in the strict sense of the word” by Origen’s community in Palestine, 
there is nevertheless “no single text which expressly proves the emerging as independent of the 
sacramental action out of the context of a meal‑celebration” (2007) 212. 
447 See especially LaPorte (1986) 71‑73. 
448 See Qaestiones et Solutiones in Genesim IV, 102; Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres Sit 79; Legum 
Allegoriarum III, 167‑176.  Texts cited in LaPorte (1986) 74. 
449 “All the texts on the eucharistic bread suggest the same conclusion: the bread is the word of 
God.  The soul cannot receive another food but the word, i.e., the bread coming down from the 
mouth of the divine word.” LaPorte (1986) 75.  Similar sentiments are expressed in Lies (1978) 
228‑240. 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drinks my blood has eternal life,” Origen immediately integrates such passages into his 
scriptural interpretation.450  Within this complex of images in which “Word” becomes 
flesh that is offered for consumption as “bread” – which is to say, generically, “food” – 
to nourish believers, Origen emphasizes that the flesh‑bread in question is precisely the 
substance of scriptural word, which may be rightly or wrongly consumed depending on 
the appropriateness of one’s hermeneutic.  It is “irrational and quite savage” to consume 
the flesh raw; rational men consume it properly prepared “through their desire to 
understand the spiritual aspects of the word.”451   
All of this is surely in keeping with Origen’s exegetical strategies, whose proper 
employment provides for the avoidance of excessive literalism (here undercooking) and 
excessive dilution of meaning (here overcooking); but when it is argued that Origen 
reads “bread of heaven” as the “word of God made the food of our soul in scripture … 
while supporting the presence of the real flesh and blood of Christ in the Eucharist,”452 
we may surely be permitted to ask whether we are begging the question of what is 
“real.”  For Philo, surely, manna is a figure signifying the nourishment that is to obtained 
from scripture, and Origen, too, means to suggest ways in which the Word is rendered 
incarnate as both the “word” of scriptural texts and the flesh of a physical body.  
Nevertheless, to suggest that Origen means the eucharistic bread as a figure (true), and 
then that he regards it as the “real flesh and blood” of Christ surely prompts the 
question of how precisely this might be so.  We must explain, that is, why Origen insists 
indefatigably on the extraordinary reverence to be accorded eucharistic bread in the 
communion rite, “lest any small part fall from it.”453 
                                                       
450 commJohn 10.99‑102.  Text quoted in LaPorte (1986) 76. 
451 Likewise, over‑boiling is to be avoided, where scriptures is transformed into something 
“flaccid, watery and limp,” as occurs in exegesis by those who “have itching ears” and 
“transform the anagogical meanings so far as they are concerned to the carelessnes and 
wateriness of their manner of life” (ibid. 10.103‑104). 
452 LaPorte (1986) 75. 
453 “You, who are accustomed to take part in the divine myteries know, when you receive the 
body of the Lord, how you protect it with all caution and veneration lest any small part fall from 
it, lest anything of the consecrated gift be lost.  For you believe, and correctly, that you are 
192 
  The problem with leaving this “reality” unexplained, as I mean to suggest, is that 
it tends toward reading Origen’s occasional comments on eucharist purely in terms of a 
“spiritualizing” exegesis, wherein the believer is progressively initiated into ever more 
etherealized realms, a process which subtly privileges a conception of Word as “words” 
(scripture) over the Word as flesh, whether in the person of the incarnate Christ or the 
eucharistic bread.  But this reading, while open to Origen’s complex understanding of 
the “Word,” seems to account inadequately for Origen’s metaphysics, just as it seems 
likewise predicated upon the prejudice toward reading Origen as a generic “Platonist” 
who devalues the corporeal relative to the incorporeal in an uncomplicated way, such 
that one is able to make the curious claim that “believers are now able to communicate 
with the word of God as did the prophets … without Christ incarnate … but directly 
with Christ the divine word.”454  The trouble here is that Christ incarnate is no less the 
divine word, and little could suggest more a forgetfulness that the Word is given as flesh 
and bread for the life of the world, as the careful correlations of the Commentary on John 
make clear. 
In a broad sense then, a reading of Origen that focuses on the bread as 
“scriptural” often risks insufficiently regarding the extraordinary lengths to which 
Origen goes in developing the possibility of incarnation within a framework of divine 
materiality – a framework which itself depends on endowing matter with great pliancy 
in terms of the qualities that it may take on.  A reading of the Contra Celsum, where 
Origen is adapting himself to some traditional, non‑Christian ways of conceiving 
mediation, and experimenting with the idea of the symbolon as a category that might 
capture the eucharist’s nature as an actual, material divine presence, is useful as a 
counterweight to interpretations preoccupied with reconstructing particular rites, or 
given to seeing the question in exegetical rather than philosophical terms.  
As I suggest at the outset, Origen’s attempt to express a certain understanding of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
answerable if anything falls from there by neglect” (homEx 13.3, trans. Heine, FaCh 71, 380f.  Text 
quoted in Buchinger [2007] 214). 
454 LaPorte (1986) 75. 
193 
eucharist in the Contra Celsum is situated within a struggle with pagan constructions of 
cult.  Mainly, Origen’s thinking unfold around his rejection of rites directed toward 
daemons.  Naturally he benefits from the intellectual resistance to pagan sacrifice already 
elaborated in the philosophical tradition, as would Augustine after him.  The existence 
of such prejudices even among pagans supplies convenient support for his rejection of 
pagan cult’s machinery.  The question, however, is whether asserting an approach within 
the framework of the long‑acknowledged system of mediations offered by daemonic and 
other traditional rites does not actually compromise the rather fervid rhetoric of 
rejection.  More simply put, the very placement of Origen’s argument can give rise to the 
insight that the theoretical raw material of cult available for Origen’s deployment was 
limited, and very much the common property of pagan and Christian thinkers, 
suggesting that his thinking on the eucharist here may be to some extent a 
reconfiguration of pagan rites. 
 It is almost as if Origen, feeling an acute sense of absence at the removal of 
daemons and the important roles they play within Platonic cosmology to ensure the 
proper sustenance of the material world.  He presents this traditional view, presented as 
Celsus’ opinion that every natural and human process must understood as falling within 
the providence of some daemon, often conceived in terms of a local divinity.  Celsus is 
appalled that Christians – still more a Christian like Origen, claiming philosophical 
credentials – should alienate themselves from these mediating presences in all of their 
variety: 
Reason demands one of two alternatives.  If they refuse to worship in the 
proper way the lords in charge of the following activities, then they ought 
neither to come to the estate of a free man, nor to marry a wife, nor to 
beget children, nor to do anything else in life.  But they should depart 
from this world leaving no descendants at all behind them, so that such a 
race would entirely cease to exist in earth.  But if they are going to marry 
wives, and beget children, and taste of the fruits, and partake of the joys 
of this life, and endure the appointed evils (by nature’s law all men must 
have experience of evils; evil is necessary and has nowhere else to exist), 
then they ought to render the due honors to the beings who have been 
entrusted with these things.  And they ought to offer the due rites of 
worship on this life until they are set free from their bonds, lest they even 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appear ungrateful to them.  It is wrong for people who partake of what is 
their property to offer them nothing in return.455 
 
In contrast, Origen argues that bad souls, with their excessive attachment to matter, are 
weighed down to earth, where they wander aimlessly, often attaching themselves to 
specific places – such as tombs and other such buildings and locales.  They are bound to 
such places “by some magical incantations or even because of their own wickedness.”456  
Linking such souls explicitly to daemons, he goes on to argue that  
Reason demands that we should think such spirits to be wicked, 
for they use their power to know the future … to deceive men and 
to distract them from God and pure piety towards Him.  That this 
is the character of the daemons is also made clear by the fact that 
their bodies, nourished by the smoke from sacrifices, and by the 
portions take from the blood and burnt offerings in which they 
delight, find in this, as it were, their heart’s desire, like vicious 
men who do not welcome the prospect of living a pure life 
without their bodies, but only enjoy life in the earthly body 
because of its physical pleasures.457 
 
Perhaps because argumentative advantage requires it, Origen here takes on the dualist 
outlook characteristic of Phaedo and Phaedrus.  Under the terms of such a view, since 
daemons are equated to the most degraded souls, immured in “the gross bodies on earth 
                                                       
455 Δυοῖν θάτερον αἱρεῖ λόγος. Εἰ μὲν ἀπαξιοῦσι θεραπεύειν τὰ εἰκότα τοὺς τῶνδε ἐπιστάτας, 
μήτ’ εἰς ἀνδρὸς ἰέναι μήτ’ ἄγεσθαι γυναῖκα μήτ’ ἀναιρεῖσθαι τέκνα μήτ’ ἄλλο πράττειν 
μηδὲν ἐν τῷ βίῳ, χωρεῖν δ’ ἔνθεν πασσυδὶ μηδὲν σπέρμα ἐλλειπομένους, ὡς ἂν ἐρημωθείη 
πάμπαν ἐπὶ γῆς τὸ τοιοῦτον γένος∙ εἰ δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἄξονται καὶ παῖδας ποιήσονται καὶ 
καρπῶν γεύσονται καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ μεθέξουσι καὶ κακῶν τῶν ἐπιτεταγμένων ἀνέξονται—
φύσις μὲν γὰρ αὕτη πάντας ἀνθρώπους πειρᾶσθαι κακῶν∙ εἶναι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη κακά, 
χώραν δ’ ἄλλην οὐκ ἔχει—, ἀποδοτέον δὴ τὰς προσηκούσας τοῖς ταῦτ’ ἐπιτετραμμένοις 
τιμὰς καὶ τῷ βίῳ λειτουργητέον τὰ πρέποντα, μέχρι ἂν τῶν δεσμῶν ἀπολυθῶσι, μὴ καὶ 
ἀχάριστοι πρὸς τούσδε εἶναι δοκῶσι. Καὶ γὰρ ἄδικον μετέχοντας ὧν οἵδε ἔχουσι μηδὲν αὐτοῖς 
συντελεῖν (C.Cels. 8.55). 
456 εἴτε μαγγανείαις τισὶν εἴτε καὶ διὰ τὴν σφετέραν κακίαν (C.Cels. 7.5) 
457 Ὁ λόγος δὴ αἱρεῖ φαῦλ’ ἄττα νομίζειν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα, τῇ προγνωστικῇ δυνάμει εἰς 
ἀπάτην ἀνθρώπων χρώμενα καὶ πρὸς τὸ περισπάσαι αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῆς καθαρᾶς 
εἰς αὐτὸν εὐσεβείας. Δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ τοιούτους αὐτοὺς τυγχάνειν καὶ τὸ ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν 
ἀναθυμιάσεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν αἱμάτων καὶ ὁλοκαυτωμάτων ἀποφοραῖς τρεφόμενα αὐτῶν 
τὰ σώματα, φιληδονούντων τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἐπ’ αὐτὸ τυγχάνειν τοῦ ὡσπερεὶ φιλοζωεῖν, 
ἀνάλογον φαύλοις ἀνθρώποις, οὐκ ἀσπαζομένοις μὲν τὸ καθαρώτερον ἔξω σωμάτων ζῆν, 
περιέπουσι δὲ διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς τὴν ἐν τῷ γεώδει σώματι ζωήν (C.Cels. 7.5). 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and [their] pollutions,” Origen may reject them out of hand, likewise rejecting as absurd 
Celsus’ view that human beings should be “handed over” the government of such 
beings:  
Men are born bound to the body, whether because of the administration 
of the world, or because they are paying the penalty for their sin, or 
because the soul is weighed down by certain passions until it has been 
purified through the appointed periods.  For according to Empedocles it 
must 
 
Wander about for thirty thousand ages away from the blessed, 
Becoming every possible shape of mortal being in the time. 
 
We must believe, then, that they are handed over to certain officers in 
charge of this prison.458 
 
Origen simply cannot accept daemons as prison wardens, nor the notion that rational 
beings should assent to such “imprisonment.”  The context of the argument – Celsus’ 
rejection of Judaism – is itself informative.  Origen is exasperated that Celsus, despite 
holding such an exalted view of the soul’s destiny, would nevertheless reject the more 
rarefied religion of the Jews while endorsing the sordid religions of Egypt, whose 
elaborate pagan claptrap serves only to imprison souls under such daemonic governance.  
Origen’s assumption of a dualist rhetoric, which implies that creatures of such a low 
grade and of such gross embodiment can hardly “govern,” enables an outright rejection 
of such a position, and takes it as obvious that daemonic rites must be replaced by rites of 
a more elevated sort. 
These more elevated rites must represent an approach that differs from Celsus’ 
                                                       
458 Ἐπειδὴ δὲ σώματι συνδεθέντες ἄνθρωποι γεγόνασιν, εἴτ’ οἰκονομίας 
τῶν ὅλων ἕνεκεν εἴτε ποινὰς ἁμαρτίας ἀποτίνοντες, εἴθ’ ὑπὸ παθημάτων τινῶν τῆς ψυχῆς 
βαρυνθείσης, μέχρι ἂν <ἐν> ταῖς τεταγμέναις περιόδοις ἐκκαθαρθῇ∙ δεῖ γὰρ κατὰ 
τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα 
 
    τρίς μιν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι, 
γινομένην παντοίαν διὰ χρόνου ἰδέαν θνητῶν∙  
 
πειστέον οὖν ὅτι παραδέδονταί τισιν ἐπιμεληταῖς τοῦδε τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου (C.Cels. 8.53). 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conventional outlook on religious rites and their efficacy.  Celsus’ thought in his On the 
True Doctrine, reflects the traditional view that to offer worship or acknowledgement to 
any divinity, no matter how low in the hierarchy of divine being, is effectively to offer 
worship to the highest god.  Origen, given his commitment to bridging the material and 
the incorporeal, likewise reveals shades of his commitment to this overall divine unity, 
sustained by the philosophical ideas of sympatheia or cosmic philia, such as when he 
argues for the role of material reality as the first rung on the ascent to God, or when he 
asserts a similar vision of the entire world as the “temple of God.”459  Obviously, though, 
he cannot embrace the full panoply of pagan rites associated with such an outlook.  
Celsus may argue that: 
the man who worships several gods, because he worships some one of 
those which belong to the great God, even by this very action does that 
which is loved by him…. It is not lawful to give honor to any to whom 
this right has not been granted by him.  Therefore … anyone who honors 
and worships all those who belong to God does not hurt him, since they 
all are his.460 
 
To underline the absurdity of according worship to mere deputies, Origen adduces the 
deliberately absurd example of the emperor Hadrian’s deified lover, Antinous: 
At all events, Hadrian’s favourite is honored, as you, Celsus, 
remarked a short while ago.  And you would not, I presume, say 
that the right to receive honour as a god has been granted to 
Antinous by the God of the universe?  We could say the same of 
the rest also, demanding proof of the assertion that the right to 
receive honour has been granted to them by the supreme God.461 
                                                       
459 “Even an uneducated Christian is convinced that every place in the world is a part of the 
whole, since the whole world is a temple of God; and he prays in any place, and by shutting the 
eyes of sense and raising those of the soul he ascends beyond the entire world.” Χριστιανὸς δὲ 
καὶ ὁ ἰδιώτης πάντα μὲν τόπον τοῦ κόσμου πέπεισται εἶναι μέρος τοῦ ὅλου, ναοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ 
ὄντος τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου∙ «ἐν παντὶ» δὲ «τόπῳ» εὐχόμενος, μύσας τοὺς τῆς αἰσθήσεως 
ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ἐγείρας τοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὑπεραναβαίνει τὸν ὅλον κόσμον. (C.Cels. 7.44).  
460 … τὸν θεραπεύοντα θεοὺς πλείονας τῷ ἕν τι τῶν τοῦ μεγάλου θεραπεύειν φίλον καὶ ἐν 
τούτῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιεῖν … οὐδ’ ἔξεστι τιμᾶσθαί τινι ᾧ μὴ ἐξ ἐκείνου τοῦτο δέδοται. Διότι τιμῶν 
τις καὶ σέβων … τοὺς ἐκείνου πάντας οὐ λυπεῖ τὸν θεόν, οὗ πάντες εἰσίν. 
461 Τιμᾶται γοῦν, ὡς πρὸ βραχέος ἔλεγες, ὦ Κέλσε, τὰ Ἀδριανοῦ παιδικά, καὶ οὐ δή που ἐρεῖς 
ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων δέδοται τὸ τιμᾶσθαι ὡς θεῷ τῷ Ἀντινόῳ. Τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ καὶ περὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων ἐροῦμεν, ἀπαιτοῦντες ἀπόδειξιν περὶ τοῦ δεδόσθαι αὐτοῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεοῦ τὸ 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The one example imperils all.  The world may be a temple, but in Origen’s view it is a 
temple in which the range of practices is about to be significantly narrowed.  At times 
Origen seems to have no rites in mind for his temple, as  when he displaces the “image” 
and “votive” associated with pagan idolatry with interior ethical transformation, where 
“images” are internalized as particular virtues: 
Images and votive offerings appropriate for God, which have not 
been made by vulgar workmen, but which are made clear and 
formed in us by the divine Logos, are the virtues which are copies 
of the firstborn of all creation.  For in him there are patterns of 
righteousness, prudence, courage, wisdom, piety, and the other 
virtues.  Accordingly, there are images in all who, according to the 
divine word, have made for themselves prudence, righteousness, 
courage, wisdom, piety, and the products of the other virtues.462 
 
As often in Origen’s thought, the Logos is presented as a bottomless repository of 
principles and relations, with the emphasis here on the virtues that may be patterned in 
the soul after their types in the life of the Logos.  The rational being’s true ascent, Origen 
believes, is to be measured precisely in terms of its assimilation of these qualities, in  
which it comes increasingly to mirror the Logos, becoming more perfectly the image of 
the image of God.  But despite such flights into disembodied virtue, Origen plainly does 
not intend to eliminate cult per se, only cult in its pagan variety.   
His rather blunt approach to this end involves simply stripping daemons of their 
offices and replacing them with angels.  Daemons, he avers, are always and everywhere 
evil, while angels belong to a more complex order: 
Similarly, not all angels are said to be angels of God, but only the 
blessed angels, while those who have turned aside to evil are 
                                                                                                                                                                    
τιμᾶσθαι (C.Cels. 8.9). 
462 Ἀγάλματα δὲ καὶ πρέποντα θεῷ ἀναθήματα, οὐχ ὑπὸ βαναύσων τεχνιτῶν 
κατεσκευασμένα ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ λόγου θεοῦ τρανούμενα καὶ μορφούμενα ἐν ἡμῖν, αἱ ἀρεταί, 
μιμήματα τυγχάνουσαι τοῦ πρωτοτόκου «πάσης κτίσεως», ἐν ᾧ ἐστι δικαιοσύνης καὶ 
σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σοφίας καὶ εὐσεβείας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν παραδείγματα. 
Ἐν πᾶσιν οὖν ἐστι, τοῖς κατὰ τὸν θεῖον λόγον σωφροσύνην ἑαυτοῖς κατασκευάσασι καὶ 
δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ σοφίαν καὶ εὐσέβειαν καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρετῶν τὰ 
κατασκευάσματα, ἀγάλματα (C.Cels. 8.17). 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named the devil’s angels, just as bad men are called men of sin, or 
pestilent sons, or sons of iniquity.  Since then there are both good 
and bad men, for this reason some are said to be men of God and 
some of the devil; so also there are some angels of God and some 
of the devil.  But the twofold division no longer holds good in the 
case of daemons; for they are all proved to be bad.  On this 
account we would say that Celsus’ words are false when he says: 
And if they are daemons of some sort, obviously these too belong to God.  
Let anyone who likes show either that the distinction in the case of 
men and angels is not a sound one, or that a similar distinction 
could be proved to hold good of daemons also.  If, however, that 
is impossible, it is obvious that the daemons do not belong to God; 
for their ruler is not God but, as the divine scriptures say, 
Beelzebul.463 
 
It is by no means clear why there should be a taxonomical distinction between wicked 
angels and daemons, but Origen offers no defense of his position beyond his urging that 
the bible and consensus support it.  Celsus’ view he finds straightforwardly intolerable: 
Celsus thinks that a man is feasting with daemons even when he 
partakes of food and drinks some wine, and when he tastes fruits, 
and, moreover, if he only drinks some water; even here, he says, 
the man who drinks is associating with daemons.  He adds to this 
that even the man who breathes in the common air gets this from 
certain daemons, since the daemons who have been given charge 
of the air grant it to living beings for breathing.464   
 
                                                       
463 Οὕτως δὲ καὶ οὐ πάντες ἄγγελοι «ἄγγελοι» λέγονται εἶναι «τοῦ θεοῦ» ἀλλὰ μόνοι οἱ 
μακάριοι, οἱ δ’ ἐκτραπέντες ἐπὶ τὴν κακίαν ἄγγελοι τοῦ διαβόλου ὀνομάζονται, ὥσπερ οἱ 
φαῦλοι ἄνθρωποι ἄνθρωποι ἁμαρτίας ἢ υἱοὶ λοιμοὶ ἢ υἱοὶ ἀδικίας. Ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ ἄνθρωποι οἱ 
μέν εἰσι σπουδαῖοι οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι, διὸ καὶ οἱ μὲν «τοῦ θεοῦ» οἱ δὲ τοῦ διαβόλου εἶναι λέγονται, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ «ἄγγελοι» οἱ μὲν «τοῦ θεοῦ» οἱ δὲ τοῦ πονηροῦ, δαίμονες δὲ οὐκέτι διχῶς, πάντες 
γὰρ ἀποδείκνυνται εἶναι φαῦλοι∙ διὰ τοῦτο φήσομεν ψευδῆ εἶναι τὸν Κέλσου λόγον εἰπόντος 
τό∙ Εἰ δ’ εἰσί τινες δαίμονες, δηλονότι καὶ οὗτοι τοῦ θεοῦ∙ ἢ δεικνύτω ὁ βουλόμενος μὴ λόγον 
ὑγιῆ εἶναι τὴν περὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀγγέλων διαίρεσιν, ἢ λόγον ἔχοντα παραπλήσιον 
δύνασθαι ἀποδείκνυσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ δαιμόνων.  Εἰ δὲ τοῦτ’ ἀμήχανον, δῆλον ὅτι οὔτε τοῦ θεοῦ 
εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες∙ οὐ γὰρ ἄρχων αὐτῶν ὁ θεὸς ἀλλ’ ὥς φασιν οἱ θεῖοι λόγοι, ὁ «Βεελζεβούλ»∙ 
(C.Cels. 8.25‑26). 
464 ὁ … Κέλσος οἴεται συνεστιᾶσθαι δαίμοσι καὶ τὸν σίτου μεταλαμβάνοντα καὶ ὅπως ποτ’ 
οὖν οἴνου πίνοντα καὶ ἀκροδρύων γευόμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ μόνου ὕδατός τις μεταλαμβάνει, 
καὶ ἐν τούτῳ φησὶ συνεστιᾶσθαι δαίμοσι τὸν πίνοντα. Προστίθησι δὲ τούτοις ὅτι καὶ ὁ τὸν 
ἀέρα τοῦτον ἀναπνέων παρὰ δαιμόνων τινῶν καὶ τοῦτον λαμβάνει, χαριζομένων δαιμόνων 
τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀέρος προστεταγμένων τὸν τῆς ἀναπνοῆς τοῖς ζῴοις ἀέρα (C.Cels. 8.31). 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Origen’s introduction of angels into the discussion enables him to retain the idea that 
governance of the world by lower divinities is necessary while rejecting the offices of 
daemons within such a system.  He rejects the particular doctrine, but accepts its 
framework, preferring merely to supplant daemonic agency with his angelic alternative: 
I challenge anyone to defend Celsus’ doctrine.  Let him show how 
those appointed to administer all the things just mentioned are 
not certain divine angels of God, but are daemons, the entire race 
of whom is evil.  For we say that the earth bears the things which 
are said to be under the control of nature because of the 
appointment of individual husbandmen, so to speak, and other 
governors who control not only the produce of the earth but also 
all flowing water and air.  For this reason also the water in the 
wells and in the natural springs becomes rain and circulates, and 
the air is kept free from pollution, and becomes capable of giving 
life to those who breathe it.  We certainly do not maintain that 
these invisible beings are daemons.465 
 
Origen’s world thus seems a very traditional cosmic temple, the critical difference being 
that the “husbandmen” and “governors” typical of such a theology have been 
advantageously replaced by angels, the true “satraps, subordinate governors, officers 
and procurators of God.”466  The daemonic role is no longer cosmic governance, but rather 
the instigation of plague, drought, pollution, and death in its various forms; they are 
even termed “public executioners” and assigned a role within a theodicy that tests the 
faith of believers by subjecting them to the torments and afflictions that only daemons can 
supply, “[harming] those who are under their power and have submitted themselves to 
them as masters.”467  The true believer, as Origen conceives the matter, “the real 
                                                       
465 Ὁ βουλόμενος τοίνυν παραστησάτω τῷ Κέλσου λόγῳ καὶ δεικνύτω, πῶς οὐ θεῖοί τινες 
ἄγγελοι θεοῦ ἀλλὰ δαίμονες, ὧν ὅλον τὸ γένος ἐστὶ φαῦλον, προστεταγμένοι εἰσὶ πάντα τὰ 
προειρημένα οἰκονομεῖν. Καὶ ἡμεῖς μὲν γάρ φαμεν οὐ χωρὶς προστασίας ἀοράτων, ἵν’ οὕτως 
ὀνομάσω, γεωργῶν καὶ ἄλλων οἰκονόμων οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς φυομένων ἀλλὰ καὶ 
παντὸς ναματιαίου ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος τὴν γῆν φέρειν τὰ ὑπὸ φύσεως λεγόμενα διοικεῖσθαι, 
καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐν ταῖς πηγαῖς καὶ τοῖς αὐθιγενέσι ποταμοῖς ὀμβρεῖν καὶ φέρεσθαι, καὶ τὸν ἀέρα 
ἀδιάφθορον τηρεῖσθαι καὶ ζωτικὸν τοῖς ἀναπνέουσιν αὐτὸν γίνεσθαι. Οὐ μὴν τοὺς ἀοράτους 
φαμὲν εἶναι δαίμονας∙  (C.Cels. 8.31).  
466 οἱ ἀληθῶς σατράπαι καὶ ὕπαρχοι καὶ στρατηγοὶ καὶ ἐπίτροποι τοῦ θεοῦ (C.Cels. 8.36). 
467 καὶ βλάπτουσι τοὺς ὑποκειμένους αὐτοῖς αὶ ὑποτάξαντας ἑαυτοὺς ὡς δεσπόταις ἐκείνοις 
C.Cels. 8.36). 
200 
Christian, who has submitted himself to God alone and his Logos, would not suffer 
anything at the hands of daemons, since he is superior to them.”468  The angel of the Lord 
“will encamp round about those who fear him and deliver them.”469  But even the failure 
of such protection can be an occasion for rejoicing, since daemonic attack  can be 
construed as an occasion for virtuous resistance and even martyrdom.  When daemons 
attack, “we [Christians] do not offer our bodies to be tortured and crucified to no purpose.  It is 
not to no purpose that the body is offered to these sufferings by the man who, because 
he does not call the daemons in the earthly regions gods, is subject to attack at their 
hands and at the hands of their worshippers.”470  Indeed, such a turn of events can 
actually be good, and “a matter dear to God” when a person has occasion “to be 
tortured for piety and to die for holiness.”471 
The crucial point, though, is that Origen has expelled the daemons while retaining 
the vestiges of a traditional cosmic architecture; nevertheless, it should not be surprising, 
that the angels who replace the daemons are denied important mediating functions.  We 
have already witnessed Origen’s unease at the propitiation of mere deputies.  Rather, 
Christians re‑assign presidency over the world’s fruitfulness directly to God, who is the 
true source of fecundity.  Celsus, 
wants us to dedicate first fruits to daemons.  But we do this to 
Him who said: ‘Let the earth bring forth a plant of grass, a seed 
that sows after its kind and likeness, and a fruitful tree that 
produces fruit, of which its seed is in it after its kind upon the 
earth.’  He to whom we render the first fruits is also the one to 
whom we send up our prayers, since we ‘have a great high priest 
who has passed into the heavens, Jesus the Son of God, and we 
hold fast the confession as long as we live, as we obtain the 
goodwill of God and of His only‑begotten Son who is manifested 
                                                       
468 ὁ ἀληθῶς Χριστιανὸς καὶ ὑποτάξας ἑαυτὸν μόνῳ τῷ θεῷ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ, πάθοι τι ἂν 
ὑπὸ τῶν δαιμονίων, ἅτε κρείττων δαιμόνων τυγχάνων (C.Cels. 8.36). 
469 «παρεμβαλεῖ … κύκλῳ τῶν φοβουμένων αὐτὸν καὶ ῥύσεται αὐτούς» (C.Cels. 8.36). 
470 Ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ εἰκῇ παρέχομεν τὸ σῶμα στρεβλοῦν καὶ ἀποτυμπανίζειν∙ οὐ γὰρ εἰκῇ παρέχει 
τούτοις τὸ σῶμα <ὁ> ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ τοὺς περιγείους δαίμονας ἀναγορεύεσθαι θεοὺς 
ἐπιβουλευόμενος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν σεβόντων αὐτούς (C.Cels. 8.54). 
471 θεοφιλές … δι’ εὐσέβειαν στρεβλοῦσθαι καὶ δι’ ὁσιότητα ἀποθνῄσκειν (C.Cels. 8.54) 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to us in Jesus.”472 
 
Daemonic presidency over nature is here ended, with responsibility for fecundity located 
rather in the God of Israel himself, as depicted in the opening chapters of Genesis, 
summoning into being the fruitful world in its profusion.  Origen’s own spiritual 
anthropology, in which the Logos reconceived as incarnate draws into closer relation the 
embodied rational human being and the Logos of God, here empowers his new 
conception of mediation, in which Jesus becomes a figure near enough to function as 
priest, while retaining the transcendence of the “only‑begotten Son” – the Word and 
Wisdom of God in whom all of created reality comes into being.  Offerings of first fruits 
made through the priesthood of Christ are thus made – in some sense – through, in, and 
to the Logos of God.  The God who receives supplies his own mediation.  
As I suggest, none of this should be particularly surprising, given the 
preparation for it that much of Origen’s thought on incarnation constitutes.  What 
surprises about this re‑formulation is Origen’s decision simply to intrude Christian 
eucharistic language into pre‑existing categories, directly imposing the eucharist as a 
displacement of the “offerings of thanksgiving” traditionally made in a pagan context, 
and explicitly placing the eucharist in the same genus as those offerings of “first fruits.”  
Within this new regime, Celsus, for his part, “as one who is ignorant of God, may render 
the offerings of thanksgiving to daemons; “but we,” argues Origen, 
give thanks to the creator of the universe and eat the loaves that are 
presented with thanksgiving and prayer over the gifts, so that by the 
prayer they become a certain holy body which sanctifies those who 
                                                       
472 ὡς ἀγνοῶν θεὸν τὰ χαριστήρια δαίμοσιν ἀποδιδότω, ἡμεῖς δὲ τῷ τοῦ παντὸς δημιουργῷ 
εὐχαριστοῦντες καὶ τοὺς μετ’ εὐχαριστίας καὶ εὐχῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς δοθεῖσι προσαγομένους 
ἄρτους ἐσθίομεν, σῶμα γενομένους διὰ τὴν εὐχὴν ἅγιόν τι καὶ ἁγιάζον τοὺς μετὰ ὑγιοῦς 
προθέσεως αὐτῷ χρωμένους. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπαρχὰς Κέλσος μὲν δαιμονίοις ἀνατιθέναι 
βούλεται, ἡμεῖς δὲ τῷ εἰπόντι∙ «Βλαστησάτω ἡ γῆ βοτάνην χόρτου, σπεῖρον σπέρμα κατὰ 
γένος καὶ καθ’ ὁμοιότητα, καὶ ξύλον κάρπιμον ποιοῦν καρπόν, οὗ τὸ σπέρμα αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ 
κατὰ γένος ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.» ᾯ δὲ τὰς ἀπαρχὰς ἀποδίδομεν, τούτῳ καὶ τὰς εὐχὰς 
ἀναπέμπομεν, «ἔχοντες ἀρχιερέα μέγαν, διεληλυθότα τοὺς οὐρανούς, Ἰησοῦν τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ 
θεοῦ», καὶ κρατοῦμεν «τῆς ὁμολογίας», ἕως ἂν ζῶμεν, φιλανθρώπου τυγχάνοντες τοῦ θεοῦ 
καὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς αὐτοῦ, ἐν Ἰησοῦ ἡμῖν φανερουμένου (C.Cels. 8.34). 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partake of it with a pure intention.473   
 
Strikingly Origen here decides to leave indefinite the identification of Jesus with the 
bread‑turned‑body.  That the eternal Son is both the one who receives and mediates, in 
priestly manner, is not in doubt; but the question of whether Jesus should be read also as 
offering is left ambiguous, couched in terms of loaves that become “a certain holy body” 
(σῶμα … ἅγιόν τι).  Rather than focusing on this question of how “body” stands in 
relation to an incarnate or eternal Christ, Origen chooses rather to focus on how this rite 
displaces traditional daemonic mediation.  Thus, despite the rhetorical assurance that 
relegates Celsus to a primitive, benighted category, Origen can scarcely disguise what is 
essentially a reconfiguration of old religion rather than the introduction of new.  He 
deflects attention from the bread or body in question, forfeiting the occasion to explain 
the possible meanings of the rite in question, preferring rather to frame it as a shifting of 
the understanding of thank‑offerings – a rite now mediated by an eternal high priest 
who is the image of the invisible God, and not by daemons who have been replaced by 
benign angels as the governors of the world’s fruitfulness.  Although we grant that 
angels rather than daemons “have been appointed in charge of the fruits of the earth and 
the birth of animals,” and although we “speak well of them and call them blessed,”474 
nevertheless, 
we certainly do not assign to them the honour we owe to God.  
This is desired neither by God nor by the beings themselves who 
have been entrusted with these matters.  In fact they approve of us 
more when we take care not to sacrifice to them than if we were to 
offer them sacrifices.  They are in no need of exhalations from the 
earth.475   
                                                       
473 ὡς ἀγνοῶν θεὸν τὰ χαριστήρια δαίμοσιν ἀποδιδότω, ἡμεῖς δὲ τῷ τοῦ παντὸς δημιουργῷ 
εὐχαριστοῦντες καὶ τοὺς μετ’ εὐχαριστίας καὶ εὐχῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς δοθεῖσι προσαγομένους 
ἄρτους ἐσθίομεν, σῶμα γενομένους διὰ τὴν εὐχὴν ἅγιόν τι καὶ ἁγιάζον τοὺς μετὰ ὑγιοῦς 
προθέσεως αὐτῷ χρωμένους (C. Cels. 8.33). 
474 Κἂν ἴδωμεν δὲ μὴ δαίμονάς τινας ἀγγέλους δὲ τεταγμένους ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς γῆς καρπῶν καὶ 
ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ζῴων γενέσεως, εὐφημοῦμεν αὐτοὺς καὶ μακαρίζομεν…. (C.Cels. 8.57). 
475 οὐ μὴν τὴν ὀφειλομένην πρὸς θεὸν τιμὴν τούτοις ἀπονέμομεν, οὔτε γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τοῦτο 
βούλεται οὔτ’ αὐτοὶ οἱ τὰ τοιάδε ἐγκεχειρισμένοι. Καὶ ἀποδέχονταί γε ἡμᾶς φυλασσομένους 
αὐτοῖς θύειν ἢ θύοντας∙ οὐδὲ γὰρ χρῄζουσιν ἐκεῖνοι τῶν ἀπὸ γῆς ἀναθυμιωμένων (C.Cels. 
8.57). 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They are merely placeholders, not the least exigent of cult maintenance, implanted in the 
traditional religious hierarchy as an anodyne Christian alternative.  The singular 
Christian God, within the framework of Origen’s incarnational theology, both mediates 
and receives thank‑offerings.   
That Origen intends a displacement of meanings rather than the introduction of 
revolutionary new concepts is most importantly evident on the lexical level.  Against 
Celsus, who insists on thank offerings (χαριστήρια) directed to daemons, and who thinks 
that those who fail in this obligation are “thankless” (ἀχαρίστους), Origen asserts that  
we, who have a clear idea of the meaning of thanksgiving 
[εὐχαριστία], say to the beings who do no good whatever but are 
on the opposite side, that we behave without any ingratitude 
[μηδὲν ἀχάριστον ἡμᾶς ποιεῖν] when we do not sacrifice to them 
or worship them.  But we avoid being guilty of ingratitude 
[ἀχάριστοι] to God who loads us with his benefits.  We are his 
creatures and are cared for by His providence.  Our condition is 
subject to His judgment, and we entertain hopes of him beyond 
this life.476   
 
Here Origen’s diligent re‑working of religious cult even allows Celsus to set the terms.  
Quite openly, eucharist (εὐχαριστία) has begun to assume all of the resonance of Celsus’ 
“thank offerings” (χαριστήρια).  Christians practicing their rite are no less imbued with 
a proper religious sense – that is, they are not ἀχάριστοι – than their pagan counterparts 
offering these conventional thanks (χαριστήρια). Underlying this gesture is the obvious 
hope Christian cult may hold its value even in pagan currency, a point made even more 
lucid by what immediately follows, as the argument pivots to a more direct 
consideration of the Christian rite itself: “Moreover, we have a symbol of our 
                                                       
476 The passage quoted in full: Καὶ πάλιν Κέλσος μὲν οὐ θέλει ἡμᾶς ἀχαρίστους εἶναι πρὸς 
τοὺς τῇδε δαίμονας, οἰόμενος ἡμᾶς ὀφείλειν αὐτοῖς χαριστήρια∙ καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ τρανοῦντες τὸν 
περὶ εὐχαριστίας λόγον φαμὲν πρὸς τοὺς μηδὲν εὐεργετοῦντας ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου 
ἱσταμένους μηδὲν ἀχάριστον ἡμᾶς ποιεῖν, ὅταν αὐτοῖς μὴ θύωμεν ἀλλὰ μηδὲ θεραπεύωμεν 
αὐτούς. Ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀχάριστοι εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν περιϊστάμεθα, οὗ τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν πλήρεις 
ἐσμέν, καὶ δημιουργήματα ὄντες αὐτοῦ καὶ προνοούμενοι ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ κριθέντες ὅπως ποτὲ 
<ἄξιοι> εἶναι καὶ ἔξω τοῦ βίου τὰς παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἐλπίδας ἐκδεχόμενοι. 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thanksgiving to God in the bread which is called ‘eucharist’ [εὐχαριστία].”477  Going 
quite beyond the suggestiveness of the χαριστήρια / εὐχαριστία juxtaposition, Origen 
here labels the eucharistic bread as a “symbol” (σύμβολον) of thanksgiving 
(εὐχαριστία) to God.  The ease with which this point is introduced strongly suggests 
that the Christian “symbol” is meant to replace other “symbols” familiar from 
traditional practice, as if Origen were asserting, “we too have a ‘symbol’,” thereby 
flagging his intention to construct the Christian rite within a familiar category of 
religious thought.  He co‑opts the cultural legitimacy of a pre‑existing template of 
religious thought and practice, while simultaneously deploying a rhetoric of difference 
that yields nothing to traditional cult, since all daemonic mediation is voided and 
replaced with the eternal priesthood of Christ, which mediates thanksgiving rendered 
only to the one God.   
By invoking the category of symbolon, Origen is by no means straightforwardly 
asserting a magical or theurgic eucharist; in fact, in the interest of affirming the 
superiority of his own approach he attempts to assimilate Celsus’ own thought to more 
deluding, destructive forms of magic.  As we shall see, though, he has difficulty 
dissociating his own thought from these same conceptual categories.  Uncomfortable at 
the ritual exploitation of certain Egyptian daemons, each of whom holds sway over the 
healing of particular parts of the human body, Celsus argues: 
We must however be careful about this, lest by association with these 
beings anyone should become absorbed in the healing with which they are 
concerned, and by becoming a lover of the body and turning away from 
higher things should be held down without realizing it.  For perhaps we 
ought not disbelieve wise men who say that most of the earthly daemons 
are absorbed with created things, and are riveted to blood and burnt 
offering and magical enchantments, and are bound to other things of this 
sort, and can do nothing better than healing the body and predicting the 
coming fortune of men and cities, and that all their knowledge and power 
concerns merely mortal activities.478 
                                                       
477 Ἔστι δὲ καὶ σύμβολον ἡμῖν τῆς πρὸς θεὸν εὐχαριστίας ἄρτος «εὐχαριστία» καλούμενος 
(C.Cels. 8.57). 
478 Ἐκεῖνο μέντοι φυλακτέον, ὅπως μή τις συνὼν τούτοις τῇ θεραπείᾳ τῇ περὶ αὐτὰ συντακῇ, 
φιλοσωματήσας τε καὶ τῶν κρειττόνων ἀποστραφεὶς λήθῃ κατασχεθῇ. Χρὴ γὰρ ἴσως οὐκ 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Origen exploits such hesitation, arguing that even Celsus must concede that such 
daemons, bound to material reality and “induced by outlandish magical 
enchantments,”479 at best work to heal only the body; and even then, one ought first to 
seek a conventional course of medical treatment.   But the argument pivots interestingly 
as Origen derides the very terminology that he elsewhere appropriates.  God, he argues, 
prefers the more single‑minded devotee, not one “who interests himself in the names of 
daemons, powers, practices, charms, plants related to daemons, stones and the emblems 
on them which correspond to the traditional shapes of daemons, whether these are 
symbolical or have some other significance.”480  Here we are obviously in the territory of 
the magical and the theurgic.  For Origen’s present argument, to know the names of 
daemons; to know their powers; to know their associated plants and incantations; and 
still more tellingly, to know inscribed “emblems” (γλυφάς) that correspond to daemonic 
shapes “symbolically” (συμβολικῶς) is to submit oneself to ignorance and delusion. 
Celsus’ unease yields Origen an extraordinary windfall, enabling an extended diatribe 
on daemons, whose debased, material orientation, whose enchainment “to blood and 
burnt offering and magical enchantments” – whose equivalence, essentially, to the most 
degraded of embodied creatures, underlines the danger to those who strive to appease 
them.  Such people effectively assimilate themselves to the daemonic state, making 
themselves daemonic – an equation the brings us full circle to Origen’s original claim that 
deamons are aking to the most debased embodied creatures.  When a worshipper 
engages the daemonic, God will thus rightly abandon him to the daemons he has elected to 
manipulate, “as a wicked and impious fellow more daemonic than human, that he may 
                                                                                                                                                                    
ἀπιστεῖν ἀνδράσι σοφοῖς, οἳ δή φασι διότι τῶν μὲν περιγείων δαιμόνων τὸ πλεῖστον γενέσει 
συντετηκὸς καὶ προσηλωμένον αἵματι καὶ κνίσσῃ καὶ μελῳδίαις καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ τοιούτοις 
προσδεδεμένον κρεῖττον οὐδὲν δύναιτ’ ἂν τοῦ θεραπεῦσαι σῶμα καὶ μέλλουσαν τύχην 
ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ πόλει προειπεῖν, καὶ ὅσα περὶ τὰς θνητὰς πράξεις ταῦτα ἴσασί τε καὶ δύνανται 
(C.Cels. 8.60). 
479 ἀλλοκότοις μελῳδίαις ἀγομένων (C.Cels. 8.60). 
480 περιεργαζόμενον δαιμόνων ὀνόματα καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ πράξεις καὶ ἐπῳδὰς καὶ βοτάνας 
οἰκείας δαίμοσι καὶ λίθους καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς γλυφάς, καταλλήλους ταῖς παραδιδομέναις εἴτε 
συμβολικῶς εἴτε ὅπως ποτὲ μορφαῖς δαιμόνων (C.Cels. 8.61). 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be torn asunder by the thoughts put into his mind by each daemon or by other evils as 
well.”481 
  That Celsus may appear to assent to something “sensible” is rhetorically helpful 
for Origen, but there is a lingering doubt as to whether this effect is achieved without 
remainder.  When he explicitly outlines the elements of practice to be rejected, 
specifying “the names of daemons, powers, practices, charms, plants related to 
daemons, stones and the emblems on them which correspond to the traditional shapes 
of daemons, whether these are symbolical or have some other significance” – he reveals 
the tensions that are built into his own formulation of the eucharist: the “symbolic” 
function of the object in material cult.  Pagan symbola are rejected; the Christian symbolon 
is approved, and all in a manner that appears finally rather arbitrary, a sort of willful 
assertion of a more restricted monotheism over the more diffuse accessibility of the 
divine in the pagan world.  “Symbolically” functioning magical‑religious acts are out, 
and are replaced with another, singular cult act, complete with its own “symbol,” cagily 
characterized as  a “certain holy body.”   The introduction of a new “symbol” is thus 
ultimately a gesture akin to the replacement of daemons by angels as benign presiding 
divinities in nature, who negate their own claims to cult, so that a true divine symbolon 
may be configured with the God of Israel at the center.   
In keeping with his typical reticence on questions of sacramental mystery, Origen 
does not spell out the possible justifications of this alignment of ancient symbolon and a 
                                                       
481 ὡς μοχθηρὸν καὶ ἀσεβὲς καὶ δαιμονικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀνθρωπικὸν καταλείψει ὁ θεὸς οἷς 
εἵλετο ὁ τὰ τοιάδε λέγων δαίμοσι, διασπαραχθησόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ὑφ’ ἑκάστου 
ὑποβαλλομένων λογισμῶν ἢ καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν (C.Cels. 8.61).  Origen further argues that even 
as a practical matter, daemonic devotions are not reliable.  If we conceive of sacrifices to daemons 
as manipulation or even as a species of bribery, then it follows that other petitioners might come 
along with a more appealing offer: “If other pelople were to invoke them and buy their service at 
the price of more blood and sacrifices and the worship that they require, then they would 
conspire against one who had worshipped them the previous day and who used to give them a 
share of the feast which they love.”  Ἄλλων γὰρ αὐτοὺς καλούντων κατὰ τῶν θεραπευσάντων 
καὶ πλείονος αἵματος καὶ κνίσσης καὶ ἧς δέονται θεραπείας ὠνουμένων αὐτῶν τὴν δουλείαν, 
ἐπιβουλεύσαιεν ἂν τῷ χθὲς αὐτοὺς θεραπεύσαντι καὶ τῆς φίλης αὐτοῖς θοίνης μεταδιδόντι 
(C.Cels. 8.61). 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new Christian symbolon.  The incarnation of the Logos is itself the material manifestation 
of God’s perfect image, and therefore in some sense conceptually akin to theurgic 
conceptions of symbol / image.  The invisible Logos of God, in this formulation, is thus the 
formal principle that constitutes a Christian symbolon, imprinted upon the material 
manifestation of the incarnate Christ as a perfect image.  Origen may thus been seen as 
experimenting with the idea of the eucharistic bread as a parallel incarnation, 
reconceptualized in terms of a theurgic symbol‑image – a deployment of a theurgic or 
magical idea that makes conceivable the continued presence in the material life of the 
Church of a Logos turned flesh turned bread.   
In this way, the conspicuous lack of theological elaboration in Origen’s account 
of the eucharist in Contra Celsum works to his advantage, making possible his easy 
assimilation of eucharist into ready‑made theological categories – precisely as a superior 
conception of the cult “symbol.” Likewise, the Logos that is conceived as a material 
image reality available for sanctifying consumption by embodied participants – so that 
the eucharist becomes, in effect, a second incarnation, an image of the image of God – a 
phenomenon that parallels the embodied rational creature, which by virtue of its 
rational relation to God is conceived as the image of the image.  Participation in the rite, 
and consumption of the bread, may thus be understood as the most intimate possible 
assimilation to the Logos for embodied creatures, wherein the fallen, imperfect embodied 
rational creature draws its sustenance from the perfect Logos, condescending to an 
embodiment that is without taint of fallenness. 
Perhaps since daemons  are easily characterized as exerting a downward pull – 
bound excessively to materiality as they are – any narrative of daemonic mediation may 
be revealed as a gross caricature  of the mediation offered by a divine hypostasis that 
assumes a material body.  While the crude ends of magic can be attained through the 
mediation of daemons invoked through their corresponding “symbols” manifest as 
images or glyphs upon stone, or through the invocation of other “symbolic” objects or 
names, true ascent to Origen’s God can be attained through the mediation of his Logos, 
whose incarnation makes possible reconceptualization of eucharistic bread as both a 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“certain holy body” and a “symbol” materially manifest – as sacred matter that is parallel 
to the body of the Logos, facilitating an encounter between the embodied rational 
creature  and the very source of the principles and relations that make up its very being.
209 
Chapter V: Theurgy and Eucharistic Mediation in Augustine 
 
1. Introduction: Augustine and the Theurgic Inheritance
 
  A central claim thus far has been that Origen’s thought on the rational being’s 
ascent to God, and the role of the Church and of Christian sacrament in mediating that 
ascent, can be understood as related to the claims of theurgy.  As ever, this by no means 
entails the assumption that Origen was a “crypto‑theurgist,” a disguised “pagan” 
concealing his insinuations of traditional rites into an otherwise pure Christian context.  
To the contrary, it is his governing Logos theology, wherein the transcendent God, 
materially manifest to humanity, makes participation in divine life accessible to a degree 
not previously conceived, that invites a conceptual assimilation of theurgic thought.  It is 
what compels Christian thinkers to draw upon assumptions about the capacity of 
material reality to mediate the divine.   
It is Christianity’s very conceptualization of the Logos, the “Word” of God, 
stemming from a sense that God has become accessible to rational beings, that makes 
possible this kind of adaptation.  In the previous chapter we have alluded to some of the 
forms that an encounter with the Logos might take: Old Testament theophanies, 
exegetical engagement with Jewish scripture, the flesh of the person of Christ, and of 
course the eucharistic bread.  Exegetical engagement and sacramental participation are 
for Origen the practices of Christian formation, where the believer is fed by the Word of 
God both under the form of scripturally grounded exegesis and homiletics, as well as 
the form of eucharistic bread, where the bread is grasped as an extension of incarnation, 
“the living bread that came down from heaven.”  The “Word” is thus manifest both 
under the form of “words” of scripture that express it, and under the form of the flesh of 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Christ which clothes it,  standing in continuity with the bread that feeds.  Within this 
complex of ideas, it is not difficult to see how this “food for the soul,” the bread of life, 
conceived along the lines of material body, is reasonably conceptualized as a symbolon, 
which – as a parallel to sound teaching – mediates an encounter with the Logos, in which 
the soul of the believer is re‑constituted according to its proper template, and comes to 
participate in the life of the eternal and risen Christ, attaining an ascent to God 
reconceived along Christian lines.  In Iamblichean theurgy, ritual engagement with the 
cult symbolon expresses the soul’s inner participation in the  logoi disseminated through 
reality by the creative Demiurge; in Christian sacrament, ritual participation in the 
eucharistic symbolon is invoked as expressive of an inner encounter with the Logos itself, 
which purifies and re‑constitutes the rational being in accord with the template set by 
Christ, the embodiment of the Logos.  This vision, driven by the incarnation of the Logos, 
naturally requires that Christian thinkers reconfigure material embodiment as a site of 
sanctification, and likewise that eliminate other forms of transcendent mediation, such 
as the Platonic daemons who are now seen as obstacles to the soul’s proper ascent. 
In this final chapter I hope to suggest that Augustine’s direct engagement with 
theurgy in his On the City of God can supply an interesting coda to a discussion of 
theurgic tendencies in earlier Christian thought.  As a Latin speaker in the West, 
removed culturally and temporally from Origen’s and Iamblichus’ Greek and Semitic 
East, he is an interesting case for a number of reasons.  Obviously, his work provides the 
occasion to witness how a Christian thinker grappled with theurgy directly, since by 
Augustine’s time it had developed into a system of thought, or at least a recognizable set 
of questions contentious even to pagan intellectuals, while Origen’s thought precedes 
the “theurgic turn” in Platonism by a number of years.  Augustine can thus be read as a 
participant in the disputes spawned by the work of Iamblichus, especially given that his 
arguments in On the City of God are leveled directly at Porphyry, whose objections 
prompted Iamblichus’ defense of theurgy in De Mysteriis.  Primarily, though, our 
interest should lie in the fact that Augustine justifies Christian eucharist within 
parameters that are strikingly parallel to what we see in Origen’s Contra Celsum.  In 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parallel to Origen’s re‑thinking of theurgy in light of Logos theology, and his assimilation 
of the symbolon to a sacramental discourse, Augustine deploys the language of signum 
(“sign”) to mark the point of sacramental encounter with transcendent reality.  
Indispensable to this approach is Augustine’s own sign theory of language, which he 
adduces to show that the eucharistic bread, conceived as a signum, may be understood 
as conceptually parallel to a vocalized word, verbum, which is understood to transmit a 
substantive incorporeal reality.  This inner substance borne by a word’s material 
utterance, explained by Augustine in terms of his theory of the “inner word,” creates 
conceptual space for a ritual sign, positioned within both this theory of language and his 
Logos theology, and thus roughly analogous to Origen’s symbolon, which is also an 
essential linguistic term re‑deployed in a ritual context.   Thus both signum and symbolon 
are re‑configured as designators of a “real” manifestation of an invisible, substantive 
reality, as outward “signs” [signa] that “signify” [significare] the transcendent reality of 
the Verbum, the Logos to which the believer is assimilated in a healing gesture.  Thus 
eucharist becomes, for Augustine as for Origen, a rite similar in kind to the rites of 
ancient tradition, but one that has been linked exclusively to a singular mediator, which 
is supplied by Christian theology as a more immediate encounter with God. 
In developing his theory, Augustine employs his own dualist rhetoric to his 
advantage, masking his necessary endorsements of material reality (which is modest, in 
any case) behind an often strident anti‑material rhetoric as he proceeds to divest cult 
ritual of all but ethical content, and to displace embodied daemons as cult mediators482 
                                                       
482 The central purpose of books 6‑10 of De Civitate Dei is to advance the claim that sacrificing to 
daemons or to other lower divinities is meaningless and ineffectual with respect to a human 
afterlife.  Indeed, despite the praise that he otherwise reserves for them, Augustine condemns 
Plato and his heirs for their singular flaw of permitting daemon worship.  Plotinus, Iamblichus, 
Porphyry, and Apuleius were all distinguished, but even they, and “the others who were of the 
same school, and indeed, Plato himself, held that sacred rites should be performed in honour of 
many gods” sed hi omnes et ceteri eius modi et ipse Plato diis plurimis esse sacra facienda putauerunt  
(De civ. D. 8.12). Augustine for his part asserts that to be “ensnared and deceived by the cunning 
of malign spirits [daemons],” is to “wander far from the true God, with Whom alone, and in 
Whom alone, and by Whom alone the human – that is, the rational and intellectual – soul is 
blessed” inretitus malignorum spirituum deceptusque fallacia longe aberret a uero deo, cum quo solo et in 
quo solo et de quo solo anima humana, id est rationalis et intellectualis, beata est (ibid. 9.2). 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with the mediation of the Logos embodied.  He then furtively introduces Christian 
eucharist as the perfect replacement for defective pagan rites erroneously tied to 
daemons, offering Christianity as the alternative to ancient traditions that offer no 
genuine ascent form the materiality in which they are inescapably grounded.  Like 
Origen, then, Augustine screens his ultimate intentions behind a rhetoric emphasizing 
difference, thereby dissembling his adoption of principles similar in kind to those that 
underpin traditional pagan rites.  
This issues to be considered in this chapter are, in summary: (2) Augustine’s 
dismissal of daemons from the divine hierarchy, a gesture that involves a searching 
critique of Apuleius’ thought on the daemonic, and a strained effort to justify their 
displacement despite their superior (because aerial) material bodies.  In this formulation, 
daemons turn out to be uniformly worse than mortals, by virtue of their eternal 
confinement to an embodied state that is completely subject to passions.  (3) His 
assimilation of these now degraded daemons into the categories of magic, witchcraft, and 
theurgy, among which he makes no distinction, and which enable no meaningful 
purification of the soul, consisting rather of encosmic manipulations that only entrap the 
soul in a shifting, illusory material world.  (4)  His displacement of theurgic / daemonic 
models of mediation, regarded as a degraded derivative of Platonic philosophy, with a 
Christian model that is adapted to the categories derived from Apuleius, and predicated 
on the mediating function of the incarnate Christ, who is unlike daemons in his 
blessedness, and also provisionally mortal, making him akin to humans.  The miserable 
immortal daemons are thus replaced by the blessed and (transiently) mortal Christ – a 
move that makes of Christ a precise remedy for the defects identified in the Apuleian 
system.  Augustine’s argument may initially appear metaphysically dualist, since he is 
urgent to deny any advantage accruing to daemonic aerial embodiment, but the dualism 
softens as the focus of the argument shifts from daemonic bodies to Christ, and as 
Augustine clarifies his view of matter as a neutral substrate for the mediation of contact 
with a divine principium (the incarnate Logos).  (5) Augustine’s application of his own 
sign‑theory of language as a model for explaining cult mediation.  Working from his 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notion of the “inner word” – the conviction that tangible utterance bears a genuine 
incorporeal substance from one mind to another – Augustine develops the idea that the 
tangible sacramental sign can likewise mediate a substantive participation by believers 
in the sacrifice of Christ.  This argument is initially obscured by Augustine’s rhetorical 
distancing of Christian rites from their pagan counterparts, which he accomplishes by 
allegorically reading biblical texts on sacrifice as “signs” [signa] of an “inner sacrifice” 
[sacrificium] defined purely as an inner disposition toward God, or in terms of ethical 
transformation.  Such a move is a sleight of hand by which Augustine sanitizes the 
language of “sign” as it applies to cult, employing allegorical reading (the “sign” of an 
inner ethical state; then later the “sign” of a forthcoming “sign,” the eucharist) in a way 
that privileges a discussion of the ends of Christian cult (purification of the soul) over a 
discussion of its mechanisms.  The effect of this strategy is to distance the Christian rite 
from any association with magic, theurgy, or pagan cult by emphasizing primarily the 
ethical content of a proper sacrificial disposition; however, when Augustine links inner 
disposition to the mystical idea of a self‑oblation of all believers united in Christ, he 
must begin to endow the tangible, visible “sign” [signum / sacramentum] of the eucharist 
with ritual force in order to draw believers into meaningful unity with Christ, who is the 
inner, invisible “sacrifice” [sacrificium] of the Church, and who is conveyed to believers 
in the signum.  That is to say, the eucharist as a sign must actually mediate something, 
and not simply stand allegorically for something. 
  Augustine’s engagement with Apuleius and Porphyry, then, commences from a 
pretended dualist rejection of matter and the daemonic worship that is presumed to be 
confined to the material realm,  and proceeds to an embrace of material mediation in 
which pagan rites are furtively displaced by Christian practice whose defining 
difference is the agent of mediation, the incarnate Logos, whose healing efficacy is 
described in terms of a theory of sign.483  Augustine’s approach thus preserves an idea of 
                                                       
483 It should be said that Augustine is somewhat more subtle than Origen in his appropriations, 
never quite naming eucharist outright, and less inclined to play word games with his 
interlocutor.  Where Origen lunges quickly to embrace the language and categories of magic and 
theurgy, even proceeding to a defense of the eucharist a bit too quickly on the heels of a rejection 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material reality as mediating, which leaves space for an incarnate Word and material 
rituals whose “signification” is coterminous with their effects.  
 
2. Augustine’s Taxonomy of Daemons 
 
  Since Augustine approaches the problem of pagan rites through the question of 
daemonic mediation, we must first consider his dismissal of the  daemons from the 
legitimate transcendent hierarchy.484  His approach is somewhat indebted to a 
Euhemeristic account of the gods,485 and derives its particular shape from exploiting the 
ambivalence on the daemonic that characterizes Apuleius’ own On the God of Socrates.486  
Recognizing that the “reason and great necessity” that daemons should “[carry] the 
petitions of men and [bring] back the answers of the gods,” is that for Platonists, “no 
god has dealings with men,”487 Augustine works within a tradition that regarded the 
mutual isolation of humanity and divinity as bridgeable by intervening entities.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
of magic, Augustine’s rhetoric suggests an acute awareness of the importance of maintaining the 
appearance of distinctive identity. 
484 On daemons in De civ. D. see Evans (1982) 98‑111, especially the Augustinian view that they are 
fallen angels and “the very originators of evil” (102). 
485 On Euhemerus’ 4th century BCE text Sacred History, which advanced the theory that the gods 
are in fact former mortals who have been posthumously elevated, and which was translated by 
Ennius and widely used by Christian apologists, see Ogilvie (1978) 55‑57.  Augustine’s 
demonolgy here is shaded with this idea, proceeding gradually to align daemons with the worst 
aspects of the human.  The approach is similar to his critique of Marcus Varro’s Antiquitates 
Rerum Divinarum (in De.Civ.D. 6‑7), which exploits Varro’s somewhat inconsistent reconciliation 
of anthropomorphically driven “civic” and “mythic” theology (within an account of religion’s 
public utility) with the speculative theology of philosophers, including his own view of the gods 
as manifestations of a cosmic soul.  Augustine’s critique, by driving a wedge between civic / 
mythic and metaphysical theology, attempts to sunder the pagan gods of Rome from divine 
transcendence.  See De civ. D. 6.7‑8, 7.18  (O’Daly [1999] 105‑106).  On the three genera of theology 
– mythicon, civile, and physicon – see Lieberg (1973); Pépin (1958) 276‑314. 
486 On Apuleius, see Dillon (1977) 306‑38, especially 317‑320 on De Deo Socratico.  O’Daly (1999) 
115‑23 summarizes.   
487 at enim urgens causa et artissima cogit daemones medios inter deos et homines agere, ut ab 
hominibus adferant desiderata, et a diis referant inpetrata. quaenam tandem ista causa est et 
quanta necessitas? quia nullus, inquiunt, deus miscetur homini. De civ. D. 8.20. Cf. Symposium 
203a.  See Dillon (1977) 317‑18, on Apuleius’ core conviction that “the world does not tolerate a 
gap” between men and God; also the notion that every element must have its proper inhabitants. 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Consistent with Apuleius, he presents this hierarchy as tripartite, with gods at the top, 
humankind at the bottom, and daemons between.  Specifically, the gods occupy the 
aether; humankind occupies the earth; and the daemons occupy the intervening air.488  
Their intermediate position is affirmed by the fact that they possess “immortality of the 
body in common with gods, but … passions of the mind in common with men.”  But this 
very subjection to the passions, argues Augustine, is the factor that make daemons take 
pleasure in theatrical performances and the debased work of the poets, and is the reason 
that Plato himself, “in detesting poetry and prohibiting works of fiction,” would have 
banished such from his ideal state.489  There is no question that these are the daemons of 
Apuleius, who are said take pleasure in theatrical performances and to enjoin vile 
magical practices upon mortals,490 and who in turn provide Augustine the occasion to 
challenge whether such beings, who require what pagans themselves many cases 
prohibit,491 ought to be regarded as mediators between gods and men.  He further 
exploits Apuleius’ own ambivalence on the daemonic, accusing him of evasion in terming 
the Socratic daimonion a “god” in the title of his work.  If there is no shame in the 
daemonic, why alter the terminology?  In Augustine’s view, Apuleius prefers deus simply 
out of the embarrassment. 
One way or the other, Augustine works to derive doubts from what he perceives 
as inconsistency in the handling of daemons.492  His treatment concludes by leaving 
daemons to their intermediate position, though deprived of any standing as mediators.  
                                                       
488 See O’Daly (1999) 115. 
489 habent enim cum diis communem inmortalitatem corporum, animorum autem cum hominibus 
passiones.... poetica detestando et prohibendo figmenta.... De civ. D. 8.14. 
490 See Dillon (1977) 318, who notes that Apuleius works within a Xenocratean tradition in 
characterizing the delight taken by daemons in the extraordinary range of religious observances 
and activities directed at them. 
491 De civ. D. 8.18‑19, where Augustine notes widespread prohibitions against magic, and the 
charges of magical practice from which Apuleius had to free himself, as evidenced by his own 
surviving Apologia.  See O’Daly (1999) 116. 
492 It is a strategy similar to that employed against Varro’s Antiquitates in Books 6‑7, where 
Augustine exploits weaknesses, but also exaggerates perceived inconsistencies in Varro’s 
treatment of religious matters in order to make the larger case for the irrelevance of traditional 
cults. 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Augustine first attacks the belief that daemons are necessarily better than men by virtue 
of their superior position.  Granting their superiority of place and body (aerial), he 
denies that such factors constitute a necessary basis of superiority, citing the many 
animals who can claim superior bodies, the “many beasts which surpass us in the 
acuteness of their senses, in the ease and rapidity of their movement, in their strength, 
and in the greatly prolonged vigor of their bodies.”493  Even birds have loftier dwellings.  
This concession of physical superiority marks the dualist phase of Augustine’s 
argument, expressed as an assertion of the primacy of the soul, and particularly of the 
intellectual soul, over any kind of body.  Daemonic aerial bodies may be superior, he 
argues, but that is no matter: 
Divine providence has indeed given to these daemons certain 
superior bodily gifts, even though we are clearly their moral 
superiors.  But this has been done in order that the things in which 
we excel them may thereby be commended to us as far more 
worthy to be desired than the body.494   
 
Augustine grants that “we, too, are to have immortality of body,” but he still prefers to 
sunder ultimate goodness from any attachment to the body, arguing that we should 
“learn to despise the bodily excellence which we know that the daemons have, in 
comparison with the goodness of life in respect of which we surpass them.”495  Their 
superiority of body and position are in any case not the result of an ascent, but rather of 
a fall:   
They do indeed dwell in the air; but they do so only because the 
were cast out from the sublimity of the higher heaven, and justly 
                                                       
493 alioquin multas sibi et bestias praelaturus est, quae nos et acrimonia sensuum et motu 
facillimo atque celerrimo et ualentia uirium et annosissima firmitate corporum uincunt. (De civ. 
D. 8.15).  See Evans (1982) 102‑103. 
494 ob hoc enim et prouidentia diuina eis, quibus nos constat esse potiores, data sunt quaedam 
potiora corporum munera, ut illud, quo eis praeponimur, etiam isto modo nobis commendaretur 
multo maiore cura excolendum esse quam corpus (De civ. D. 8.15). 
495 habituri et nos inmortalitatem corporum…. excellentiam corporalem, quam daemones habere 
nossemus, prae bonitate uitae, qua illis anteponimur, contemnere disceremus… (ibid. 8.15). 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condemned for their irreparable transgression to dwell in this 
region as in a prison appropriate to them.496 
 
Augustine struggles with the problem of daemonic bodies, finally conceding, as he must, 
their superiority, though not ungrudgingly: 
…Even though Plato’s classification of bodies seems to be the 
correct one, the same order is not to be observed when assigning 
merits to souls; for it may well be that a superior soul will inhabit 
an inferior body, and an inferior soul a superior body.497 
 
Augustine thus flatly rejects any assertion of qualitative correspondence between bodies 
and souls, but plainly he prefers to stake out a position that simply severs body from 
soul: “As to their [the daemons’] being aerial in body, what is that worth, when a soul of 
any kind whatsoever is to be preferred to any kind of body.”498  Augustine can be 
unremitting on this point, as he later shows: 
For a living creature – that is, an animal – consists of soul and 
body; and, of these two elements, the soul is certainly better than 
the body.  Even when flawed and weak, it is certainly better than 
even the most healthy and sound body.  For the greater excellence 
of its nature is not brought down to the level of the body even by 
the taint of vice, just as gold, even when impure, is valued more 
highly than even the purest silver or lead.499 
 
Given his commitment to an eventual Christian “immortality of body … to which our 
purity of soul now leads us.”500 Augustine may not be entirely consistent on this point, 
                                                       
496 qui in hoc quidem aere habitant, quia de caeli superioris sublimitate deiecto merito 
inregressibilis transgressionis in hoc sibi congruo uelut carcere praedamnati sunt  (ibid. 8.22). 
497 ut intellegamus non eundem ordinem tenendum, cum agitur de meritis animarum, qui uidetur 
esse ordo in gradibus corporum; sed fieri posse, ut inferius corpus anima melior inhabitet 
deteriorque superius (ibid. 8.15). 
498 quod corpore aeria, quanti aestimandum est, cum omni corpori praeferatur animae 
qualiscumque natura (ibid. 8.16). 
499 cum enim animans, id est animal, ex anima constet et corpore, quorum duorum anima est 
utique corpore melior, etsi uitiosa et infirma, melior certe corpore etiam sanissimo atque 
firmissimo, quoniam natura eius excellentior nec labe uitiorum postponitur corpori, sicut aurum 
etiam sordidum argento seu plumbo, licet purissimo, carius aestimatur (ibid. 9.9). 
500 … inmortalitatem corporum … quam puritas praecedat animorum (ibid. 8.15). 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but for purposes of the present case he prefers to make the body’s quality altogether 
independent of that of the soul.   
This move makes it possible for Augustine to assail the daemons despite their 
superior bodies and higher position.  With superior bodies declared inconsequential, 
and with subjection to all the vices of humankind and worse, daemons can hardly be said 
to mediate between men and gods.  Apuleius, emphasizing the proximity of their ways 
to those of men, grants that they are “agitated by the same perturbations of mind as 
men: vexed by injuries; placated by obsequies and gifts; gratified by honours; delighted 
by the diversity of sacred rites; and provoked if any such rites are neglected.”  What is 
more, their activity also lies behind “the divinations of augurs, soothsayers, prophecies 
and dreams … and the miracles of sorcerers.”501  Such associations, along with their 
passion for the theater, constitute the raw material of Augustine’s critique, but he is also 
concerned to justify their displacement by means of a more refined argument. 
  To this end, Augustine attempts to exploit Apuleius’ own complex of five 
qualities used to distinguish gods, daemons, and mortals.  Within this taxonomy, 
Apuleius defines daemons as “animal in genus, passive in soul, rational in mind, aerial in 
body, and eternal in time,”502 going on to assert that of all these categories, the daemons 
have the first three in common with humans (animal, passive, rational), the fourth as a 
characteristic unique to themselves (aerial), and the fifth in common with the gods.  
Deploying these categories to attack them, Augustine argues that if they are animal in 
genus, passive in soul, and rational in mind, then they can claim no superiority to 
humankind, since when those characteristics are combined with immortality, the state of 
daemons becomes a form of entrapment.  As Augustine’s analysis proceeds they become 
increasingly like humans, but for their eternal entrapment in aerial bodies, which are of 
no benefit to them by virtue of the principle that “a soul of any kind whatsoever is to be 
                                                       
501 ...eisdem quibus homines animi perturbationibus agitari, inritari iniuriis, obsequiis donisque 
placari, gaudere honoribus, diuersis sacrorum ritibus oblectari et in eis si quid neglectum fuerit 
commoueri.... diuinationes augurum, aruspicum, uatum atque somniorum ... quoque ... miracula 
magorum. (ibid. 8.16). 
502 ...genere animalia, animo passiua, mente rationalia, corpore aeria, tempore aeterna (De Deo 
Socrat. 6, apud De civ. D. 8.16). 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preferred to any kind of body.”503 This combination of qualities enables Augustine to 
conclude that such “aerial animals” can hardly be worthy of cult, since they are “rational 
only so that they may be miserable … passive only so that they may suffer .. and eternal 
only so that their misery may have no end!”504  In this re‑classification of daemons as 
essentially human‑like, with the caveat that they are trapped in this deficient stasis, 
Augustine’s thought reveals its Euhemeristic influences, and perhaps edges closer to 
that of Origen, who parodies daemons as malevolent souls.  Augustine concludes from 
Apuleius’ account that daemons, in the passionate affliction of their rational souls, are 
thus “like foolish and unrighteous mortals … not in their bodies, but in their 
characters.”505  Absent any capacity to resist the passions assailing their souls, daemons 
may be accounted not merely like mortals, but actually worse, lacking all spiritual 
fortitude:  
He [Apuleius] cannot remain silent as to that which shows that 
they are miserable.  For he confesses that their minds in respect of 
which he has asserted that they are rational, are not imbued and 
fortified even with sufficient virtue to resist to any degree the 
irrational passions of the soul.  Rather, they are themselves 
agitated by storms and tempests … as is usually the case with 
stupid minds.506 
 
Such beings are like the most debased instances of humankind, and can share no 
likeness with “wise men, who, when they are assailed in this life by such disturbances of 
                                                       
503 ...quod corpore aeria, quanti aestimandum est, cum omni corpori praeferatur animae 
qualiscumque natura (De civ. D. 8.16). 
504 ...ad hoc rationalia ut misera esse possint, ad hoc passiua ut misera sint, ad hoc aeterna ut 
miseriam finire non possint (ibid. 8.16). 
505 ...sed stultis mortalibus et iniustis non corporibus, sed moribus similes (ibid. 9.3).  Augustine is 
exploiting what is in fact a softer characterization of daemons as susceptible to emotion, and 
deriving from it the assertion of a total daemonic susceptibility to passions that marks them as 
more degraded than human beings (De Deo Socrat. 12, p.20 Thomas, cited in O’Daly [1999] 119, 
with comments).  See also Evans (1982) 103. 
506 confitens eorum mentem, qua rationales esse perhibuit, non saltem inbutam munitamque 
uirtute passionibus animi inrationabilibus nequaquam cedere, sed ipsam quoque, sicut stultarum 
mentium mos est, procellosis quodam modo perturbationibus agitari (De civ. D. 9.3). 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soul … resist them with untroubled mind.”507  That certain human beings have capacities 
for virtue that exceed those of daemons is a point that Augustine exploits.  In Apuleius’ 
careful distinctions between gods, daemons, and mortals, he fails to find “[anything] at all 
which the daemons seem to have in common specifically with good men, and which is 
not found in bad.”508  Augustine concedes that such limited wisdom as humanity might 
possess is “slow,” but he insists that such wisdom does at least occur, and that any 
account of the human would be deficient without noting those few cases in which such 
wisdom was brightly manifest.  The cultivation of wisdom is the path by which mortals 
can aspire to some of the qualities displayed by gods, and as bare and limited as human 
prospects appear to be, Apuleius has left a certain narrow path open for human 
aspiration.  Augustine is emphatic that no such path is open for daemons, for whom 
Apuleius has omitted even the barest prospect for the cultivation of wisdom: 
If, therefore, he wishes us to believe that some of the daemons are 
good, he would have included in his description of them 
something by which we might see that they have some measure of 
blessedness in common with the gods, or some kind of wisdom in 
common with men.  As it is, however, he has mentioned no good 
quality of theirs whereby the good may be distinguished from the 
bad.509 
 
As in Origen’s account, all daemons are straightforwardly bad; lacking furthermore any 
capacity for wisdom, the share with human beings only a susceptibility to passions. 
                                                       
507 ut ne hominibus quidem sapientibus comparandi sint, qui huius modi perturbationibus 
animorum ... etiam cum eas huius uitae condicione patiuntur, mente inperturbata resistunt (ibid. 
9.3).  See O’Daly (1999) 119 for Augustine’s reflections on Stoic and Platonic‑Peripatetic theories 
on resistance to the passions, particularly his view that the differences are finally semantic. 
508 ...nihil ... omnino, quo daemones cum bonis saltem hominibus id uiderentur habere commune, 
quod non esset in malis (De civ. D. 9.8).  The key points of weakness that Augustine seems to find 
are daemonic susceptibility to passions, as noted above, and the present idea that daemons lack 
wisdom, and hence any means by which they might resist the attacks of passions.   See O’Daly 
(1999) 120. 
509 proinde si aliquos daemones bonos uellet intellegi, aliquid etiam in ipsorum descriptione 
poneret, unde uel cum diis aliquam beatitudinis partem, uel cum hominibus qualemcumque 
sapientiam putarentur habere communem.  nunc uero nullum bonum eorum commemorauit, 
quo boni discernuntur a malis. (De civ. D. 9.8). 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[Apuleius] asserts most clearly that, as to the soul, the daemons 
resemble men, not gods, and that this resemblance does not lie in 
the daemons’ possessing the good of wisdom, in which men can 
also share.  Rather, it lies in the fact that they too are subject to the 
storms of passion which dominate stupid and wicked men but 
which are mastered by wise and good men, who would, indeed, 
prefer not to experience them at all rather than to overcome 
them.510 
 
Such being the state of daemons, it follows that they should be neither emulated, nor 
regarded as mediators in any sense:  
What reason is there, then, apart from folly and miserable error, 
for you to humble yourself to worship a being whom you do not 
wish to resemble in your life?  And why should you pay religious 
homage to one whom you do not wish to imitate, when the 
highest duty of religion is to imitate him whom you worship?511 
 
  Augustine further refines daemonic deficiency in soul by identifying the flawed 
soul as the singular inadmissible factor in any process whose end is the return of the 
human soul to its proper state of contemplating the divine.  Since the passive soul is the 
element held in common by both daemons and mortals, and the immortal body is the 
element held in common between daemons and gods, Augustine argues that daemons 
could mediate only by virtue of the body, a ridiculous scenario in which daemons are 
“inverted” – afflicted with a degraded soul and an unduly elevated body: 
What wickedness or punishment, then, has suspended these false 
and deceitful mediators head downwards, so to speak, so that 
they share the inferior part of a living creature – that is, the body – 
with superior beings, but the superior part – that is, the soul – 
with inferior beings?  They are united with the celestial gods by 
                                                       
510 ... animo autem non diis, sed hominibus similes daemones apertissime inculcans; et hoc non 
sapientiae bono, cuius et homines possunt esse participes, sed perturbatione passionum, quae 
stultis malisque dominatur, a sapientibus uero et bonis ita regitur, ut malint eam non habere 
quam uincere. (ibid. 9.8). 
511 quae igitur causa est nisi stultitia errorque miserabilis, ut ei te facias uenerando humilem, cui 
te cupias uiuendo dissimilem; et religione colas, quem imitari nolis, cum religionis summa sit 
imitari quem colis? (ibid. 8.17). 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the part that serves, but they are united in misery with earthly 
men by the part that rules.512 
 
Deriving the language of “serving“ and “ruling” from Sallust’s War with Catiline,513 
where the body that serves is associated with “beasts” and the soul that rules with gods, 
Augustine argues that daemons are bestial because their uppermost attribute is the body, 
while their governing faculty drawn downward into closer proximity to mortals.  The 
faculty that should rule is instead ruled.  Such an orientation, given its eternity, is a 
wretched stasis, a terminal consignment to torment:  
Hence, if anyone observes that the daemons share eternity with the 
gods because, unlike living creatures on earth, their souls and 
bodies are not separated by death, we must nonetheless think of 
those bodies not as the vehicles of eternal triumph , but as the 
bonds of eternal damnation.514  
 
The daemons, insofar as their superior bodies are a “perpetual prison,”515 are finally 
worse off than mortals.  
Augustine further supports his case by appealing to the argument from “three 
opposites,” intending particularly to explain how it is that daemons can occupy an 
intermediate position despite their degraded quality.  He works from three qualities, 
conceived as opposites, by which Apuleius distinguishes the relative condition of gods 
and men – “sublimity of location, everlastingness, and blessedness” for gods, “lowliness 
of station, mortality, and misery”516 for men.  In terms of the first set of opposites 
(location), the position of daemons in the middle cannot be denied.  In terms of the 
second set (duration), Augustine continues to grant their immortality, which places 
                                                       
512 quaenam tandem istos mediatores falsos atque fallaces quasi capite deorsum nequitia uel 
poena suspendit, ut inferiorem animalis partem, id est corpus, cum superioribus, superiorem 
uero, id est animum, cum inferioribus habeant, et cum diis caelestibus in parte seruiente 
coniuncti, cum hominibus autem terrestribus in parte dominante sint miseri? (ibid. 9.9). 
513 Cat. 1 
514 unde etiamsi quisquam propter hoc eos putauerit aeternitatem habere cum diis, quia nulla 
morte, sicut animalium terrestrium, animi eorum soluuntur a corpore: nec sic existimandum est 
eorum corpus tamquam honoratorum aeternum uehiculum, sed aeternum uinculum 
damnatorum. (De civ. D. 9.9). 
515 perpetuo ... vinculo (ibid. 9.10). 
516 locus sublimis, aeternitas, beatitudo ... locus infimus, mortalitas, miseria. (ibid. 9.12). 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them at the divine end of the spectrum.  In terms of the third set (psychic state), 
Augustine insists on daemonic misery by again appealing to Apuleius’ failure to posit 
any daemonic capacity for resisting passions:  
What remains, therefore, but the conclusion that these 
intermediate beings possess the highest extreme of one of the two 
remaining attributes [everlastingness ‑ mortality] and the lowest 
extreme of the other [blessedness ‑ misery]?  For if they possessed 
the highest extreme of both, or the lowest of both, they would not 
then be intermediate; rather, they would rise upwards or fall 
downwards, as the case might be.517 
 
The argument pivots entirely on Augustine’s exploitation of Apuleius’ willingness to 
endow mortals with at least some capacity for wisdom, and his omission of such 
qualities from the daemonic life.  Working from the assumption that these qualities, 
conceived in terms of opposite extremes, dictate position within a cosmic topography, 
Augustine can now explain how it is that daemons occupy a middle position despite the 
seeming implausibility of such an arrangement.  He has managed to argue that 
ascending position does not entail ascending blessedness.  
Despite his success in explaining the intermediate position of daemons in terms of 
the “three opposites,” Augustine still must establish this neatly calibrated balance in 
terms of the “five qualities.”  With their intermediate position a property particular to 
themselves, it initially appears that they hold three of the remaining four qualities in 
common with mortals (animal in genus, rational in mind, and passive in soul) and only 
one in common with gods (immortality in body).  If this is so, Augustine asks, “how are 
they intermediate, then, when they have one of their attributes in common with the 
highest, but three with the lowest?”518  But this is merely an effort politely to correct 
Apuleius, refining what he regards as imperfectly explained.  All three species, argues 
Augustine, are unique with respect to one of the five attributes, namely the types of 
bodies they possess – earthly, aerial, and aetherial – a fact that implies perfect spatial 
                                                       
517 quid igitur restat, nisi ut hi medii de duobus summis unum habeant et de duobus infimis 
alterum? nam si utraque de imis habebunt aut utraque de summis, medii non erunt, sed in 
alterutram partem uel resiliunt uel recumbent (9.13). 
518 quo modo ergo medii, quando unum habent cum summis, tria cum infimis? (ibid. 9.13). 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distribution and therefore enables the cancellation of that quality from the equation.  
With respect to two of the remaining four qualities, all three species are alike in being 
animal in genus and rational in mind: “for Apuleius himself, when he spoke of gods and 
men, said, ‘You have here two animal natures’; and the Platonists never maintain that 
the gods are anything other than rational in mind.”519  For three of the five attributes 
then, either symmetrical distribution or perfect likeness is maintained, thus allowing for 
their cancellation.  Of the two remaining attributes, “that of being passive in soul, and 
that of being eternal in time,” the former is shared with mortals and the latter with gods, 
so that of these two remaining attributes, the latter exerts an upward pull in the scale 
toward divine realms, and the former exerts a downward pull toward mortal realms, 
and a precisely calibrated balance is maintained.  The daemons are maintained in their 
position by an “exact balance,”520 a stasis consistent with the conclusion of the argument 
from three opposites, with daemons eternally suspended in a state of passion‑induced 
misery – an “eternal misery or miserable eternality”521 – a conviction that Augustine 
believes Apuleius would have held had he not feared offending the worshippers of 
daemons.522 
  It follows that no “eudaimones” may be properly said to exist,523 since ascribing 
goodness or blessedness to them would upset the balance, aligning them too closely 
with the gods and thus disrupting their intermediate position.  At precisely this point in 
the argument Augustine begins to hint at the possibility of constructing a superior kind 
of mediation facilitated by the capacity for wisdom that is granted to the human.  Given 
                                                       
519 nam et ipse cum de diis et hominibus loqueretur: ʺhabetis, inquit, bina animaliaʺ, et non solent 
isti deos nisi rationales mente perhibere. (ibid. 9.13). 
520 proportonali ratione (ibid. 9.13). 
521 misera aeternitas vel aeterna miseria (ibid. 9.13). 
522 “For he who said that they are ‘passive in soul’ would have called them ‘miserable’ had he not 
feared to offend their worshippers”; qui enim ait ʺanimo passiuaʺ, etiam ʺmiseraʺ dixisset, nisi 
eorum cultoribus erubuisset. (ibid. 9.13). 
523 An important point for Augustine, since Apuleius shows a willingness to class the embodied 
human soul as a type of daemon, as well as souls that have left the body to perform their several 
beneficial or pernicious roles (suggesting perhaps a Euhemeristic influence on Apuleius), and of 
course daemons that have never known a body, with which he classes the Socratic daemonion and 
the guardian daemons of Plato (Dillon [1977] 319‑320). 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the human potential for wisdom, Augustine asks “why [it is] not these same wise men 
who are appointed as mediators between miserable mortals and the blessed immortals, 
since they have blessedness in common with the immortals and mortality in common 
with miserable mortals?”524  This is a straightforward correction of the daemonic 
“inversion” that Augustine finds in Apuleius’ thought, with a mortal body and a blessed 
soul displacing the daemons’ immortal body and wretched soul.   Augustine describes such 
men merely as “counselors” who could advise “miserable mortals in the pursuit of 
blessedness, so that, after death, men may achieve immortality also, and so be united 
with the blessed and immortal angels,” but clearly he is already hinting at the 
Christology he will later develop.525  For the moment, though, the Augustinian “wise 
man” is philosophy’s sage526 who will be mortal and blessed – subject to death but 
nevertheless happy and wise – where the daemons are just the opposite, immortal and 
wretched – subject only to passions and forever unable to escape their power.   
 
3. Theurgy as Daemonic Cult 
 
  The confinement of daemons to an intermediate position stripped of any 
mediating role supplies the basis for Augustine’s attack on all cult rites directed at such 
lesser divinities.  As was his method in dismantling any credible theory of daemonic 
mediation, Augustine will attempt to exploit the ambivalence and unease of his 
philosophical interlocutors in his effort to undermine magic and theurgy.  He suggests 
that Porphyry’s assumed inquisitiveness in the Letter to Anebo is merely an imposture to 
mask what was really his resistance to theurgy, asserting that he “overturns these 
                                                       
524 cur non ipsi potius medii constituuntur inter mortales miseros et inmortales beatos, 
beatitudinem habentes cum inmortalibus beatis, mortalitatem cum mortalibus miseris? (De civ. D. 
9.14). 
525 To be addressed in section 4 of the present chapter. 
526 See O’Connell (1968) 269f., for Augustine’s theorizing of a “great and divine man,” and its 
kinship to a Photinian, logos‑anthropos Christology. 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sacrilegious arts” by “acting the part of an inquirer seeking guidance.”527  His very 
hesitations and inquiries reveal that he “chose … to avoid giving offense to the Egyptian 
who was devoted to such errors and who believed himself to have some great 
knowledge.”528  He opines that Porphyry may have “blushed for his friends the 
theurgists,” further speculating that he already knew the truth, but that he “still did not 
feel free to speak out against the worship of many gods.”529  This pose is akin to that 
adopted toward Apuleius, who is likewise accused of blunting his opinions on daemons 
for fear of offending their partisans.   
  Such a posture, bolstered by what is in fact an obvious skepticism on Porphyry’s 
part, opens up argumentative possibilities for Augustine.  In keeping with the tone and 
argument of the Letter to Anebo, Augustine lumps together magic and theurgy.  In the 
course of vindicating biblical miracles over the tricks of conjurers, he asserts that the 
miracles  
were performed through simple faith and pious trust, and not by 
means of incantations and charms composed by practitioners of 
the art of wicked curiosity: the art which the call either magic, or 
by the more detestable name of witchcraft, or by the more 
honourable one of theurgy.530  
 
Under Augustine’s indictment both magicians and theurgists are “equally bound by the 
false rites of the daemons whom they worship under the name of angels.”531  Porphyry 
himself was extremely doubtful as to whether “this art can furnish anyone with a means 
of returning to God.”532  Suspicious of theurgy, Porphyry can recommend it only for the 
                                                       
527 … ubi consulenti similis et quaerenti et prodit artes sacrilegas et euertit. (De civ. D. 10.11). 
528 … uoluit hominem aegyptium talibus erroribus deditum et aliqua magna se scire opinantem 
non … offendere (ibid. 10.11). 
529 … contra multorum deorum cultum non libere defendebat (ibid. 10.26).  Cf. 10.27, where he 
accuses Porphyry of recommending theurgy to the uneducated masses, thereby establishing 
them in the belief that he himself, as a philosopher, regards as empty and useless, merely because 
he wants “to reward his teachers” (ut … mercedem reddas magistris tuis). 
530 … fiebant autem simplici fide atque fiducia pietatis, non incantationibus et carminibus nefariae 
curiositatis arte compositis, quam uel magian uel detestabiliore nomine goetian uel honorabiliore 
theurgian uocant … (ibid. 10.9). 
531 … utrique ritibus fallacibus daemonum obstricti sub nominibus angelorum (ibid. 10.9). 
532 Porphyrius … reuersionem uero ad deum hanc artem praestare cuiquam negat (ibid. 10.9). 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purification of the spiritual soul, arguing that it can only affect “the spiritual part, 
whereby we receive the images if corporeal things.”533  By means of theurgic rites 
(teletae) this lower part of the soul can become better adapted for receiving impressions 
of “spirits and angels, and for seeing the gods;”534 however, the intellectual soul 
“receives no such purification from these theurgic mysteries as would make it fit to 
behold its God and to perceive the things that truly exist.”535   The purification of the 
spiritual soul is thus only a partial achievement that accomplishes nothing toward 
attaining “immortality and eternity.”536  Furthermore, according to Porphyry, the higher 
soul – the intellectual or rational soul –  categorically does not require theurgic mysteries 
in order to “escape into its own realm.”  Theurgy is thus superfluous by Porphyry’s own 
admission, in terms of philosophy’s final aims.  Even at its best it appears morally 
neutral, as Augustine argues by referring to Porphyry’s story of a certain Chaldean, 
whose efforts at theurgic purification were thwarted by the interference of a rival 
theurgist who enviously invoked other beings to constrain the benevolent, purifying 
divinities of the first.537  Such a case reveals that theurgy may be employed either for 
good or evil, and that it is comprised merely of techniques for enlisting the services of 
potentially rival powers.  Reading theurgy in light of his daemonic taxonomy, Augustine 
concludes that such rites are nothing more than manipulation of just such malevolent 
beings, who are beset with passions and tormented by envy.  He again invokes 
Porphyry’s own skepticism, founded on the assumption that the good gods invoked by 
the first Chaldean should hardly have been intimidated or coerced by the evil deities  
invoked by the other.  Even Porphyry thinks that the flaws in such a system are obvious.  
If practitioners of such arts do in fact see “visions of miraculous beauty, of angels or 
gods,” argues Augustine, “this is what the Apostle means when he speaks of Satan 
                                                       
533 … sed spiritali, qua corporalium rerum capiuntur imagines (ibid. 10.9). 
534 …spirituum et angelorum et ad videndos deos (ibid. 10.9). 
535 [fatetur intellectuali animae] nihil purgationis accedere, quod eam faciat idoneam ad 
uidendum deum suum et perspicienda ea, quae uere sunt (ibid. 10.9) 
536 inmortalitatem aeternitatemque (ibid. 10.9). 
537 ibid. 10.9. 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transforming himself into an angel of light.”538  And such things do occur, as Augustine 
makes clear: “It is, however, true that things are done by means of theurgic arts which in 
every way surpass human ability.”539 Manipulations and visions within the perceptible 
world thus do occur, but Augustine views such visions, produced by theurgy’s 
conditioning of the spiritual soul, as superfluous if not outright dangerous, and vacuous 
when compared to the purification of the intellectual soul that is required for the soul’s 
real ascent, and that cannot be supplied by theurgy; in fact, viewed in light of 
Augustine’s developed taxonomy of daemons, such rites must always be seen as a 
hindrance to the soul’s ascent, since daemons are enslaved by a psychic condition that 
propels them only to the delusion and destruction of mortals.540  Even the very way in 
which Porphyry writes on the subject, argues Augustine, “brings to mind things of a 
kind that no sober consideration could attribute to any but malign and deceitful 
powers.”541  Augustine notes that Porphyry posits additional beings – beyond angels 
and daemons, capable of “imitating gods and daemons and the souls of the dead” – 
presumably because Porphyry himself prefers some other agency than angels and 
daemons in order to explain how it is “by using stones and herbs that they cast spells on 
certain persons, or open closed doors, or perform some other marvel of this sort.”  But 
for Augustine it is all the same: 
As to Porphyry’s view that by means of herbs and stones and 
animals, and certain kinds of sounds and words and figures and 
drawings, and even by observing certain movements of the 
                                                       
538 quasdam mirabiliter pulchras … vel angelorum imagines vel deorum …. illud est, quod 
apostolus dicit: quoniam satanas transfigurat se uelut angelum lucis.  (ibid. 10.10).  Cf. 2 Cor. 
11.14. 
539 uerum quia tanta et talia geruntur his artibus, ut uniuersum modum humanae facultatis 
excedant … (De civ. D. 10.12). 
540 For an unsettling account on the fundamentally physiological mechanism by which daemons 
bring about pernicious dreams and visions, particularly Augustine’s conviction that every 
“movement of the soul” produces corporeal responses, which persists as  physiological 
dispositions (habitus) whose faintest traces (vestigia) may be exploited by keen‑scented daemonic 
agencies as media for insinuating daemonic thought, thus enabling daemons to intrude upon the 
imagination, see O’Daly (1987) 122‑123. 
541 sequitur tamen et ea … quae sobrie considerata tribui non possunt nisi malignis et fallacibus 
potestatibus. (De civ. D. 10.11). 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heavenly bodies in the turning heavens, man may create on earth 
powers capable of bringing about various effects: all such beliefs 
arise from the tricks which those same daemons play on the souls 
of those who are subject to them, creating delicious entertainment 
for themselves from the errors of mankind.542 
 
Augustine simply brushes aside Porphyry’s attempt to clear daemonic hierarchies from 
involvement in theurgy.  Since theurgy can purify only the spiritual part of the soul, 
which is the site of perception, it follows that any divinities stimulated by theurgic rites 
to bring about certain phantasms, events, or alterations in the world are actually creating 
only alterations in human perception that are illusory by definition.  The manipulation 
of objects or verbal formulae are thus little more than hallucinogenic, tending to confine 
the soul in a distracting material world.  The theurgist believes that his perception‑
altering acts are actually producing a meaningful outcome, when actually, given the 
nature of daemons, he merely confines himself in an endless cycle of material delusion.  
The very gesture of believing in such deceptive rites is itself an illusion foisted upon the 
practitioner by the deities presiding over the rites.  The whole process is a closed system 
within which the lowest part of the soul is entrapped by the lowest deities who can in no 
sense further the intellectual soul’s ascent to God. 
 
4. Christ as Perfect Embodied Mediation 
 
  Theurgy is thus merely a seductive, competing form a purification, lacking the 
substance that Augustine is willing to grant the philosophical schools,543 and making 
false promises for mediation of the soul’s ascent:   
                                                       
542 et quod ei uidetur herbis et lapidibus et animantibus et sonis certis quibusdam ac uocibus et 
figurationibus atque figmentis, quibusdam etiam obseruatis in caeli conuersione motibus 
siderum fabricari in terra ab hominibus potestates idoneas uariis effectibus exsequendis, totum 
hoc ad eosdem ipsos daemones pertinet ludificatores animarum sibimet subditarum et uoluptaria 
sibi ludibria de hominum erroribus exhibentes (ibid. 10.11). 
543 Philosophy is “too arduous for all save a few,” and since those who lack talent or access are so 
many, “more may be compelled to resort to these secret and illicit teachers of yours than to the 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These most impure daemons, pretending to be etherial gods, whose 
heralds and messenger you have become, have promised that 
those who are cleansed by the art of theurgy in the spiritual part 
of their soul shall not, indeed, return to the Father, but shall dwell 
above the aerial regions among the ethereal gods.544 
 
Theurgy’s capacity for mediation is ultimately an exotic lie, only a parody of a Platonic 
vision, and it is grounded in a superstitious devotion to a system of demonstrably false  
mediators.  In Christianity Augustine hopes to assert a form of mediation that is 
superior to both philosophy and theurgy, while retaining the demotic appeal that he 
senses in the latter. 
Concluding that humankind lacks capacity for wisdom adequate to produce a 
sage such as his proposed system of human mediation would require, Augustine resorts 
naturally to the Christian solution of the perfect god who assumes the burden of an 
earthly body, a Christology that works from the premise of perfect unity of divine Logos 
and fully human being, and which can be made to conform to the system of attributes 
taken from Apuleius.545  Since all men are miserable, “as is argued … more credibly and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Platonic schools.”  [philosophia] ardua nimis atque paucorum est … plures ad secretos et inlicitos 
magistros tuos, quam ad scholas platonicas uenire cogantur. (ibid. 10.11). 
544 hoc enim tibi inmundissimi daemones, deos aetherios se esse fingentes, quorum praedicator et 
angelus factus es, promiserunt, quod in anima spiritali theurgica arte purgati ad patrem quidem 
non redeunt, sed super aerias plagas inter deos aetherios habitabunt (ibid. 10.27). 
545 Augustinian Christology is akin to Origen’s account of the union of Christ’s soul with the 
Word in Princ., 2.6, where the mind / soul of Christ “is the medium of union between the Word 
and the flesh … inseparably united to the Word with such an intensity of affection and 
immediacy of intuition that becomes like the Word in every respect…” (TeSelle [1970] 148).  This 
approach had lost credibility after the condemnation of Paul of Samosata in 268, due to its 
adoptionist appearance, but rebounded after the condemnation of the Apollinarian heresy 
around 380, which had diminished the mediating, human aspects of the person of Christ (ibid. 
148).  To think in terms of moving from the idea of “sage” to the idea of Logos incarnate is in part 
to follow the trajectory of Augustine’s Christology, which departs from the idea of a “wise man 
participating in the Word,” and arrives at a Word incarnate (ibid. 147).  No doubt TeSelle is 
correct in recognizing, given the emphasis in this Christology on a human soul / mind that 
mediates the union between Logos and body, that “the kind of union Augustine envisaged, a 
unity mediated by a human mind, could involve, given his strongly Platonist psychology and 
epistemology, a perfect responsiveness of the human understanding and affections to the ideal 
plans contained in – indeed, equivalent with – the Word, and consequently a perfect coincidence 
between the ‘Word’ and the ‘man’” (154).  Miles (1979), pp. 88‑97,  follows the trajectory of 
Augustine’s thought, emphasizing his development of a more sophisticated category of persona, 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probably,” then the mediator in his system must be god as well as man, one who, “by 
the intervention of his blessed mortality, may lead men out of their mortal misery to a 
blessed immortality.”  In terms of Apuleius’ five qualities, what distinguishes this type 
of mediation from that offered by a hypothetical sage is that the mediator is 
characterized by  
transient mortality and everlasting blessedness, so that, in His 
transient condition, he might resemble those destined to die, and 
might translate them from their mortality into his everlasting 
condition.546 
 
A key difference in this Christian mediation is this provisional assumption of mortality.  
Angels cannot serve as mediators because their immortal blessedness removes them from 
the world of men; therefore a deliberately assumed, transient mortality is the essential 
disruption introduced into the carefully balanced system of qualities touching gods, 
daemons / angels, and mortals, supplying a bridge for wretched mortals that no sage or 
angel can provide.   
It is important to note that this modification of divine hierarchies is understood 
by Augustine to be effective precisely in inverse relation to the ineffectiveness of the same 
model when populated with daemonic mediators; that is to say, it remedies the key 
defects of the old system, construed in terms of the (five) attributes on loan from 
Apuleius.  The system is thus slightly altered, so that the retention of blessedness and 
the passage through mortality can be transferred to those who participate in his 
mediation: 
The immortal and miserable mediator interposes himself in order 
to prevent us from passing to a blessed immortality; for that 
                                                                                                                                                                    
which enables a union of divine and human nature without confusion (unio inconfusa); she, too, 
acknowledges the pivotal role of the human soul of Christ in effecting mediation: “The human 
soul of Christ is the locus of cohesion of the two natures and is the sine qua non of their unity” 
(96).  See also O’Connell (1968) for an account more emphatic of Augustine’s accomodation of the 
Plotinian narrative of the soul’s fall and repatriation in his Christology. 
546 … quod … credibilius et probabilius disputatur…. ut homines ex mortali miseria ad beatam 
inmortalitatem huius medii beata mortalitas interueniendo perducat…. habere oportuit 
transeuntem et beatitudinem permanentem, ut per id, quod transit, congrueret morituris, et ad 
id, quod permanet, transferret ex mortuis. (De civ. D. 9.15). 
232 
which impedes our passage, namely misery itself, persists in him.  
But the mortal and blessed Mediator interposed himself, so that, 
having passed through mortality, He might make the dead 
immortal by the power that He showed in his own resurrection, 
and bestow upon the miserable the blessedness which He Himself 
had never relinquished.547 
 
Augustine thus leaves the theoretical structure of mediation intact, asserting the 
superiority of a new, Christian mediation to a defective, Platonist and polytheist 
approach.  Not surprisingly, he also frames the issue comfortably in terms of 
philosophy’s normative aspiration for the soul, acknowledging Plotinus as the thinker 
who best defines the issue: “We must fly, therefore, to our beloved fatherland, where 
dwells both our father and all else.  What is the ship, then, and how are we to fly?  We 
must become like God.”548  Becoming like God is a challenging prospect for mortals since 
“the soul of man is unlike that incorporeal and immutable and eternal Being in 
proportion as it longs for temporal and mutable things.”  Augustine’s approach to 
mediation is intended to solve this problem, namely that “things below, which are 
mortal and impure, cannot approach the immortal purity which is above.”  Since 
diseased daemons counter‑productively long in their eternal wretchedness for “temporal 
and mutable things,” only Christ’s inversion of their bodily and psychic characteristics – 
his purity in soul and voluntary mortality in body – “can afford us aid which is truly 
divine in cleansing and redeeming us.”  Only Christ can bridge the incorporeal 
immutable and the corporeal perishable.549   
                                                       
547 ad hoc se quippe interponit medius inmortalis et miser, ut ad inmortalitatem beatam transire 
non sinat, quoniam persistit quod inpedit, id est ipsa miseria; ad hoc se autem interposuit 
mortalis et beatus, ut mortalitate transacta et ex mortuis faceret inmortales, quod in se 
resurgendo monstrauit, et ex miseris beatos, unde numquam ipse discessit (ibid. 9.15). 
548 ʺfugiendum est igitur ad carissimam patriam, et ibi pater, et ibi omnia.  quae igitur, inquit, 
classis aut fuga? similem deo fieriʺ (ibid. 9.17, paraphrasing Plotinus, Enn. 1.6.8 and 1.2.3.) 
549 incorporali uero illi aeterno et incommutabili tanto est anima hominis dissimilior, quanto 
rerum temporalium mutabiliumque cupidior…. inmortali puritati, quae in summo est, ea quae in 
imo sunt mortalia et inmunda conuenire non possunt…. mundandis liberandisque nobis uere 
diuinum praebeat adiutorium  (De civ. D. 9.17).  Augustine’s concern in the present context to 
assimilate his thought to an Apuleian template may tend to obscure his Christology’s embrace of 
a mediation that happens not simply because a particular man, a “sage,” has been assimilated to 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Naturally the nature of the divine embodiment resists any taint that contact with 
matter might impart:  “Far be it from the God Who is certainly immune from 
contamination to fear contamination from the humanity with which he clothed Himself, 
or from the men among whom He dwelt in human form!”  Since the incarnation is the 
uniting of full humanity to the Logos, it is immune to any ill effects potentially imparted 
by matter,550 while daemons, as lower creatures, remain vulnerable – an insight that 
vindicates two principles: that “true divinity cannot be contaminated by the flesh;“ and 
that “daemons are not to be thought better than ourselves because they have flesh.”551 
Christ’s perfectly assimilated soul enables the insulation of the Logos from taint, while 
the daemonic soul, given its characteristics, is drawn into the pollution and entrapment of 
materiality.  This assumption of full humanity enables Augustine to sidestep the issue of 
qualitatively graded materiality: mortals ascend to God through the mediation of a 
humanity fully assimilated to God, not through a series of ascending grades: 
This path [to God] is viewed as a corporeal only by the friends of 
the daemons, who arrange the elements like steps between the 
aetherial gods and earthly men, with the aerial daemons in the 
middle.  This is a view which is entirely false and full of error, for 
righteousness does not progress in this way; for we must rise up 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the Word (the logos‑anthropos theology in which a man has been simply subsumed into the 
Word), nor because the Word has assumed soulless matter (the logos‑sarx theology that de‑
emphasizes Christ the man), but because the human mind of Jesus has been “joined to and mixed 
with (copulatus, commixtus) the Word in a unity of person (div.qu., q. 73, 2; c.Faust.  XXII, 40; trin., 
IV, 13, 16 and 20, 30)” (TeSelle [1970] 149, with texts cited).   In the case of Christ, a singular 
human being “’[bears] the person’ of the Wisdom of God (agon., 20, 22)” and does so naturaliter 
rather than participatione (TeSelle [1970] 149, with texts cited).  See also Miles (1979) 90f.  The 
authentically mediating element is the mind or the soul of Christ, at one with the Word, where 
his fully human mind mediates participation in the Word for other human souls, when their 
minds are re‑cast in the image of his. 
550 In a larger sense, it is Augustine’s view of the mind of Christ as the mediating link between 
Word and flesh, that makes possible the claim that the Word is insulated from travails of 
embodiment, while nevertheless assuming embodiment for the salvation of humanity (TeSelle 
[1970] 149, noting  f.et sym., 4, 10; div.qu., q. 73 and q. 80; agon., 18, 20). 
551 qui profecto incontaminabilis deus absit ut contaminationem timeret ex homine quo indutus 
est, aut ex hominibus inter quos in homine conuersatus est…. nec carne posse contaminari ueram 
diuinitatem, nec ideo putandos daemones nobis esse meliores, quia non habent carnem (De civ. 
D. 9.17). 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to God not by ascending in body, but by coming to resemble him 
spiritually, that is incorporeally.552 
 
For a Christian to assert that we do not rise to God by “ascending in body” may seem a 
rather ill‑fitting claim, but it becomes clear that Augustine’s program for eliminating the 
daemonic requires his rejection of the one quality in which they stand superior to 
humans: the body.  Taken as a general principle, this can make Augustine appear 
extremely dualist and almost Gnostic, party to a view that sorts poorly with a full 
endorsement of human corporeality in the incarnation and resurrection; but his need to 
drive out the embodied daemons forces him to embrace a view of the body as, at best, a 
kind of value‑neutral substrate that can become the provisionally shared ground of God 
and man by virtue of the incarnation.   
Thus daemonic embodiment appears to drive Augustine toward a certain kind of 
dualism, whose logic appears to be that if daemons have bodies, then embodiment 
should be de‑emphasized in the economy of salvation.  This lingering anxiety is surely 
evident in Augustine’s apparent yearning to be altogether shed of the flesh as soon as 
possible.  “We might indeed,” he argues, “attribute too much merit to ourselves while in 
the flesh, were it not for the fact that we live subject to His pardon until we lay flesh 
aside.”  The incarnation itself thus becomes a divine kenosis wherein the flesh assumed 
by the Logos is a medium for the conduction or  transmission of the cleansing due the 
soul: “This is the reason  why grace has been bestowed upon us  through a Mediator, so 
that those who are defiled by sinful flesh might be cleansed ‘by the likeness of sinful 
flesh.’”553  Material flesh thus seems to be strictly a neutral medium endowed with a 
quality of conductivity, so that although human embodiment is a hindrance, through 
flesh the human soul may encounter the God who cleanses.   
                                                       
552 quando quidem et in ipsa uia corporali (quae falsissima est et plenissima erroris, qua non iter 
agit iustitia; quoniam non per corporalem altitudinem, sed per spiritalem, hoc est incorporalem, 
similitudinem ad deum debemus ascendere) ‑ in ipsa tamen uia corporali, quam daemonum 
amici per elementorum gradus ordinant inter aetherios deos et terrenos homines aeriis 
daemonibus mediis constitutis…. (ibid. 9.18). 
553 propterea ergo nobis per mediatorem praestita est gratia, ut polluti carne peccati carnis peccati 
similitudine mundaremur. (ibid. 10.22). Cf. Rom. 8.3. 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This tendency is evident in Augustine’s attempt to align the Trinity with the 
Platonic principia acknowledged by Porphyry.  He chastens Porphyry for his failure to 
recognize that the “Lord Christ is the principium by Whose incarnation we are cleansed,” 
arguing that Porphyry wrongly holds Christ in contempt because of his assumption of 
flesh.554  In the ensuing dispute over the plausibility of incarnation,555 Augustine explains 
the possibility of fleshly embodiment as mediating rather than hindering.  Christ the 
“good and true Mediator” has shown that 
it is sin which is evil, and not the substance or nature of flesh.  He 
showed that a body of flesh and a human soul could be assumed 
and retained without sin, and laid aside at death, and changed 
into something better by resurrection.556 
 
As ever, there are hints here of qualitatively superior bodies in resurrection, but 
Augustine endorses primarily a negative position: bodies do not necessarily have to do 
harm – a minimum position that he must maintain if Christ’s earthly body is to be 
asserted as a medium for the divine principium, which is the divine element that purifies 
and redeems, and which Augustine identifies with the Word: 
For it is not the flesh which is the principium, and not the human 
soul, but the Word, through Whom all things were made.  Thus, it 
is not the flesh as such which cleanses us.  What cleanses us is the 
Word that clothed itself in flesh when ‘the Word was made flesh 
and dwelt among us.’”557 
                                                       
554 … dominum christum esse principium, cuius incarnatione purgamur (De civ. D. 10.24). Cf. 
10.26, where Augustine chastens Porphyry for not recognizing in Christ the patrikos nous: “But 
you do not believe that this mind [nous] is Christ; for you despise Him because of the body that 
He received from a woman, and because of the shame of the Cross.”  Porphyry acknowledges 
three principles: God the Father; God the Son, conceived as the patrikos nous; and a “soul‑faculty.”  
Augustine suggests that Porphyry’s principles shadow a Trinitarian outlook, but that he fell short 
of conceding the full implications of his own though.  See O’Daly (1999)  129‑30. 
555 such as at 10.29, where Augustine argues from the shared premise that the intellectual soul 
“can become one in substance with the Mind of the Father” that it should be equally plausible 
that “the Son of God should assume one intellectual soul for the salvation of many.” 
556 … peccatum esse malum, non carnis substantiam uel naturam, quae cum anima hominis et 
suscipi sine peccato potuit et haberi, et morte deponi et in melius resurrectione mutari (De civ. D. 
10.24). 
557 neque enim caro principium est aut anima humana, sed uerbum per quod facta sunt omnia. 
non ergo caro per se ipsa mundat, sed per uerbum a quo suscepta est, cum uerbum caro factum 
est et habitauit in nobis (ibid. 10.24). Cf. John 1.3; 1.14. 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It would appear then that Augustine is pressed to endorse embodiment by the urgent 
need to supply the principium‑Logos with appropriate housing.  That housing supplied, 
the Word is then positioned to cleanse its votaries: “The principium, then, having 
assumed soul and flesh, purifies both the soul and flesh of those who believe in Him.” 
The ensuing “purified” flesh would presumably be “pure” in terms of its transparency 
to the work of the Logos, its capacity to “conduct” divine grace.  Daemons, though 
theoretically superior in body, are thus circumvented by the incarnate principium, who, 
unlike humanity – “carnal, infirm, guilty of sin, and wrapped in the darkness of 
ignorance” – is characterized rather by a human nature that was “righteous and not 
sinful.”558 
  The important concession in Augustine’s thinking here is that embodied material 
reality can mediate divinity, a point that he is at pains to reject in the case of the daemons, 
despite their unfortunately superior bodies.  This principle enables a cleansing based on 
humanity’s proximity to something that would otherwise be far removed: we “would be 
wholly unable to perceive this Principium unless we were cleansed and healed by 
him.”559  The incarnation of a principium thus concedes the possibility that a higher 
principle, mediated by embodiment, can potentially purify rather than merely distract 
the human soul, as the embodied daemons associated by Augustine with theurgy tend to 
do.  The implications of this for cult are considerable, as Augustine suggests by his 
insertion into the discussion of the principium of a comment on the eucharistic discourse 
in John’s gospel: 
For when, speaking in parables, Christ spoke of eating his flesh, 
and those who did not understand Him were offended, and went 
away saying, ‘This is a hard saying, who can hear it?’, He 
                                                       
558 carnales, infirmi, peccatis obnoxii et ignorantiae tenebris obuoluti … [natura humana] iusta, 
non peccatrix (De civ. D. 10.24). 
559 Cf. 10.29, where Augustine argues that by the incarnation “it was made possible for us to come 
to Him, Who was so far from us: to the immortal from the mortal; to the immutable from the 
mutable; to the righteous from the ungodly; to the blessed from the wretched.” 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answered those who remained: ‘It is the Spirit that quickeneth; the 
flesh profiteth nothing.’”560 
 
In interpreting this passage, Augustine, noting that Christ is “speaking in parables,” 
explains that those who depart lack the deeper insight that the consumption of the flesh 
is actually about mediated, corporeal access to the incorporeal “Spirit.”  The latter is of 
the essence, and the flesh important only insofar as it supplies an avenue of approach to 
the principium that has made itself accessible by assuming embodiment. 
  We shall return to this passage shortly, when aspects of Augustine’s 
understanding of Christian eucharistic cult will be under closer scrutiny; but central to 
his view of the eucharist is his evident intention here to frame the passage from John’s 
gospel as a conceptual parallel to the incarnation : just as the flesh incarnating the Logos 
is not an end to be vindicated in itself, but rather a neutral, purified mediating element, 
eliminating the interval between the human soul and the divine mind, likewise his 
reading of the eucharistic passage discloses the view that sacrament is no end in itself – 
“the flesh profiteth nothing” – but rather a purified, mediating element providing 
contact with the purifying principium‑Logos.  In the context, Augustine merely means to 
adduce an exemplum that replicates the reasoning that he has just applied to the 
incarnation itself.  
The suggestion of a parallel between incarnation and eucharist, in the context of 
a theory that vindicates corporeality as a conductor of divine principle, makes of the 
eucharist a mediating rite that would exceed every theurgic practice on offer.  The very 
prospect that the principle of the Logos might be a continuous healing presence 
somehow mystically attained through the sacred rite of the eucharist, prompts 
Augustine to upbraid Porphyry’s disciples, who along with their master foolishly 
believe that “the soul must leave behind all union with a body in order that the soul may 
dwell in blessedness with God.”561  In fact, argues Augustine, the pupils should correct 
the master, and remind him that  
                                                       
560 ibid. 10.24. 
561 … omne corpus esse fugiendum, ut anima possit beata permanere cum deo (ibid. 10.29). 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following Plato, you [Platonists] say that the world is an animal, 
and a most blessed animal; and you wish also to say that it is 
everlasting.  How, therefore, is it never to be released from a body, 
and yet never to lack blessedness, if, in order for the soul to be 
blessed, the body must be left behind?562 
 
A similar argument is advanced concerning the sun and the other stars, in a manner 
immediately reminiscent of Origen.  If the sun and stars are both embodied and blessed, 
and if they are eternally so, how must separation from a body be required for 
blessedness?563  Augustine is also fully aware that the incarnation and resurrection force 
this position upon him, noting that the Logos was not only blessedly incarnate, but that 
after Christ’s death he was raised up, “changed by the resurrection into something 
better, because now no longer mortal but incorruptible….”564; and furthermore, that 
believers may come to participate in resurrection in just such an embodied state:  
We do not in the least doubt that those [resurrection] bodies will be 
everlasting, and that they will be of the kind demonstrated in the 
example of Christ’s resurrection …. We preach that they will be 
entirely incorruptible and immortal, and that they will in no way 
hinder the contemplation by which the soul is fixed upon God.565 
 
Augustine thus may pretend not to endorse a graded scale of material embodiment – as 
his rejection of daemons requires – but he plainly must endorse the idea that material 
embodiment may become transparent to the effects of spiritual purification.  With 
embodiment thus established, it remains for Augustine to delineate a cult option that 
may replace the cult of embodied daemons whose intermediate state is only a barrier to 
mediation.  His reference to the eucharistic discourse in John, with its emphasis on 
                                                       
562 platone quippe auctore animal esse dicitis mundum et animal beatissimum, quod uultis esse 
etiam sempiternum.  quo modo ergo nec umquam soluetur a corpore, nec umquam carebit 
beatitudine, si, ut beata sit anima, corpus est omne fugiendum? (ibid. 10.29). 
563 ibid. 10.29. 
564 … in melius resurrectione mutatum iam incorruptibile neque mortale… (ibid. 10.29). 
565 [corpora] futura tamen sempiterna minime dubitamus, et talia futura, quale sua resurrectione 
christus daemonstrauit exemplum. sed qualiacumque sint, cum incorruptibilia prorsus et 
inmortalia nihiloque animae contemplationem, qua in deo figitur, inpedientia praedicentur… 
(ibid. 10.29). 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consumed “flesh” that opens access to Spirit, already hints at how this new scheme of 
cult mediation might appear. 
 
5. Eucharist as Sign: A Sign Theory of Language Applied to Cult 
 
Before proceeding to the argument that Augustine is deploying the term signum 
in a sacrificial or ritual context in a manner suggestive of theurgy, it should first be 
noted that, as is the case with a term like symbolon, in signum we are dealing with a term 
that for Augustine derives primarily from a theory of language.566  Just as the symbolon 
has a history as an exegetical term, before thinkers like Origen or Iamblichus could 
apply it to material realities as “texts,” so signum finds its primary use as a term of the 
sign‑theory that grounds Augustine’s theory of language.  For the present argument, it is 
critical to understand how, for Augustine, the spoken “word” (verbum) functions as a 
“sign” (signum) of “things” (res) by transmitting thoughts and mental states (motus animi, 
cogitationes, notiones) from one mind to another.  To understand the spoken “word” as 
bearing this inner content, and to recognize Augustine applying this concept as an 
analog to eucharist, is to begin to grasp how, for Augustine, the sacramental sign 
(sacramentum / signum), in “signifying” (significare) “sacrifice” (sacrificium), actually 
mediates the substantive content of the latter to ritual participants, rather than merely 
allegorically marking ethical abstractions. To this end, two important points can be 
drawn from Augustine’s earlier writings: first, Augustine’s believe that words signify 
“things” (res), and second, that each word in any verbal formulation bears from the 
mind of the speaker to the mind of the recipient its own distinct inner content, which is 
the idea or concept of the “thing” signified – ultimately the “inner word” of Augustine’s 
theory. 
                                                       
566 The scholarship on Augustinian sign theory is extensive.  See Kirwan (2001); Stock (1996); 
Markus (1996, 1957); Pollmann (1996); Rist (1994); Mayer (1974, 1969). 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The works in which Augustine can be seen working out his sign‑theory are the 
early De Dialecta,567 De Magistro (389), and De Doctrina Christiana.568  De Magistro and De 
Doctrina Christiana are both concerned to map the ways in which one mind’s contents 
may be transmitted to another, consistent with Augustine’s fundamental understanding 
that words have been instituted among men precisely to enable the transmission of 
thoughts (cogitationes) between them.569  In De Doctrina Christiana he asserts that words 
are signs of things (res), and furthermore, that their only role is to signify.570  
Distinguishing between “natural” signs (naturalia) and “given” signs (data), he classes 
words as the primary, though not the only instance of latter category.571  Augustine 
characterizes that which is transmitted in terms of state of mind: “thoughts”; whatever 
may be “conceived in the mind that anyone may wish to communicate”; the “will”; the 
“impulses of our mind.”572  Signs thus convey states of mind, though Augustine believes 
that they signify “things” (res), where a “thing is whatever is sensed or understood or 
hidden.” The sign in such a case – “one that can be comprised of letters” – reveals both 
itself and “something beyond itself” to its recipient.573  This treatment is from the early, 
unfinished textbook De dialectica, but we recognize it in the later De magistro, in the 
assertion that “a word is a sign of any kind of thing,” the continuation of the same idea 
of a one‑one correspondence between individual words and “things,” the concepts of 
                                                       
567 Of uncertain authorship, though consensus leans toward Augustine, who identifies himself at 
7.13, and who lists in his Retractationes (1.6) a work on dialectic among the disciplinarum libri 
begun in Milan, and that he claims left unfinished prior to his return to Africa [388].  Texts cited 
in Kirwan (2001) 190‑91. 
568 The latter was begun late in the fourth century and not likely completed for over a quarter 
century. 
569 ench. 22.7.  Text quoted in Kirwan (2001) 190. 
570 1.2.2.  Text quoted in ibid. 191. 
571 2.1.2‑2.2.3.  Text quoted in ibid. 
572 ench. 22.7; doc.chr. 2.3.4; mag. 1.2; doc.chr. 2.1.2.  Texts cited in Kirwan, who notes, “According to 
Augustine … speech is a means of mind exposure, and speakers expose their minds by giving 
signs of their minds contents” (192). 
573 De dialectica 5.7.  Text quoted in Kirwan (2001) 193. 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which can be conveyed from one mind to another by the signing word – as the insistence 
on parsing the inner conceptual content of each word in a line of the Aeneid shows.574 
Augustine’s theory is not Stoic, though it does show evidence of Stoic influence.  
The manner in which he adapts Stoic terms is important insofar as it shapes his idea of 
the “inner word,” which in turn makes his theory sufficiently pliant to be brought to 
bear on a theory of sacramental signing.   His incomplete De dialectica appears to have 
been composed to some degree as a response to Stoic thought,575 whose sign‑theory is 
perhaps most famously expressed by Sextus Empiricus.  In it, three items are said to be 
linked: “the thing signified, the thing that signifies, and the thing come upon [to 
tunchanon].”  In a given case, the thing signified is “the very state of affairs [pragma] 
revealed by an utterance,” which is apprehended “as it subsists in accordance with our 
thought”; the thing that signifies is “an utterance [phone]”; and the thing come upon is 
the “external subject [ektos hupokeimenon].”576  In the example given, the uttered name 
“Dio” does not signify the person Dio – who would be the “external subject” [ektos 
hupokeimenon]; nor does it signify a “thought” of Dio in the mind of a hearer; rather, it 
signifies a “state of affairs” that accords with the thought of whosoever comprehends 
the sign.  The Stoic term for such “states of affairs [pragamata]” is lekta, “sayables,” which 
are regarded as incorporeal and external to the mind.  Interestingly, the term is not 
translated into Latin except perhaps as dicibile in the De Dialectica of Augustine,577 where 
he lays out what initially appear to be loosely analogous terms: verbum, dicibile, res – 
adding the additional term of dictio.  In Augustine’s account, a verbum is classed as a 
dictio when it refers to an external res (rather than to itself, as it might when under a 
grammarian’s scrutiny); as a dictio, it is understood to convey to the hearer the dicibile 
that reposes in the speakers mind, and that is conveyed to the hearer’s upon utterance.  
Dicibilia are this the “mental counterpart of words,” which “become dictiones on 
                                                       
574 ibid. 193‑194 
575 See ibid. 196. It is surely of further interest that Diogenes Laertius notes Chrysippus’ definition 
of “dialectic” as the science of “what signifies and what is signed” (Lives of the Philosophers 7.62.  
Text cited in Kirwant [2001] 196). 
576 Adversos mathematicos 8.12.  Text quoted in Kirwan (2001) 196. 
577 5.7‑8.  Text quoted in ibid. 197‑98. 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utterance.”578  The dicibile, however, although Augustine may have derived it from the 
Stoic lekton, is not its equivalent, since Augustine insists on identifying it with mental 
conceptions and thoughts – the mental counterparts of the verbum.  For Stoics, they are 
incorporeal and external to the mind.  What is more, since Augustine expressly declares 
that verba are signs and res are signified, the dicibilia do not play a functional role in the 
process of signification as they do for the Stoics, in Augustine’s theory seeming rather to 
substantify the signifying verbum (=dictio) as its intellectual content.579   
Augustine’s outlook thus appears not precisely Stoic, but it does bear this 
interesting notion of  the dicibile as idea or conception that seems to haunt the articulated 
word as its intellectual content.  The term would not recur in Augustine’s later writings, 
but the concept would, as in the dialogue De Quantitate Animae (387 / 388), where he 
suggests that the articulated word is “made up” (constet) of “sound and signification” in 
such a way that “the sound reaches the ears but the signification reaches the mind,” and 
where the “signification” is understood to stand in relation to the sounded word as the 
soul of a living thing stands in relation to its body.580  This account retains many of the 
attributes of Augustine’s treatment in the De Dialectica, though it prefers terms like notio 
and cogitatio to dicibile as designators of the pre‑articulate thought‑content of the verbum.  
The new element is the conception of words as composites of sound and signification, 
where the latter is understood as the incorporeal thought inhabiting the mind prior to 
utterance, and animating the verbal utterance, almost as its incorporeal soul.  It is not 
unreasonable to speculate that Augustine developed this notion of “inner words” from 
contemplating the word of God, conceived as incorporeal and therefore soundless, and 
that such reflection prompted him to devise a notion of pre‑articulate “inner” word that 
may be articulated in any of a range of languages, depending on the target audience – 
that is, the inner word that is not even a particular word.581  It is certainly an enticing 
                                                       
578 ibid. 199.   
579 ibid. 199. 
580 quant.  32.65‑66.  Text quoted by Kirwan (2001) 200. 
581 Kirwan (2001) 200‑201. 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idea that word of God might inhabit outer forms – whether conceived in terms of 
spoken words or otherwise. 
My point here is not to criticize Augustine’s theory – whether as an instance of 
speech‑thought isomorphism or otherwise582 – requiring “a one‑one correspondence 
between the elements of a sentence … and the elements of thought signified by that 
sentence”; rather, I mean to suggest that Augustine’s apparently high level of confidence 
in the capacity of the verbum‑signum both to signify “things” (res), and to mediate cleanly 
the substantive, incorporeal concepts of those things from one mind to another by the 
tenuous mechanism of the spoken word, can illuminate how it is that eucharistic 
sacrament may convey a reality by “signifying” it, a process to which Augustine 
deliberately applies the spoken word as a parallel. 
When he first approaches the question, though, Augustine evinces little interest 
in asserting the viability of materiality in conveying such substance; rather, keeping the 
argument within the parameters of the assertion that Christ affords his votaries aid that 
is “cleansing and redeeming,”  he prefers to assert that Christian worship may be 
conceived in terms of two options, conceived as equally potent ways of offering the 
worship that his due to God: “To Him, we owe the service [servitus] which in Greek is 
called latreia, whether this be expressed through certain sacraments [sacramentis] or 
performed within our own selves.”583  His instinctive preference is for the latter of the 
two, since latreia offered up from the bottomless subjectivity of the self removes the 
prospect of tainting Christianity with pagan associations.  He prefers rather to make of 
the faithful a metaphorical temple housing internal spiritual transformation: “For we are 
his temple, each of us and every one of us together, since He deigns to dwell both in the 
whole harmonious body and in each of us singly.”584  No cult ritual is required where 
the faithful are the temple, and the other tangibles of religion likewise may be 
                                                       
582 as Kirwan does, presumably rightly. 
583 huic nos seruitutem, quae λατρεία graece dicitur, siue in quibusque sacramentis siue in nobis 
ipsis debemus (De civ. D. 10.3). 
584 huius enim templum simul omnes et singuli templa sumus, quia et omnium concordiam et 
singulos inhabitare dignatur (ibid. 10.3). 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systematically rendered superfluous or figurative: “Our heart is His altar when we lift it 
up to Him…. We sacrifice bleeding victims to him when we strive for His truth even 
unto blood.”585  Other appurtenances are similarly transformed into figurations of 
spiritual ascent.  The faithful become “sweetest incense” when they “burn in His sight 
with godly and holy love.”586  Holidays and sacred festivals, to the extent that they have 
any meaning at all, are kept merely as memorials to divine benefaction.  “Upon the altar 
of our hearts” we offer “the sacrifice of humility and praise,” as we “re‑choose” – 
[religentes] a speculative etymology for religio – the God we had lost through the fall.587  
Indeed, the term sacrificium itself designates a “divine thing,” even if in a trivial sense it 
is an act “performed or offered by man.”588  In all such instances the stuff of religious 
cult is neutralized, a move that Augustine justifies by privileging the soul’s final 
incorporeal good, which is “nothing other than to cling to Him, by Whose incorporeal 
embrace alone the intellectual soul is, if one may so put it, filled up and impregnated 
with true virtues” – a formulation that emphasizes the sought after end over the 
mechanism of its attainment.589   
  Given such a tendency, it should occasion no surprise that Augustine seems 
deliberately to deploy the language of sign [signum] in an almost excessively figurative 
manner.  For him, such terms initially appear to operate in the category of allegory, the 
grounds for such use being that in requiring sacrifices, God never truly intended the 
tangible acts described, but rather the spiritual dispositions that such acts can be said to 
represent.  At bottom, the basis for this claim is the Platonic argument that God gains 
nothing from sacrifices, which supply no divine need or deficiency.  “Who could be so 
foolish,” Augustine asks, “as to suppose that the things offered to God in sacrifice are 
                                                       
585 cum ad illum sursum est, eius est altare cor nostrum … ei cruentas uictimas caedimus, quando 
usque ad sanguinem pro eius ueritate certamus (ibid. 10.3). 
586 [eum] suauissimo [adolemus] incenso, cum in eius conspectu pio sanctoque amore flagramus 
(ibid. 10.3). 
587 [ei sacrificamus] hostiam humilitatis et laudis in ara cordis.... 
588 etsi enim ab homine fit uel offertur, tamen sacrificium res diuina est (ibid. 10.6). 
589 nullum est aliud quam illi cohaerere, cuius unius anima intellectualis incorporeo, si dici potest, 
amplexu ueris impletur fecundaturque uirtutibus. (ibid. 10.3). 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necessary to Him for some purposes of His own?”  The philosophical argument is also 
scriptural: “I have said to the Lord, Thou art my God: for Thou needest not my 
goodness.”590  Whether one’s claims are based on Greek philosophy or biblical wisdom, 
the conclusion remains the same: God “has no need of cattle, or of any other corruptible 
and earthly thing, or even of man’s goodness.”  The corollary, as Augustine puts it, is 
that “everything which is done in rightly worshipping God is of profit not to God, but to 
man.”591   
  The fact that the sacrifices prescribed by ancient Jewish law had long been 
jettisoned makes such an approach convenient for Augustine.  The absence of such 
sacrifices had long pressed exegetes to apply alternative interpretive paradigms to the 
scriptural texts that initially imposed them, making it thus a straightforward project to 
supply figurative meanings on the acts prescribed in the Old Testament.  Augustine 
clarifies the manner in which such ancient sacrifices are to be understood by figuratively 
deploying the term signum – the “sacred sign” [sacrum signum]: 
The people of God now read of these [sacrifices], but they do not 
perform them.  We are to understand these things simply as 
symbols of what we are to do now for the purpose of drawing 
near to God…. A sacrifice as commonly understood therefore, is 
the visible sacrament [sacramentum] of an invisible sacrifice; that 
is, it is a sacred symbol [sacrum signum].592 
 
He further supports this narrow focus on inner disposition rather than sacrificial act 
with reference to the psalmist, who cries out, “Thou desirest not sacrifice, else I would 
give it: Thou delightest not in burnt offerings.  The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a 
                                                       
590 dixi domino, dominus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges (Psalm 1.2, apud De 
civ. D. 10.5). 
591 non solum igitur pecore uel qualibet alia re corruptibili atque terrena, sed ne ipsa quidem 
iustitia hominis deus egere credendus est, totumque quod recte colitur deus homini prodesse, 
non deo. (De civ. D. 10.5). 
592 … quae nunc dei populus legit, non facit, aliud intellegendum est, nisi rebus illis eas res fuisse 
significatas, quae aguntur in nobis, ad hoc ut inhaereamus deo…. sacrificium ergo uisibile 
inuisibilis sacrificii sacramentum, id est sacrum signum est. (ibid. 10.5). 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broken and contrite heart the Lord will not despise.”593  Despite the fact that a Christian 
biblical hermeneutic conveniently requires this shift to figurative meanings, it is not 
difficult to discern why Augustine might resort here to such traditions of exegesis, since 
such a move enables him to exploit Christianity’s rejection of ancient Jewish practices as 
a wedge to drive between Christian and pagan practice.  The ritual sacrifice, in this view, 
is merely a metaphor for an attitude of obeisance toward God; the ritual acts described 
are a “visible sacrament” [visibile sacramentum] – an outward sign [signum] – of an 
“invisible sacrifice” [invisibile sacrificium] which turns out to be rather as vaporous as an 
intention or an attitude.  At its most illuminating, such an approach to “sacrifice” only 
reveals the degree to which devotees should give themselves over to God, with 
martyrdom as the extreme instance, as the blood of sacrifice in such narratives is meant 
to suggest: “We sacrifice bleeding victims to him when we strive for His truth even unto 
blood.”  But even then, the sacrifice remains ritually insignificant, and serves only as an 
instructive indicator of how a believer is to surrender even his life blood unto God.  
Once an attitude, or disposition of faith is attained – once the believer attains a “broken 
spirit” as his own orientation –  then the narrative or description of sacrifice is exhausted 
of meaning, since the acts described are finally empty of any meaningful ritual 
substance. 
  Such allegorical reading of biblical texts seems natural enough for a Christian 
thinker; more devious, though, is this seemingly deliberate sanitizing of the signum.  
Here we are far from the lexicon of theurgy, where the term symbolon expands from 
exegetical contexts and comes to denote inner formal principles made manifest, linked to 
divine activity, and given perfect, outward, material expression.  Outer manifestation is 
thus linked closely to inner, ultimate reality.  This sense of symbolon is also a shade of 
meaning that Origen is happy to embrace, declaring that far from being outdone by 
traditionalist pagans, Christians too can lay claim to a symbolon in their eucharistic 
bread.  Augustine, on the other hand, rather than linking outer expression and inner 
                                                       
593 si uoluisses, inquit, sacrificium, dedissem utique; holocaustis non delectaberis.  sacrificium deo 
spiritus contritus; cor contritum et humiliatum deus non spernet. (ibid. 10.5). 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reality in any substantive way, proceeds with the intention of sundering the two.  Ritual 
act as mere metaphor – sacrifice that effects or mediates nothing in itself – is now a 
“sacred sign.”  Furthermore, the sacrificial act with which God is not particularly 
concerned is now “a symbol [signum] of the one that He does desire.”594  Indeed, “all the 
divine commandments … which we read concerning the many kinds of sacrifice offered 
in the ministry of the tabernacle or the temple, are to be interpreted symbolically 
[significando], as referring to love of God and neighbor.”595  Charity and contrite hearts 
replace ritual act, and for Augustine, eager to escape any cultic association of 
Christianity and paganism, the terminology of the “sign” now handily designates ritual 
acts emptied of substantial content and read simply in metaphorical, didactic terms.   
Ever engaged with scripture, Augustine finds his idea conveniently vindicated 
everywhere.  Doing good is the sacrifice required by God, according to the Apostle: “To 
do good and to communicate, forget not: for with such sacrifices God is well pleased.”  
When the prophet Hosea gives God to declare, “I desire mercy, not sacrifice,” Augustine 
is content to infer that “nothing else is meant than that one kind of sacrifice is preferred 
to another; for that which men call a sacrifice is only a symbol [signum] of the true 
sacrifice.”596  So powerful in fact does Augustine find this idea that he even transforms it 
into the original divine motive for demanding sacrifice in the first instance, asserting 
that the texts in the Law were never actually meant to refer to the acts that they describe: 
For if He did not want the sacrifice that He does require … to be 
symbolised [significari] by those sacrifices which He was thought to 
desire for His own pleasure, then surely He would not have 
commanded in the old Law that the latter were to be offered.597 
 
                                                       
594 illo igitur quod eum nolle dixit, hoc significatur, quod eum uelle subiecit (ibid. 10.5). 
595 quaecumque … in ministerio tabernaculi siue templi multis modis de sacrificiis leguntur 
diuinitus esse praecepta, ad dilectionem dei et proximi significando referuntur (ibid. 10.5). 
596 “bene facere,” inquit, “et communicatores esse nolite obliuisci; talibus enim sacrificiis placetur 
deo”; “misericordiam uolo quam sacrificium.” nihil aliud quam sacrificium sacrificio praelatum 
oportet intellegi; quoniam illud, quod ab omnibus appellatur sacrificium, signum est ueri 
sacrificii. Heb. 13.16, Hos. 6,6 apud De civ. D. 10.5, with emphasis added. 
597 nam si ea sacrificia quae uult … nollet eis sacrificiis significari, quae uelut sibi delectabilia 
desiderare putatus est: non utique de his offerendis in lege uetere praecepisset (De civ. D. 10.5). 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If God had not originally required mercy, he’d never have required the killing of calves!  
Put more charitably, God’s original or ultimate intentions already embrace the need for 
figurative interpretation.  Furthermore, Augustine can assume such a unanimity in the 
serious intellectual community on the question of divine impassibility and the sheer 
emptiness of tangible sacrifice, that surely the only conceivable explanation for the 
presence of injunction to ritual sacrifice in Old Testament Law is an original intent that 
already embraces allegorical or figurative reading. 
  From Augustine’s re‑casting of sacrifice in terms of a virtuous inner state, and 
deliberate sundering of the idea of signum –  symbolon from any inner content, it is but a 
short step to viewing the individual human being as a figurative sacrifice – or perhaps a 
literal martyr, as hinted above – who offers himself to God.  The Apostle himself, as 
Augustine notes, endorses the theory that the body can be seen in figurative sacrificial 
terms,598 and when yoked to with the familiar Pauline notion that the community of 
believers is in some sense Christ’s body, with Christ himself as head, it further makes 
sense to conceptualize this self‑offering as somehow mirroring or bringing to full 
fruition the sacrifice of Christ himself: 
The redeemed city – the whole congregation and fellowship of the 
saints – is offered to God as a universal sacrifice for us through the 
Great High Priest Who, in His Passion, offered even Himself for 
us in the form of a servant, so that we might be the body of so 
great a head.599 
 
As often, a Christ who is both priest and offering embraces the faithful in their self‑
sacrifice by virtue of the fact that, in the view of Pauline thought, they constitute his 
body.  It is precisely here, though, where the question arises as to just how that 
collective, mystical participation in Christ is effected, that Augustine’s sundering of 
signum and sacrificium may begin to break down.  Augustine suggests that this conjoined 
                                                       
598 Cf. Rom. 6.11 apud De civ. D. 10.6. 
599 …[ut] tota ipsa redempta ciuitas, hoc est congregatio societasque sanctorum, uniuersale 
sacrificium offeratur deo per sacerdotem magnum, qui etiam se ipsum obtulit in passione pro 
nobis, ut tanti capitis corpus essemus, secundum formam serui (De civ. D. 10.6). 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self‑offering, predicated on the possibility of being “one body in Christ”600 and thereby 
participant in the mediation that the High Priest offers, “is the sacrifice [sacrificium] 
which the Church continually celebrates in the sacrament of the altar, by which she 
demonstrates that she herself is offered in the offering that she makes to God.”601  The 
self‑oblation of believers, mediated through Christ’s high priesthood, is the church’s 
daily offering, an alignment that re‑unites sacrificium to the tangible work of the altar, 
and implies that the signum is something more concrete, and that substance of sacrificium 
is not to be so easily separated from its outward signum. 
  Paul’s assertion that “the sacrifice of Christians” consists precisely in this being 
somehow “one body” at first satisfies Augustine’s inclination to read sacrifice in 
primarily spiritual, rather than ritual terms, but his insistence on seeing this “unified 
body” in the eucharist forces a reconfiguration of his terms.  It is simply by no means 
clear that a eucharistic sacrificium may be read in the same allegorical manner that he 
brings to bear on Old Testament sacrificium.  When the altar is re‑introduced, the 
allegorizing disposition must to some degree be banished, and the terms signum and 
sacrificium re‑thought in their tangible, ritual dimension, eager though Augustine has 
been to downplay that aspect of his terminology earlier.  We do see him lean toward this 
more tangible aspect when, in rejecting sacrifice to angelic beings, he asserts that “in 
sacrificing, we offer visible sacrifice only to Him to Whom, in our hearts, we ought to 
present ourselves as an invisible sacrifice,” a statement that at least does not exclude 
tangible offering.602  Such a formulation grants an explicit distinction, while likewise 
implying a link between invisible and visible sacrifice, such that the latter is not reduced 
to a metaphor for the former; and this “visible sacrifice” is certainly the sacrifice “which 
the Church continually celebrates” and by which she is united to Christ’s self‑oblation, 
namely, the Church’s eucharistic ritual.  Augustine confirms this identification as he 
                                                       
600 “This is the sacrifice of Christians: ‘We, being many, are one body in Christ.’”; hoc est 
sacrificium christianorum: multi unum corpus in christo (ibid. 10.6; cf. Rom. 12.3f.). 
601 quod etiam sacramento altaris fidelibus noto frequentat ecclesia, ubi ei daemonstratur, quod in 
ea re, quam offert, ipsa offeratur. (De civ. D. 10.6).   
602 … ita sacrificantes non alteri uisibile sacrificium offerendum esse nouerimus quam illi, cuius in 
cordibus nostris inuisibile sacrificium nos ipsi esse debemus. (ibid. 10.19). 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returns to the theme of Christ’s mediation, noting the latter’s intention “that there 
should be a daily sign [sacramentum cotidianum] of this in the sacrament of the Church’s 
sacrifice [sacrificium],”603 on the grounds that the Church is instructed to regard herself as 
offered through Christ.  The introduction of such a precise formulation, makes it clear 
that that Augustine has discarded or at least substantially modified his previous use of 
terms such as “sign” and “sacrament” to designate the metaphorical, pedagogical 
function of sacrificial acts, shaping them in accordance with a new approach, in which 
the sign / sacrament [signum / sacramentum] actually signify the sacrifice [sacrificium] of 
the Church in a manner which makes real the unity of all believers in the death of Christ.  
If Christ incarnate enables an embodied encounter with divine principium – i.e., with the 
inner, invisible Logos – and if Christ resurrected is the prototype of the believer’s 
resurrection body; and furthermore, if the sacrifice of the church is understood to reify 
the notion of Christ and all believers as “one body,”  then surely the language of “sign” 
must read as efficiently linked to the content of “sacrifice.”  For participation to be real, 
the rite must be more than metaphor.  
We might see the beginnings of a move in this direction in Augustine’s interest in 
extending the range of what is signified in Old Testament rites beyond spiritual 
disposition, to include the Christian sacrifice that they portend: “the sacrifices of the 
holy men of old were the many and various signs of this true sacrifice.”604  Here the 
ancient sacrifices commended by scripture are not merely to be read figuratively as 
outward signs of inward attitudes, but as obscure “signs” of a later, outward “sign” – as 
the signs of a sign, where hindsight reveals those more ancient sacrifices as anticipatory 
of the Church’s true sacrifice.  Such a collocation suggests strongly that the 
comparatively imperfect gestures of Old Testament sacrifice have been replaced by the 
perfect and substantive sacrifice of the church – a different matter from merely 
signifying inner states.  In the new framework, we are within a conceptual framework in 
which religious acts have an implied ritual force, and resist mere dissolution into ethical 
                                                       
603 cuius rei sacramentum cotidianum esse … ecclesiae sacrificium… (ibid. 10.20). 
604 …huius ueri sacrificii multiplicia uariaque signa erant sacrificia prisca sanctorum (ibid. 10.20). 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symbolism.  As such, when we observe Augustine’s thinking on the Christian rite 
unfolding, we plainly may not assume that signum functions merely as a metaphor to 
suggest some inner state.  Although he may sometimes appear disposed to yearn for a 
world in which no formal rites of mediation are necessary – so that “sacrifice” is 
achieved merely in purity of heart – such a principle simply cannot inform his 
interpretation of Christian eucharist, in large part because he has so diligently 
implicated the community of believers as meaningful participants in the Church’s daily  
sacramentum / signum, which is the Church’s sacrificium.  There is simply too much 
substantive involvement here, in terms of the destiny of believers, for the Church’s 
sacrifice to be merely metaphor, a pedagogical prompt or an allegorized “text” for some 
sought‑after inner state.  The key to this “something more” that the eucharist must be 
lies in Augustine’s reconfiguration of the eucharistic “sign” as parallel to the signing 
word. 
Augustine makes his substantive move in urging that “visible sacrifices are 
symbols [signa] of invisible ones in the way that the words we speak are signs of 
things.”605  The very deployment of such a parallel strongly suggests Logos theology, but 
we should take care lest we confuse the Logos of God with a spoken word, and it is very 
clear that Augustine here speaks of the latter.  Perhaps – employing for a moment the 
Logos of God in place of the parallel of a spoken word – the outward sign might be 
conceived as standing in a relationship to a signified reality in a manner that is 
analogous to the Logos’ re‑presentation of God the Father, in which the Word is a distinct 
hypostasis but remains no less God.  This is an appealing idea, and Augustine’s thought 
on language is plainly, as we have seen, shadowed by the influence of the Word of God, 
perhaps to the point of his development of a theory of an “inner,” unspoken word.  But 
we should adhere to the figure that Augustine actually employs: that built on the 
relationship between a spoken word as a “sounded sign” [sonantia signa] of the things 
[res] signified, in parallel to “visible sacrifices” (sacraments) as “signs” [signa] of invisible 
                                                       
605 … haec [visibilia sacrificia] ita signa esse illorum [invisibilium sacrificiorum], sicut uerba 
sonantia signa sunt rerum (ibid. 10.19). 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sacrifices.  The inference that is to be drawn is that Augustine is placing the outward 
“sign” of the eucharist on the same plane with the reality of its inner “sacrifice” that it 
represents.  Seen in relation to Augustine’s sign theory of language, whose formulaic 
assertion of the relationship of signum‑res is here perfectly replicated, it is clear 
Augustine means to suggest – despite his earlier tendency to evacuate biblical “signs” of 
tangible content – that the visible sign, in signifying an invisible reality, bears within itself 
a substance that it conveys from point of origin to recipient, in the way that a spoken 
word (dictio) bears its inner conceptual content (dicibile) with complete transparency to a 
hearer; i.e., the substantive content of the “invisible sacrifice” is equally substantively 
borne by the sign to those who receive it.  Just as word bears the concept of a thing, 
transmitting from one mind to another, and establishing it as equally present to the 
recipient, just so the outward sign of the eucharist  bears a content that makes present in 
equal degree for the recipient the inner sacrifice that it signifies.  
Other assertions of “word” as parallel are even more suggestive.  We find the 
figure again in the context of Augustine’s discussion of Old Testament theophanies, 
where the purpose of the argument is to assert that God can come into an immediate 
contact with humanity without elaborate hierarchies of mediation.  The theophanies 
may thus be seen as instances in which God has become manifest in the world even 
prior to the incarnation.  Here Augustine suggests that God, who can be perceived in his 
essence only by the intellect, can nevertheless make himself perceptible.  In defense of this 
idea, he again deploys the signum‑res theory: 
Nor should it disturb us that God, though invisible, should often 
have appeared in visible form to the patriarchs.  For just as the 
sound by which we hear a thought which was first formulated in 
the silence of the mind is not itself a thought, so the aspect under 
which God is seen even though He is by nature invisible is not the 
same thing as God Himself.  It is however, He Himself Who is 
seen, just as the thought itself is heard in the sound of the voice; 
and the patriarchs were not ignorant of the fact that, even though 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the bodily form was not God, they nonetheless saw the invisible 
God.606 
 
Again the same principles are evident, and if anything Augustine works out their 
implications more forcefully.  God, he argues, can be materially present in the world in 
the same way that a pre‑articulate thought can be fully manifested and conveyed by a 
spoken word.  “The sound by which we hear a thought” is a spoken word (verbum‑
dictio); the “thought first formulated in the silence of the mind” is the mental concept 
(dicibile) of the thing signified (res) that is conveyed by the spoken word, but which is not 
itself that word.  The distinction should bring to mind immediately Augustine’s 
assertion in De Quantitate Animae that the articulated word is “made up” (constet) of 
“sound and signification” in such a way that “the sound reaches the ears but the 
signification reaches the mind.”  In the present passage “the thought is heard in the 
sound of the voice,” by which Augustine plainly means that insofar as the spoken word 
conveys the thought to the receiving mind, it is to be regarded as that thought made 
manifest.  It is distinct from the thought (dictio is distinct from dicibile), but it is 
nevertheless the thought rendered audible.  In exactly the same manner, theophanies 
bifurcate into a material manifestation – the “visible form” of God,  “the aspect under 
which God is seen” – and an inner signification – “He [who] is by nature invisible – 
forming a composite such that the patriarchs may say that although the outward form 
“was not God,” it is nevertheless “He Himself Who is seen, just as the thought itself is 
heard in the sound of the voice.” 
Augustine is thus clearly applying to the phenomenon of theophanies the same 
reasoning that he applies to the reality of eucharist; the fact that he would draw upon his 
sign theory of language to do so surely supplies license to view the two issues in 
parallel.  The essence of God transcends perception, but what is seen and heard is 
                                                       
606 nec mouere debet, quod, cum sit inuisibilis, saepe uisibiliter patribus apparuisse memoratur.  
sicut enim sonus, quo auditur sententia in silentio intellegentiae constituta, non est hoc quod 
ipsa: ita et species, qua uisus est deus in natura inuisibili constitutus, non erat quod ipse.  uerum 
tamen ipse in eadem specie corporali uidebatur, sicut illa sententia ipsa in sono uocis auditur; nec 
illi ignorabant inuisibilem deum in specie corporali, quod ipse non erat, se uidere (ibid. 10.13). 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nevertheless God manifested.  If we extend this reasoning from theophanies to eucharist, 
the visible sacrifice offered daily by the Church is Christ without actually being Christ in 
essence; that is, to borrow the language from Augustine, though the bodily form is not 
Christ, it is Christ himself who is seen.  The eucharist mediates Christ’s sacrifice such 
that it is no less real or present for being mediated, just as the spoken word expresses and 
transmits the thought to which it gives voice in a manner that excludes its diminution. 
The eucharist, then, is conceived by Augustine as a visible sign that mediates a 
substantial incorporeal reality.  That Augustine would develop a sign theory built 
around a notion of “inner word” – the unexpressed, unvoiced, incorporeal reality that 
precedes physical utterance – and that he would apply it both to theophanies as 
perceptible and real mediation of God, and to the eucharist as the “sign” of the Church’s 
sacrifice, suggests strongly that he views the eucharist as a materially mediated 
encounter with the incorporeal Word of God.  This conclusion is supported by the fact 
that such reasoning underpins the incarnation itself, where Augustinian Christology 
regards Christ as ideal material mediator because of the perfect assimilation of his own 
rational soul to the Logos.  The body of Christ itself transparently mediates the 
incorporeal Logos.  Given the investment of Augustine’s theory in the idea of an “inner 
word,” likely shaped by his meditation on the incorporeal Logos, we might conclude that 
the eucharistic bread, as a sign, is an expressed word giving voice to an “inner word” 
that is the inner Word, and that it may therefore be understood as an encounter with the 
very Logos of God, who heals the wounded rational souls of men through the mediation 
of an embodied encounter.  To believe that this is so requires only that we assent to the 
proposition that Augustine, in a manner akin to Origen, believes that the “bread of life,” 
conceived in parallel to the incarnation (“I am the bread….”) may be conceptualized in 
accordance with a theory of sign that actually effects the soul’s purifying access to the 
healing Logos, a process whose end is described in terms of the participation of believers 
in the life of the eternal, risen Christ. 
As noted at the outset, where Iamblichean theurgy supplies symbola as the 
mediating mechanisms enabling the soul’s participation in the logoi disseminated 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through reality by creative work of the Demiurge, Christian sacrament, shaded with this 
outlook, invokes the eucharistic sign as an mediating mechanism enabling an inward 
encounter with the Logos itself, effecting purification and enabling the re‑constitution of 
the human soul in conformity with the soul of Christ, uniquely expressive of the divine 
Logos.  It goes without saying that Augustine can afford no open endorsement of 
theurgy, since it is the business of this portion of On the City of God to reject it,  but it is 
also plain that despite his vigorous denunciations, and his attempt at a thorough 
draining of the language of signum / sacramentum and sacrificium of all but allegorical,  
spiritualized content, he nevertheless quietly insinuates shades of meaning for signum 
that stand in parallel to Iamblichus’ theory of symbolon, and appropriates the very 
categories of mediation that he depopulates of Platonic daemons, collapsing mediation 
into the work of a single divine agency.  All of which suggests powerfully that 
Augustine in some measure dissembles his borrowing of a theory of cult from the very 
parties whom he condemns, a system of mediations that allow for a materially mediated 
repatriation of the soul.
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
 
The present study has attempted to hold together two often competing scholarly 
interests, one in Christian rhetoric and the other in Christian thought.  These two 
concerns are often in competition because a rhetoric that asserts difference and distinct 
identity can easily occlude the substantive appropriations that Christian thinkers make, 
since its very purpose is to conceal those appropriations from pagan opponents.  The 
task of properly grasping the mutual engagement of pagan and Christian thought can 
thus give rise to difficulties that are not always resolved in modern scholarship, since 
many modern approaches have often developed from a principle of isolating a “unique” 
Christianity from an ambient pagan world.  
The fact remains, however, that even if we grant the necessity of regarding the 
intellectual culture of the ancient Mediterranean as common to both pagan and 
Christian, and rightly seek evidence for the lateral transmission of ideas – rather than 
adhering to approaches that isolate Christianity – we must nevertheless confront 
thinkers of the third and fourth centuries in terms of a narrative of lineage.  The 
necessary qualification is simply that lineages must not be conceived as exclusive.  
Christians do not influence only Christians any more than pagans influence only pagans.  
Origen, as we have seen, was part of an Alexandrian intellectual elite, standing in a 
tradition with Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus as an heir to the philosophical circle 
of Ammonius Saccas, whose school mediates much of Neopythagorean Middle 
Platonism into later antiquity.  It is therefore unsurprising that that we can see Origen 
and Iamblichus’ views on metaphysical first principles, the problem of material 
embodiment, and material mediation of incorporeal principles as derived from 
ultimately kindred sources.  As we look to later periods, Augustine’s thought suggests 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strongly that such questions have a vital afterlife.  As an aggressive participant in the 
continuing dispute over theurgy, Augustine exploits Porphyry’s ambivalence over the 
matter, embracing the latter’s skepticism as grounds for asserting the superiority of 
Christianity as a system of mediation – as a via universalis.  Iamblichus, Origen and 
Augustine, then, can be seen as not only men of elite education and Platonist orientation, 
but as direct participants in the very same debate – with Porphyry’s anxiety over 
theurgy serving as something of a tangible link between them.  Under such a 
construction, Origen and Augustine are distinguished from Iamblichus principally by 
the Christian need to displace all mediated principles with the one principle of the Logos, 
and by a dissembling rhetoric that enables their retention of core theurgic principles 
while rejecting particular theurgic hierarchies and rites. 
The main preoccupation that lies behind such an intellectual culture and its 
various lineages is with Plato.  Chapter III begins with the assumption that Iamblichus’ 
development of a philosophically grounded theurgy is in part a response to perceived 
deficiencies in the Platonism of his day.  From this premise, he develops his resistance to 
such claims as the “undescended” soul, and an articulation of a distinctive cosmology, in 
which the material cosmos is reconceived in more monist terms, to account for its 
capacity to mediate the fallen soul’s repatriation.  Through a Neopythagorean 
metaphysics, he affirms the goodness of material reality as a manifestation of eternal 
cosmic proportions, thereby resolving the Platonic tradition’s ambivalence over the 
soul’s relation to matter, and asserting matter as both disorienting hindrance and 
necessary instrument.  From this theoretical basis, he claims that the theurgically re‑
oriented soul participates in the demiurgic organization of the material cosmos through 
cult that properly aligns it with the demiurge’s daemonic functionaries, whose role is to 
“create” the material cosmos through the dissemination of formal principles.  The 
Iamblichean theory of the symbolon reflects just this kind of outlook, and posits that the 
truly initiated philosopher knows the secrets of cosmic creation, expressed in terms of 
symbola – the arcane signs and imprints dispersed through material nature that as the 
theurgist’s portal to the invisible demiurgic world of gods and daemons. 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Since Origen employs this very language of “symbolon” in a context that 
emphatically rejects pagan cult, Iamblichus’ explanations of these symbola – though 
chronologically later – may be crucial to understanding the links connecting Christian 
thinkers like Origen with a theurgic worldview – links that are the more enticing 
precisely because figures like Origen and Augustine rhetorically dissimulate their own 
embrace of such language and thought.  When we consider further the philosophical 
preoccupations that are shared between Origen and Iamblichus, as Chapter IV 
undertakes to show, such claims for kinship in the matter of symbola become better 
grounded.  In a manner similar to Iamblichus, Origen resists dualism in favor of a more 
ambivalent embrace of material reality’s potential.  Not unlike Iamblichus in his 
resistance to Porphyry, Origen undertakes to defend embodiment on traditional Platonic 
ground, accusing his interlocutor (Celsus) of failing to grasp the vindications of material 
reality that the Platonic tradition contains.  In light of his cosmology and spiritual 
anthropology – which constitute his Christian variant on the Platonic narrative of the fall 
of the soul into material being – it should occasion little surprise that for him, too, 
embodiment requires material cult as part of a remedy.  Given such a necessity, it 
should likewise not surprise us that Origen is pressed to jettison much of the pagan 
apparatus of mediation – the daemons who find a legitimate place in Iamblichus’ system 
– as preparation for introducing the incarnate Logos who mediates divine life for all 
rational, embodied creatures, and whose rationale is continuous with theoretical 
justification of material sacrament, construed in terms of symbolon.  Quite simply, Origen 
replaces traditional religious forms with a Christian variant, parallel in its 
conceptualization, but conceived as an extension of the incarnation of the Logos, whose 
mediation thoroughly replaces that of gods and daemons in the pagan pantheon.   
Augustine, as I have argued, may be reasonably be included in the argument on 
account of his preoccupation with the same set of problems, evidenced principally by his 
direct engagement with Iamblichus’ interlocutor, Porphyry, and by his use of rhetorical 
dissimulation akin to Origen’s to disguise his borrowings.  As a latecomer to the 
conversation, Augustine, too, must confront the question of theurgy and daemonically 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mediated cult as systems that claim to effect the soul’s remedy and ascent.  
Unsurprisingly, his arguments in On the City of God follow trajectories similar to 
Origen’s account.  Like Origen, Augustine must resist a dualist tendency, eventually 
embracing a view of matter as a neutral medium enabling the soul’s contact with a 
divine principium, the Neoplatonic nous reconceived as the incarnate Logos.  Since the 
Logos has become intimately available in the Christian system, he must – again like 
Origen – dismiss traditional, pagan hierarchies of gods and daemons along with the 
widely dispersed principles that they are thought to mediate, relegating them rather to 
the categories of magic and theurgy, which consist entirely of empty material 
contrivances that only entrap the soul in the material world.  In a more detailed account 
than Origen supplies, he replaces theurgic / daemonic models of mediation – as 
exemplified in the arguments of Apuleius – with a Christian model that is conspicuously 
adapted to the very structure of mediation that informs Apuleius’ account, and that 
depends on a claim for the incarnate Logos as a superior mediator, a gesture that makes 
Christ the precise remedy for the defects identified in the Apuleian system.   
While Augustine’s engagement with theurgy is naturally more direct, his 
appropriations are nevertheless as artful as Origen’s, replicating the latter’s tactic of 
directly insinuating eucharist into a conceptual framework prepared by paganism.  But 
unlike Origen, rather than straightforwardly appropriating the language of symbolon, 
Augustine applies his own sign‑theory of language as a model for explaining cult 
mediation, developing the idea that a tangible sacramental signum can mediate the work 
of the Logos in the sacrifice of Christ.  Somewhat more skillfully than Origen, Augustine 
initially obscures this point by rhetorically distancing Christian rites from their pagan 
counterparts by emphasizing the literary function of the term signum, making biblical 
narratives of sacrifice mere signa of inner spiritual dispositions, and thus quarantining 
the term from magic and theurgy; however, as Augustine applies his sign‑theory of 
language as an explanation of the eucharist, he makes clear that for him the eucharist is a 
visible “sign” that conveys in a substantial way the content of the church’s invisible 
“sacrifice” [sacrificium] to participating believers – in the same manner that a material 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“word” bears the substance of a thought.  Augustine’s engagement with theurgy, then, 
may be observed to commence from a dualist rejection of matter and daemonic rites, and 
to proceed to an embrace of material mediation in which pagan rites are furtively 
displaced by Christian practice whose defining difference is the mediated principle, the 
incarnate Logos, whose efficacy through ritual is described in terms of a theory of sign.  
Augustine’s approach thus preserves an idea of material reality as a mediator of 
transcendent principle, which creates conceptual space for an incarnate Word and 
material rituals whose “signification” is coterminous with their effects.  
In the end, when we scrutinize what is essentially theurgic in the thought of 
Origen and Augustine, we recognize that both thinkers, in surprisingly similar ways, 
construct provisional systems of Christian sacramental mediation, informed by a 
theology of the incarnate Logos, and conceptually parallel to the pagan and theurgic 
systems of mediation that their rhetorical approach rejects. 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